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Abstract 
 
Calls for greater public participation in the policy process have become a commonplace in 
contemporary governance, advocated across the political spectrum. Part of what makes 
participation beguiling is that it can take many meanings. This thesis investigates those 
meanings and their implications for how to do participatory policy-making. It outlines an 
innovative new typology of four modes of public participation in social policy decisions. 
The four modes – labelled: knowledge transfer, collective decision-making, choice and 
voice, and arbitration and oversight – are each linked to different traditions in democratic 
and public administration theory. As such, they go beyond existing typologies of 
participation, which are either rooted in one, radical participatory, normative orientation, or 
abstracted from broader normative debates altogether. This typology is followed by an 
empirical study of the procedural preferences of 34 key informants involved with 
participation in health, housing, poverty, and social security policy in Britain. It combines 
a Q-method survey and qualitative interviews to provide a novel mix of quantitative and 
qualitative data on each person’s preference. The analysis demonstrates that the 
preferences of the majority of study participants mirror the knowledge transfer and 
collective decision-making modes of participation, with significant disagreements over the 
objectives of participation and how much power should be afforded to the public. The rich 
mixture of quantitative and qualitative data also enables a deeper exploration of the nature 
of procedural preferences than existing studies, which have primarily employed secondary 
data analysis of large-scale surveys. It establishes that there are not just differences 
between participants but deep ambivalences within participants’ preferences. The thesis 
then proposes a systems approach to participation in governance. It describes three 
functions that participation can serve in complex policy systems: effectiveness, autonomy 
and accountability. The four modes of participation are matched with the three functions, 
using examples from the English National Health Service (NHS) for further elucidation. 
This approach provides a framework for designing and assessing participatory policy-
making that takes account of the diversity of procedural preferences. 
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Chapter 1 
Social Policy, Vanguard of Democratisation 
 
The Big Society is a vision of a more engaged nation, one in which we take more 
responsibility for ourselves and our neighbours; communities working together, not 
depending on remote and impersonal bureaucracies. 
Conservative Party Manifesto, 2015 
 
We have a shared ambition to clean up Westminster and a determination to oversee 
a radical redistribution of power away from Westminster and Whitehall to councils, 
communities and homes across the nation. Wherever possible, we want people to 
call the shots over the decisions that affect their lives. 
David Cameron and Nick Clegg, Coalition Programme for Government, 2010  
 
We will devolve more power to local authorities and local communities, giving 
people real power over the issues that matter most to them. 
Labour Party Manifesto, 2005 
 
 
1.1 Why Participation? 
The vision of a more participatory politics and society is now a commonplace in the 
rhetoric of UK Government. Each of the last three governments have made greater 
opportunities to participate a feature of their offer to the electorate. Despite the Coalition 
Government (2010-15) presenting their commitment to redistribute power as “a turning 
point in the relationship between government and people – the beginning of a new chapter 
in our democratic history” (HM Government 2010, 4), their rhetoric is almost identical to 
that of the preceding administration (see above). The New Labour Government legislated 
for a ‘Duty to Consult’ in 1999, and later a stronger ‘Duty to Involve’ in 2009, which 
applied to all English councils and other local governmental bodies. Citizen participation 
in some form was embedded in a number of its flagship policy reforms including Sure 
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Start, the New Deal for Communities and the creation of NHS Foundation Trusts. 
Similarly, the devolved government of Scotland has made participation one of the four 
pillars of the ‘Scottish Approach’ to public services following the 2011 Christie 
Commission on public service reform. As the need for greater participation in the face of 
democratic malaise has become a shibboleth of UK politics, advocated across the political 
spectrum, the notion of the active, participating citizen has become an everyday feature of 
the landscape of governance in the UK. This notion has been used as a justification for a 
plethora of policy prescriptions, from the marketisation of health and education through the 
expansion of choice in public services, to experiments with deliberative forms of policy-
making such as the National Institute of Clinical Excellence's (NICE) Citizens Council and 
the participatory budgeting processes that are increasingly employed by local authorities 
throughout England.  
Interest in participation has not been confined to the UK. Indeed the UK is arguably 
one of the laggards in the trend towards more participatory governance. It is a defining 
feature of radical left-wing, Latin American governments from Brazil to Venezuela, it is 
advocated by the econocrats of the World Bank as a central tenet of their development 
programmes, and is an aspiration for radical social movements such as Occupy and Spain’s 
15M movement. This participatory fervour is perhaps best typified by the rise and rise of 
participatory budgeting. Participatory budgeting began in one Brazilian municipality, Porto 
Alegre, in 1989 but by 2010 had spread to almost 1500 locations across five continents 
(Sintomer et al. 2012), and has continued to grow since. 
Participation is arguably a foundational concept of political organisation. It pertains 
to what Geuss (2008) has claimed is the first question that political theory should ask of 
real politics: who does (or is able to do) what to whom for whose benefit? Participation is 
about who governs, who is governed, and the relationship between the two. Accordingly, 
every theory of democratic governance needs a conception of the role of the citizen in the 
process of governing, even if, like Schumpeter (1976), it is only to restrict it to the minimal 
role of voting in elections. It is no surprise, therefore, to find the rise in support for more 
participatory politics and policy attributed to a range of very different political traditions.   
The rise in initiatives for citizen participation has occurred concurrently with the 
deliberative 'turn' or 'revival' in democratic theory (Dryzek 2000; Elster 1998). Some of the 
most important political theorists of the last decades, such as John Rawls and Jurgen 
Habermas, have described themselves as deliberative democrats, and focused their 
attention on legitimate processes for political decision-making. Habermas’ contention that 
11 
 
the legitimate settling of political questions depends upon the complete and equal inclusion 
of all affected parties in institutionalised practices of rational public debate (Habermas 
1992, 448–49) has held particular sway over notions of citizen participation. Wainright 
(2003) also notes the influence of a longer tradition of participatory democracy that grew 
out of the radical social movements of the Sixties and Seventies and has since been 
promulgated by the ‘participatory left’. Given that broad citizen participation is the kernel 
of participatory and deliberative forms of democracy, it is little surprise to find a radical 
democratic agenda at the heart of the canon in this field. Arnstein's (1969) influential 
ladder of citizen participation, for instance, categorises forms of participation with the eye 
of a radical democratic activist and Fung describes his proposals for 'empowered 
participation' as “a third path of reform that takes its inspiration from the traditions of civic 
engagement and participatory democracy rather than public-management techniques or 
competitive markets” (2004, 9). 
The alternative paths to participation, noted by Fung, and often advocated more 
from the right of the political spectrum, have also had their influence on the increase in 
participatory policy-making. The legitimacy of decision-making by elite bureaucracies was 
eroded by the neo-liberal challenge to the democratic socialism that animated many of the 
architects of the welfare state (Le Grand 2003). New Public Management has frequently 
been cited as a driver of increased consumer participation in policy organisations 
(Parkinson 2004; Papadopoulos and Warin 2007; R. Rowe and Shepherd 2002). In 
addition, there has been a revival in Conservative localism that Ryder (2015) traces back to 
Nozick’s libertarian vision for a localist utopia and Wainright (2003) credits to 
communitarianism, with its focus on community self-reliance. 
These different approaches to and understandings of participation are not limited to 
theoretical debates amongst academics. They are prevalent in real world politics and can be 
observed in the different phraseology of the manifesto extracts at the beginning of this 
chapter. The earliest extract, from the Labour manifesto, employs the trope of people 
power and draws on ideas of a more participatory democracy. The Coalition similarly 
employ the people power trope but couch this in a more populist anti-politics. The most 
recent Conservative manifesto takes a wholly different approach and promotes the 
communitarian idea that citizens need to take responsibility for their communities. The 
notion of redistributing power has vanished. A number of studies have also noted the 
variety of influences on how participation has been practiced, for instance: Martin (2008) 
identifies democratic and technocratic rationales behind participation; Parkinson (2004) 
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draws attention to the competition between new public management and deliberative 
democratic imperatives driving deliberative reforms; Papadopoulous and Warin (2007) 
also note the influence of new public management and various radical democratic ideas, as 
well as adding a third influence with the notion of a collaborative governance approach to 
participatory policy; Abelson et al. (2003) refer to the governance approach, the 
deliberative democratic approach and a neo-liberal, consumerist influence; and Barnes, 
Newman and Sullivan (2007) outline four official discourses of the public – consumer, 
empowered, responsible, stakeholder - as well as pressure for inclusive democracy from 
outside the state. 
The breadth of the advocates for public participation, the precipitating ideological 
influences, and its policy applications, point to the tension behind the apparent consensus 
in favour of citizen participation. Compare, for instance, the empowered self-interest of the 
neo-liberal, consumer-citizen with the other-oriented, reasoning-citizen of deliberative 
democracy and it is clear that, while both philosophies may be animated by a notion of the 
participating citizen, they are different, seemingly incompatible, notions. Participation – 
like justice, liberty, or fairness – is a polysemous concept that can be constructed in 
multiple ways. Edelman wrote close to forty years ago of participation’s “symbolic 
potency and semantic hollowness” (1977, 120), yet; compared with other similarly slippery 
terms like liberty, there have been few attempts to systematically examine the many ways 
we fill the semantic void when we use the term participation. The studies detailed above 
have primarily noted the different influences on participation in an ad hoc fashion, as a 
tangential component of their broader study. The variability between the different studies 
points to the limitations of their conceptual categorisations. It is not difficult to use one of 
the studies to unpick the categorisations of the others. Papadoupolous and Warin's (2007) 
elaboration of the different types of participation entailed by participatory and deliberative 
democratic principles undermines the notion that there is a single, unified democratic 
impulse driving public participation in the policy process. Likewise, the presentation by 
Barnes, Newman and Sullivan (2007) of four official discourses of participation questions 
the extent to which there is a single, coherent 'governance' perspective, or administrative 
perspective, within state institutions. 
There has also been a tendency from a radical democratic perspective to engage in 
a project of classifying what is ‘authentic participation’ according to the principles of 
participatory democracy, whilst discounting those forms of participation that do not fit 
with these normative precepts as not quite legitimate, even a betrayal of the true principles 
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of participation. Pearce, for instance, posits the idea of participatory democracy, “based on 
principles of popular sovereignty and direct involvement of all citizens, including and 
especially the poorest, in decision making”, in contrast to its debased form of participatory 
governance, with its “appropriation by mainstream institutions of discourses and concepts 
(among them participation) expressing emancipatory hopes and turning them into new 
'tyrannies'” (2010, 15). In a plural society with multiple competing value orientations, it is 
of some, but only limited, worth to know that state-led participatory initiatives rarely live 
up to participatory democratic ideals. Previous work of this author showing that official 
evaluations of deliberative initiatives in the UK pay scant regard to principles of 
deliberative democracy (R. Dean 2012), as well as Barnes, Newman and Sullivan (2007) 
locating pressures for inclusive democracy outside the state and in contradistinction to their 
four official discourses of participation, suggests that rather than practising a debased form 
of deliberative or participatory democracy, official interest in increased public participation 
is often due to commitment to other competing normative propositions. In order to 
understand these initiatives it would be more instructive to analyse them in the light of 
what they are intended to achieve and why their propagators view them as legitimate, 
viable approaches to participation. 
While radical democrats acknowledge other approaches to participation but dismiss 
them, advocates of more neo-liberal forms of participation show little awareness of other 
alternatives. Armed with an alternative nomenclature of consumer choice and voice (Le 
Grand 2008), their focus is on how citizens can participate as consumers, primarily through 
choosing which services to use or refrain from using and providing customer feedback 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Le Grand 2008). Although there is scope for the notion of 
voice to encompass radical democratic ideas, it is usually conceived of in depoliticised, 
consumerist form; in the words of the President of the World Bank, Jim Yong Kim (2013), 
“Citizen voice can be pivotal in providing the demand-side pressure on government, 
service providers, and organizations such as the World Bank that is needed to encourage 
full and swift response to citizen needs.” This lack of engagement between advocates of 
participation across ideological divides also inhibits the exploration of hybrid forms or 
combinations of participation that may strengthen each other. 
The polysemy of participation is part of what makes it beguiling. Its flexibility 
means it is adaptable to a range of political contexts. Its vagueness enables people with 
quite different worldviews to coalesce around a common project. Nonetheless, the lack of a 
thorough understanding of the competing logics that drive participatory innovation 
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hampers our understanding of current practices and the possibilities for future 
development. In 1989 the democratic scholar Robert Dahl wrote: 
The theory and practices of modern democracy have resulted not only 
from the legacy of popular government in ancient city states but also from 
other historical experiences, both evolutionary and revolutionary, they are 
an amalgam of elements that do not fully cohere. As a result contemporary 
democratic theory and practice exhibit inconsistencies and contradictions 
that sometimes result in deep problems. (1989, 13) 
In the intervening period there has been a great deal of democratic scholarship that has 
attempted to clarify the presuppositions behind alternative theories of the democratic state 
(Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009; Held 2006) and contribute to improving democratic 
institution building. The theory and practice of participation, however, still exhibits 
inconsistencies and contradictions that result in deep problems. It means that when we 
create opportunities to participate or when we decide to participate, we often do so with 
complex, even contradictory, assumptions about what participation means underpinning 
our decisions. This thesis will point to a number ways that a lack of appreciation for the 
different logics of participation results in muddled thinking or incompleteness, both in 
academic debates and in practice.  
The primary aim of the thesis is to provide an account of the different ways 
participation is understood, in the academic literature, the policy literature and amongst 
actors involved with participatory initiatives. It follows John Dewey’s advice that,  
It is not the business of political philosophy and science to determine what 
the state in general should or must be. What they may do is aid in the 
creation of methods such that experimentation may go on less blindly. 
(1926, 34)  
The thesis is not prescriptive about adopting one particular model of participation. It 
attempts to understand different approaches to participation from within the perspectives 
from which they are advocated. The objectives of the thesis are therefore principally 
analytical rather than normative. Providing an analytical account of alternative modes of 
participation - their rationales and practices, how they animate those involved with 
participatory initiatives, and what functions they serve in the broader political system – is 
intended to foster clarity in academic debates about how to classify and evaluate 
participatory policy-making. It is also intended to assist commissioners to be more clear-
sighted in their designs, potential participants to be more aware of what they are getting 
involved in, and critics to be more nuanced in their criticisms. The later parts of the thesis 
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do present some recommendations – chiefly Chapter 6, which proposes a pluralistic system 
of participation – but these arguments predominantly rest on pragmatic premises arising 
from the analytical insights of previous chapters. Overall then, the aim is to contribute to 
better quality participation in governance processes, but without prescribing what quality 
means from within a single normatively contentious perspective on participation.  
 
 
1.2 From ‘Participation in Democracy’ to ‘Participation in Governance’   
This thesis draws on democratic thinking, but it is not concerned with democracy as 
commonly conceived; the realm of politicians, political parties, voters and elections. It is 
about policy, bureaucracy, governance. Democratic theory still tends to view policy as a 
purely technocratic endeavour, a neutral translation of political input into policy output. 
Scholars of public administration have rarely shared the idea that political will is 
straightforwardly applied through administration. They have noted the extensive discretion 
of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1980) and how policy is prosecuted through networks 
of diverse stakeholders with differing capabilities to shape implementation to their interests 
(Boswell 2016). Some scholars have argued that, with the rise of the ‘network society’ 
(Castells 2000), the normative project of democracy has been supplanted by an alternative 
project for good governance (Bang and Esmark 2009). This shift has inverted the 
subservience of policy to politics, so that “the orientation of the political system [has 
switched] from politics before policy to policy before politics” (Bang and Esmark 2009, 
18). Whereas the politics-policy conception of the political system sees broad-based social 
interests and identities forged through the competition of electoral politics, represented by 
politicians and political parties and then implemented by bureaucracy, the policy-politics 
conception views publics as formed in relation to more specific policy issues, with social 
interests and identities shaped through investment in these policy projects. 
The politicisation of policy has been accompanied by a re-evaluation of ‘public 
encounters’, namely; the contacts between citizens and public officials (K. Bartels 2013). 
Though the vast majority of citizen interactions with the political system are through 
public encounters with officials as service users or clients, such encounters have 
traditionally been seen as problematic. The Weberian conception of bureaucracy in which 
officials were considered to be duty-bound to the impersonal application of specified rules, 
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meant public encounters were feared for their dangerous potential to create opportunities 
for clientilist actions or relationships impervious to democratic control. According to 
Bartels (2013) this conception has been challenged from three directions. First, the New 
Public Management, which critiques bureaucracy as inefficient and over-regulated, 
maintains that public encounters are valuable for enhancing the power of customers, and as 
a means to improve service quality. Second, the challenge from Critical Theory argues that 
administrators should not be seen as inhumane cogs in the political machine and stresses 
the necessity of re-founding the moral agency of public officials in their interactions with 
citizens. Third, participatory governance critiques impersonal bureaucracy for alienating 
citizens, disconnecting officials, and thus reducing the ability of the political system to 
effectively problem-solve. It calls for public encounters in spaces of shared decision-
making in order to find more effective policy solutions. The shift to policy-politics and the 
re-evaluation of public encounters should not be viewed as straightforward processes of 
depoliticisation, or the triumph of technocracy over democracy, but also as a process of 
politicisation and democratisation of policy and administration. The democratic theorist 
Mark Warren, for instance, claims policy and administration have now become the 
vanguard of democratisation, in a way that could prove to be “a transformation of 
democracy as dramatic and important as the rise of mass electoral democracy in the 
nineteenth century” (2009, 9).  
If actions within the realm of policy and administration are at the forefront of 
democratisation (Warren 2009) and “the principal force behind societal change” (Bang and 
Esmark 2009, 18), then it is in social policy that these changes have their deepest roots. 
Public participation has naturally been more prevalent in the quotidian policy domains than 
those that are more removed from citizens’ everyday existence, so we find attempts to 
democratise health, education, housing, policing, and welfare in ways that are not apparent 
in foreign, economic or industrial policy1. The practice of public participation in social 
policy design and service delivery has a longer history than scholars’ concern with a 
network society and network governance. In the UK, public and patient involvement 
through Community Health Councils was established as early as 1974 (since reorganised 
into Local Involvement Networks (LINKs), then again into their current form as 
Healthwatch). Similarly, social housing has a history of participation dating back to the 
                                                 
1 There have also been attempts to conduct environmental policy, science and technology policy, and arts 
policy in more a more participatory fashion, which do not fall within the confines of what is usually 
considered to be ‘social policy’ as an academic field. 
17 
 
1970s (Hague 1990), and there now exists an extensive architecture for tenant and 
community participation in housing, neighbourhood and regeneration policy. In both 
education and healthcare, the public has been encouraged to think of itself as consumers in 
a market for services, but also given opportunities to take up leadership roles as governors 
of schools and hospitals. Public participation in social security, poverty and social 
exclusion policy appears to be a newer phenomenon but is proliferating. Community 
involvement was embedded into large New Labour projects aimed at tackling social 
exclusion such as the New Deal for Communities and Sure Start. There was a National 
Pensions Debate in 2006, and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) has 
experimented with deliberative research exercises to inform benefits policies. There are 
also novel civil society initiatives like the Poverty Truth Commissions of Glasgow and 
Leeds and the Commission on Poverty, Participation and Power, all of which connect(ed) 
those experiencing poverty with those who make and deliver policy about poverty. 
It is the promise of participation to potentially reduce forms of social exclusion that 
has drawn most excitement in the field of social policy. Lack of political engagement has 
itself been defined as key component of social exclusion, with relationships to other forms 
of exclusion such as low income, low wealth, lack of productive activity and social 
isolation (Burchardt, Le Grand, and Piachaud 1999; Levitas et al. 2007). Political inclusion 
through participation has been advocated as a means for realising inclusive citizenship that 
gives a voice to those usually excluded from making the decisions that affect them (Lister 
2002; Lister 2007; Beresford and Hoban 2005). In addition, participatory spaces have been 
championed as arenas for ‘a politics of needs interpretation’, where people can negotiate 
their social rights (H. Dean 2013).  
The success of participation in actually reducing exclusion and tackling inequalities 
is, however, somewhat mixed. At the level of individual participatory projects, there have 
undoubtedly been some successes that have resulted in more inclusive policy-making and 
better outcomes for previously disadvantaged groups (Fung 2004; 2015). Still, for some 
projects it is difficult to identify whether there has been any impact on policy at all (del 
Tufo and Gaster 2002; Kashefi and Keene 2008). They have commonly resulted in 
frustration, dissatisfaction and powerlessness for citizens, as their concerns are outweighed 
by other institutional imperatives (Newman et al. 2004; Martin 2011). If participatory 
inputs fail to influence policy outputs then it is unlikely they will address the more difficult 
issue of inequalities in policy outcomes. At the macro-level, it has been remarkably 
difficult to uncover large-scale impacts. The growth of participatory policy-making and 
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other participatory democratic initiatives has been accompanied by growing inequalities in 
wealth and income, and there have been concerns that much participation at best 
reproduces existing inequalities and at worst exacerbates them (Lowndes, Pratchett, and 
Stoker 1998; 2001; Walker, McQuarrie, and Lee 2015). Participatory innovations in 
legislative politics, which have received more sustained evaluation have shown similarly 
mixed effects (G. Smith 2009). Touchton and Wampler (2014) have documented how 
participatory budgeting in Brazilian cities has been linked to increased provision for the 
problems of the poor, as well as improved health inputs and outputs. In contrast, direct 
legislation through citizens’ initiatives and referenda have a well-established bias towards 
those with resources (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004). 
The study of participation in governance processes remains in need of greater 
attention from within the field of social policy for two primary reasons. First, if social 
policy has become the primary locus of democratisation, this has not been matched by a 
concomitant increase in social policy research on this topic. There is an opportunity for the 
field of social policy to greatly contribute to these debates. In thinking about participation 
in governance from the perspective of social policy, this thesis aims to ensure that 
inappropriate theories and concepts, such as the notion that policy is simply a neutral 
process of technocratic translation, are not uncritically adopted in the field of democratic 
innovation.  To paraphrase Foucault (2004), social policies are not born of nature, they are 
born of real battles; poverty and social exclusion are the results of actual social processes 
of politics and policy-making. The shift from politics-policy to policy-politics means these 
battles increasingly take place within the policy process, and thus a policy-oriented 
perspective is necessary to fully understand them.  
The second reason is that if these battles increasingly take place within the policy 
process then, despite the mixed results to date, new forms of participation in policy-making 
retain their promise for addressing a core agenda of social policy research: the wicked 
problem of persisting inequalities in the access to, and benefits from, social goods such as 
healthcare, education and housing. These forms of participation take on greater importance 
in the face of mounting evidence, at least from the US, that representative democracy has 
been captured by the affluent and takes little account of the concerns of the median or 
disadvantaged voter (Gilens 2014; Gilens and Page 2014; L. M. Bartels 2010). The 
Habermasian two-track conception of the political system in which a free-wheeling public 
sphere generates communicative power that informs but is separated from the sites of 
administrative power is inadequate. JS Mill founded the superiority of democracy partly on 
19 
 
the principle that “the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from 
being disregarded when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed to 
stand up for them” (1861, 65). The politicisation of the policy process should entail its 
democratisation. Citizens, particularly those on the margins, can only stand up for 
themselves if they are involved in the policy battles that characterise the interpretation of 
democratic will into concrete policy outputs. Fung has argued, 
Advancing social justice through participatory governance is a nontrivial 
achievement. It requires at least two necessary conditions. First, reform 
champions must simultaneously seek both greater public engagement and 
greater equality. Second, champions must have the imagination and 
resourcefulness to design and implement participatory institutions that 
work. (2015, 519) 
In providing a framework for understanding the different ways that participation has been 
used in social policy and what these different modes of participation can feasibly achieve, 
the thesis will contribute to Fung’s second condition for participatory social policy to 
advance social justice. It can assist designers of, and participants in, participatory 
governance with the imagination and resourcefulness to make participation work. 
 
 
1.3 Defining the Object of Study 
Participation in governance can cover a broad set of phenomena, so it is important 
to more specifically define the object of study. For the purposes of this research project 
participation is characterised as ‘institutionalised public participation in social policy 
decision-making’. Each component of this characterisation is quite broadly conceived, 
though it also entails important exclusions. Participation in ‘decision-making’ is 
interpreted as a means by which the public can influence or take policy decisions. The 
research does not explore participation as a form of co-production, in which citizens are 
directly involved with the provision of public services (Bovaird 2007; Whitaker 1980; 
Alford 1998). As a form of ‘institutionalised’ decision-making there must be a connection 
to the body or network with the authoritative power to realise any decision that results 
from the participation, which is analogous to what Warren (2009) calls ‘governance-driven 
democratisation’. Though institutionalised it covers both weak publics that only have 
advisory influence and strong publics that encompass decision-making (Fraser 1990). It 
tends to be elite-driven, and thus is more characterised by ‘invited’ than ‘claimed’ 
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participatory spaces (Gaventa 2006). Nonetheless, the tendency of spaces for participation 
in governance to be state-created does not make them impervious to bottom-up claims. As 
shall be demonstrated, invited spaces can be designed with more or less flexibility for the 
participants to negotiate the conditions of the space. Furthermore, there is always the 
potential for participants to subvert the conditions of their invitation, and invited spaces 
may themselves have been created in response to bottom-up demands (Cornwall and 
Coelho 2007). The ‘institutionalisation’ condition does however point to another important 
exclusion from this research. This thesis does not attempt to account for participation in 
civil society actions such as protest and campaigning, which is only alluded to when it can 
illuminate the discussion of more institutionalised participation. These exclusions are not 
intended to signify that participation in decision-making is more important than protest or 
co-production, a well-functioning political system would contain possibilities for all three. 
They simply fall outside of the scope of this research.    
Defining what is meant by the ‘public’ in public participation is somewhat 
complex. If we take seriously the idea that a public does not exist independently waiting to 
express itself or be represented, but is constituted through the process of participating 
(Mahony, Newman, and Barnett 2010; Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan 2007), then we have 
to countenance that to a large extent it resists a concise pre-definition. Barnes, Newman 
and Sullivan (2007) have documented the multiple ways that publics are differently 
constituted through different participatory exercises, so to define what constitutes the 
public would be in some sense to pre-judge the question this thesis poses, that of what 
constitutes participation in social policy decision-making. As a working definition, for the 
purposes of this thesis ‘public participation’ refers to instances in which individuals engage 
in the policy process as: 1) citizens2 or service users on 2) matters of public concern. The 
definition thus has two parts; the first relating to the type of role the participant takes on, 
and the second relating to the type of issue. Nonetheless, neither part should be interpreted 
too rigidly as the boundaries of both are open to question.  
On the type of role, to participate as a member of the public or a citizen is to do so 
without specialist status as a result of one’s technical expertise, for example; I may be an 
engineer and bring to a participatory initiative the benefits and perspectives of being an 
                                                 
2 The term citizen participation is used interchangeably with public participation throughout this thesis. 
Citizen is used in an inclusive way to refer to anyone who is a part of and could thus be said to have a 
legitimate claim to be affected by the decisions and policies of a community. It is not intended to signify a 
person’s legal standing within a nation state. 
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engineer, but would not be participating in a formal capacity as an engineer. Service-users 
are, however, often involved explicitly because of their specialist knowledge of their 
condition or service provision, and the focus on representativeness in some participatory 
exercises is often related to an assumption that people with different identities possess 
different perspectives, namely; one is implicitly asked to participate as a woman, or as an 
Asian.  
On the type of issue, feminist theory has similarly taught us that we should always 
question any tight definition of what is a public and what is a private matter. It is far from 
simple to draw a neat dividing line between participation as a private individual and 
participation on matters of public concern. There has, for instance been a movement to 
give patients much greater influence over decisions about their own healthcare, which at-
first-glance could be clearly demarcated from participation on matters of public concern. 
Processes of citizen redress, which provide avenues for people to challenge public services 
when they receive unfair or poor treatment through complaints, appeals and tribunals, 
would also appear to fall outside of the definition of ‘participation on matters of public 
concern’. Nonetheless, greater patient choice and voice has been explicitly advocated for 
its proclaimed beneficial systemic effects in improving the performance of public services 
(Le Grand 2003; 2008), as has citizen redress (Dunleavy et al. 2005). Moreover, citizens 
often use individualised processes of redress for public ends, to try to prevent repeated 
failures or challenge policies that impact on a wider population, and redress feeds into 
broader processes of policy oversight by ombudspersons and regulators. Determining the 
boundaries for what counts as public participation is thus more art than science. Part of the 
aim of this thesis, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, is to problematize what have commonly 
been taken to be the boundaries of public participation and make the case for a more 
capacious definition that takes account of these complexities.  
Social policy as a field of enquiry also has fuzzy boundaries. In its broadest 
definition social policy is simply the study of the ways that social relations can be 
organised in the service of human well-being (H. Dean 2012). Here it is used in a more 
restricted sense, as a signifier for a set of policy domains that have occasioned the 
collective provision of social goods, with a particular focus on health policy, housing and 
neighbourhood policy, poverty, social exclusion and social security policy. This focus on 
policy comes at the expense of a consideration of participation in electoral politics. The 
emphasis is on the type of public encounters detailed above, between citizens and officials 
as opposed to citizens and politicians. The thesis is about participation in policy 
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organisations that often have no or only weak links to the legislature, rather than political 
organisations and arenas such as political parties and parliaments. This includes but is not 
limited to the central state bureaucracies that do still retain their connection to legislative 
politics. With the agencification of the state capacity (Moynihan 2006; Christensen and 
Lægreid 2006), as well as its fragmentation into policy networks (Rhodes 2007; Sørensen 
and Torfing 2005), there are an increased number of policy organisations that require 
public participation precisely because their weak democratic anchorage calls into question 
their legitimacy to make and/or implement public decisions.  
There is a final important exclusion that is more related to the approach to the 
object of study rather than the definition of the object itself. There is considerable 
scepticism about the practice of participation and how it can be abused, for example; in 
order to legitimate a decision that has already been taken elsewhere, to manipulate public 
opinion, or shift blame for difficult decisions (Martin 2008; Papadopoulos and Warin 
2007; G. Rowe and Frewer 2000; Pearce 2010; Arnstein 1969; Pretty 1995; Lee, 
McQuarrie, and Walker 2015). An understanding of the different abuses of participation is 
of undoubted importance for analysing real world practices. Nevertheless, since this thesis 
is concerned with competing understandings of what might reasonably argued to be 
legitimate forms of participation, in which those involved could be said to be engaged on 
genuine terms, it does not give much consideration to egregious examples of democracy-
washing, in which participation is abused in order to create the veneer of legitimacy. There 
is also something to be said for not rushing to make normative judgements about 
participatory activities, which rarely straightforwardly empower citizens as opposed to 
drawing them into alternative modes of governing comprising new relationships of power 
(Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan 2007). What is considered legitimate and illegitimate of 
course depends upon the normative assumptions that underpin one’s own view, as noted 
above in the discussion of the radical democratic project to define authentic participation. 
A more normatively plural understanding of participatory practices could assist the 
analysis of when participation is actually disingenuous and when it only diverges from 
one’s own normative preferences but is genuine from within an alternative perspective.        
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1.4 Thesis Structure and Narrative 
The aim of this thesis is not to make a case for or against participation in general, 
nor to advocate for one particular approach to participation. Given the plurality of political 
values in complex contemporary societies, these are questions that are better left to real 
political debates that take account of the specificity of context. It instead aims to unravel 
what could be considered plausible alternatives for how to make policy-making more 
participatory. In order to do so it draws on an eclectic range of sources. Though it is not 
purely an exercise in ideal theory, it employs ideal theories of democracy and public 
administration in order to establish alternative rationales for participation and their 
associated practices. It does not, however, derive its answers wholesale from theoretical 
precepts. The democratic and public administration theory is supplemented with an 
analysis of the grey literature on participation, for instance the guides on how to do and 
how to evaluate public participation that are commonly produced by government agencies 
and civil society organisations. This is also accompanied with an examination of actual 
examples of participatory social policy and the values that they embody, along with some 
original empirical research that investigates the participation preferences of those involved 
with participatory social policy initiatives in the UK. The empirical research, which forms 
the basis of Chapters 4 and 5, is restricted to the UK, but the theoretical work (primarily 
Chapters 3 and 6) draws on wider traditions and means that the thesis as a whole has 
broader applicability. The different elements of this approach and how they fit together, 
along with what kind of inferences it enables, are described in Chapter 2, which outlines 
the research design.   
Typologies of participation mechanisms are the first subject of analysis. Existing 
typologies have been particularly bad at recognising the normative plurality that can be 
observed in our political and policy institutions and that has informed approaches to 
participation in governance. Mostly they take one of two approaches. They categorise 
participatory mechanisms from worst to best according to a radical participatory world 
view, an approach Bishop and Davis (2002) have called the continuum model and of which 
Arnstein’s (1969) ladder is the most prominent example. Alternatively, they categorise by 
institutional design features, such as how participants are selected, without reference to the 
principles that underpin such designs (Fung 2006; G. Rowe and Frewer 2005). Chapter 3 
presents an answer to the question of whether there are a range a coherent approaches to 
participation with alternative normative underpinnings. It gives an overview of existing 
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typologies and their problems, before outlining a new typology of four modes of 
participation. These four modes - which are termed knowledge transfer, collective 
decision-making, choice and voice, and arbitration and oversight – comprise a set of 
practices associated with specific rationales for participation. These rationales are situated 
in distinct theories of democracy and public administration, the ways that they have 
defined the relationship between citizen and state, the problems of governing and their 
concomitant deficits. The typology is a challenge to the continuum model in that it 
highlights how this approach takes certain normatively contentious assumptions and 
presents them as if they are universal features of participation. It is not, however, intended 
to replace the typologies of mechanisms by institutional design features. It is best used in 
conjunction with them in order to comprehend which types of participation might best suit 
different contexts, as well as why the same participation mechanism is often deployed in 
quite different ways. 
The middle part of the thesis reflects on the empirical component of the research, 
which combined a Q-method survey with unstructured interviews to explore procedural 
preferences for participation in social policy decision-making. Chapter 4 employs this data 
in tackling the question of whether the participation preferences of those involved with 
participatory policy-making initiatives reflect the four modes of participation proposed in 
Chapter 3. This is important since other similar studies have demonstrated that the 
conceptual categories that prevail in the academy do not always translate to a broader 
population (Dryzek and Berejikian 1993; Skelcher, Sullivan, and Jeffares 2013). It is 
primarily structured around results of the Q-method survey and what they can tell us 
regarding participants’ beliefs about the objectives of participation and appropriate roles 
for citizens and officials, as well as how participation should be practiced and evaluated. 
The findings provide some support for the utility of the typology of the four modes of 
participation, particularly the knowledge transfer and collective decision-making modes, 
for understanding how people think about participation. The data provide more than just a 
hypothesis test though. The participants in the study are key informants specially selected 
for their knowledge and experiences of participatory social policy. The rich data provided 
by the combined qualitative and quantitative approach means that participants’ knowledge 
and experience can be brought to the fore to enrich the modes of participation in a process 
of translation between academic, practitioner and lay knowledge. An understanding of how 
those designing and participating in these initiatives think about them is also instructive for 
comprehending current practices, for instance; what types of participation are likely to be 
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instituted, as well as potential tensions that might exist between those with different views 
of the process. 
Chapter 5 draws on the same data, though with greater focus on the qualitative 
material, to speak more directly to the small but burgeoning literature on procedural 
preferences (e.g. Bengtsson 2012; Bengtsson and Christensen 2016; Font, Wojcieszak, and 
Navarro 2015; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; P. Webb 2013). The possession of both 
in-depth quantitative and qualitative data on the same person’s procedural preference is 
rare. It presents an opportunity to interrogate an important ontological divide between two 
approaches to researching political opinions: a quantitative ‘cognitivist’ tradition that has 
primarily used large-scale surveys to measure and aggregate individual cognitions, and a 
qualitative ‘discursive’ tradition that has tended to focus on naturally-occurring speech or 
research interviews to examine how opinions are discursively constructed. The chapter 
attempts to navigate a path between the two approaches demonstrating how participation 
preferences are both predictable and patterned at the aggregate level, yet ambivalent and 
context-sensitive at the individual level. It continues the exegesis of different of modes of 
participation by conducting this analysis though a concentrated discussion of two divisive 
issues: the distribution of decision power and the role of self-interest and conflict in 
participation. The focus of this chapter on the heterogeneity within an individual’s 
preference also facilitates an analysis of the ways in which these views may be used 
productively to make sense of one’s place in a complex set of social relations, and the 
ways they become traps that prevent individuals from seeing plausible alternatives or 
adapting to changed circumstances. 
In Chapter 6 there is a move back towards theory. This chapter asks how we can 
take account of the range of theoretically plausible and empirically desired modes of 
participation when building effective participatory institutions. It makes the case for a 
systemic approach to thinking through these issues by drawing on insights from recent 
innovations in two different theoretical fields. One is the insight from deliberative systems 
theory that no single deliberative arena performs all the necessary functions to authorise a 
political decision, thus it must be distributed across different arenas each performing 
different labours (Dryzek 2010; Mansbridge et al. 2012; Parkinson 2006). The other is 
Grid-Group Cultural Theorists’ argument that, given the diversity of plausible worldviews, 
to achieve widespread legitimacy we have to constructively harness the contestation 
between different viewpoints rather than adopt ‘elegant’ solutions that optimise around a 
single problem definition (Verweij and Thompson 2006). The chapter examines the 
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contribution that participation can make to complex policy systems, what problems is it 
intended to solve? It proposes three functions – effectiveness, autonomy, and 
accountability – demonstrating how different modes of participation can perform different 
labours with regard to these functions. Examples of participation in the English National 
Health Service are used to illustrate throughout, with the additional purpose of showing 
that the systemic way of thinking also has purchase in clarifying understanding of current 
practices, what they are attempting to achieve, where the tensions lie, and how they can be 
improved.               
The final chapter discusses the implications of the theoretical innovations and 
empirical findings outlined in the previous chapters for both the academic literature and for 
policy-making. It is divided into three sections. The first section primarily considers the 
implications for the academic literature, particularly the existing typologies of participation 
and common ways of thinking about participatory governance. The second section 
concentrates on how the lessons of the research may be employed in improving 
participatory practice, emphasising the need for a flexible understanding of citizens and 
officials’ roles and relationships in participation initiatives. The concluding section then 
suggests some potentially fruitful directions for further research, detailing some ideas for 
extending the research empirically and analytically. Before any of these questions are 
addressed, a thorough account of the study design and methodological approach is 
presented in Chapter 2. This next chapter situates the study within the tradition of 
philosophical pragmatism and considers how the mixed methods approach, combining 
documentary analysis, a quantitative Q-method survey and qualitative interviews, 
contributes to strengthening the design of each component and the quality of inferences 
that it is possible to draw. 
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Chapter 2  
Research Design and Methods 
 
 
This chapter gives a detailed account of the research design and methods. The 
reader may be surprised to find the methodological discussion at such an early stage of the 
thesis, but it has been situated here for two reasons. First, Chapter 3 provides an extensive 
overview of the academic literature, but it is not a traditional literature review. It is 
intended to be a substantive theoretical contribution that was arrived at through the process 
of literature review and an empirical stage of research that is described below in Section 
2.2. Other relevant literature is then discussed in the specific chapters to which it pertains, 
rather than in a separate literature review chapter.  
The second reason is that one of the primary methods employed within this project, 
Q-method, is not widely known. In addition, some of its practices – for instance, the 
facility to generate statistically significant results using small samples – may seem unusual 
to readers more accustomed to traditional quantitative survey methods. Accordingly, it was 
felt important to give a clear and comprehensive statement of the methods at an early stage 
of the thesis; both to aid readers who are unfamiliar with the approach to understand the 
analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, which discuss the empirical results, as well as to avoid 
unnecessary methodological concerns or confusions. 
The chapter is composed of four main sections. The first section outlines the 
methodological approach and the two stage, mixed methods design. The following two 
sections each relate to one stage of that design. They detail each component of the 
methods, why it was chosen and how it was conducted. For each of these two stages the 
discussion is divided into four subsections: purposes, data collection, data analysis and 
inferences (summarised in Figure 2.11 below). The final section of the chapter discusses 
the ethical considerations that accompanied this research and the procedures used to 
address them. 
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2.1 Overall Design and Methodological Approach 
This study broadly consisted of two empirical stages. The first stage was qualitative 
in orientation. It involved an inductive thematic analysis of documents from the academic 
and grey literature on approaches to public participation in policy decisions, with the aim 
informing a typology of public participation and generating a catalogue of themes that 
could inform the development of the Q-method survey instrument employed in the second 
stage of the project. This second stage combined a Q-method survey with unstructured 
interviews of a group of 34 purposively sampled individuals involved with public 
participation in policy-making. The objective was to explore their procedural preferences 
concerning participation. Q-method is an approach to studying individuals’ views that asks 
participants to perform a process called Q-sorting. They rank a set of statements 
concerning the phenomenon under investigation, in this case participation, onto a pre-set 
distribution grid, based on their relative level of agreement with each statement. These 
rankings are then subject to statistical analysis in order to identify common viewpoints 
amongst the participants. The second stage of the project has what (Tashakkori and Teddlie 
2003) refer to as an integrated mixed model design. It is ‘mixed model’, as opposed to 
‘mixed methods’, because it combines qualitative and quantitative approaches in all phases 
of the study, not only in the data collection and analysis phases (Teddlie and Tashakkori 
2003). It is integrated in that throughout the different phases of the project qualitative and 
quantitative components are used to mutually influence how each phase is conducted (see 
Figure 2.11 for an overview). The interviews are conducted directly after a participant has 
performed their Q-sort and informed by this process. The thematic analysis of the 
interviews helped to guide the statistical solution for the Q-method results, and the Q-
method results were important in selecting the themes for discourse analysis. Moreover, 
the inferences in Chapters 4 and 5 simultaneously draw on both the qualitative and 
quantitative data analysis. 
Mixed methods research has always provided a challenge to the qualitative-
quantitative paradigm wars whereby particular methodological approaches were viewed as 
wedded to particular ontological and epistemological principles (Bryman 2008; Teddlie 
and Tashakkori 2003). Accordingly, there have been numerous attempts at establishing a 
foundation for the mixed methods approach independent of qualitative and quantitative 
traditions (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003). One such foundation is methodological 
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Figure 2.11: Overview of study design 
 
Adapted from (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). Ovals represent traditionally qualitative orientation, rectangles traditionally quantitative.  
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pragmatism. Research design is a craft skill, and we make choices about which methods to 
employ based upon the effects they produce, 
There can be no better or more natural way of justifying a method than by 
establishing that “it works” with respect to the specific appointed tasks 
that are in view for it. (Rescher cited in Maxcy 2003, 81) 
For the methodological pragmatist the key question is will the research design effectively 
produce results, with methodological pragmatism having been described as the 
‘dictatorship of the research question’ (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003). The best research 
design is one that is most well-suited to tackling the research questions. This is a sensible 
starting point and one that was adopted in designing the approach to this study, though it 
does overestimate the extent to which research is technocratic process of input and output, 
as opposed to a journey of discovery in which the researcher must also always be alive to 
the new pathways that serendipity bestows.  
The primary research question for this study was to ask whether there are a number 
of distinct and coherent perspectives on participation in social policy decisions, and if so, 
how these frame: a) the objectives of participation; b) the roles of participants, officials and 
the relationship between them; c) participatory forms and practices; d) criteria for 
evaluating the efficacy of participatory processes. Q-method “is most often deployed in 
order to explore (and to make sense of) highly complex and socially contested concepts 
and subject matters from the point of view of the group of participants involved” (Watts 
and Stenner 2005, 70). It is thus a good fit for this endeavour to understand the complex 
concept of participation, in its multiple and contested guises. The combination of Q-
method and qualitative interviews also had some practical advantages for interrogating this 
phenomenon compared to using traditional surveys or only interviews. Unlike a survey, the 
Q-sorting process forces respondents to continually compare the different statements they 
are presented with in order to prioritise which they most agree and most disagree with. 
This is particularly valuable in a field where many of the terms such as participation and 
empowerment are superficially attractive, thus can receive assent without much thought. 
The interview then provided an opportunity to probe further the ways these statements 
were prioritised and the struggles participants experienced in choosing between them, 
adding depth to the data. This dual process therefore created a rich data set that also had an 
objective structure derived from transparent and replicable statistical procedures. The 
objective data structure that could not have been obtained from interviews alone is an 
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additional benefit, since similar types of qualitative studies of ‘cultural orientations’ in 
various fields have been subject to criticisms of ‘bird-spotting’, that is searching out 
examples that fit their theory (Mamadouh 1999). Moreover, this thesis argues that 
theorising about participation has been skewed by the normative biases of the researcher 
and an objective data structure helps to guard against researcher bias. 
Pragmatism can extend to many different facets of the research process, and there 
were also pragmatic considerations in terms of what it was feasible to achieve given the 
limitations of the research project. There are no appropriate secondary data sources that 
could address the questions this project set out to answer. Given that conducting a 
traditional survey on a large, randomly-selected sample is extremely expensive, there was a 
substantial advantage in using Q-method, from which it is possible to obtain significant 
results and make the kinds of inferences necessary to address the research questions 
without a large, randomly-selected sample. 
Pure methodological pragmatism as a justification for the selection of research 
methods leaves open the question of the epistemological and ontological assumptions that 
underlie the particular methodological approach selected. This study is primarily 
concerned with people’s interpretations and preferences for participation; as such, it would 
appear to naturally fall into an interpretivist field of enquiry. The research field is, 
however, not so straightforward. There is a considerable debate around the nature of 
political attitudes and how to study them. It could be argued that the dominant approach is 
post-positivist in orientation. It employs large-scale quantitative surveys, informed by the 
idea that attitudes are stable and measurable mental entities belonging to an individual, 
which can be captured by a small number of survey items, and have a causal relationship to 
actions. Most of the studies of individuals’ procedural preferences for policy decision-
making are of this type (Bengtsson 2012; Bengtsson and Christensen 2016; Font, 
Wojcieszak, and Navarro 2015; Neblo 2015; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). 
Nonetheless, this approach has been criticised by post-structuralist researchers who have 
questioned the utility of quantitative measurement of attitudes in favour of qualitative 
exploration of what they consider to be a context-dependent, intersubjective and 
discursively-oriented phenomenon (see Chapter 5 for more detailed discussion of this 
debate).  
One approach to designing this study would have been to pick a side in this debate 
and then employ the corresponding methods. Philosophical pragmatism, however, rejects 
the idea that we can have a fully worked out, a priori epistemological and ontological 
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position. We come to know the world by acting upon it, with specific ends in mind, and by 
analysing the effects of our actions (Maxcy 2003). Rather than picking a side, the project 
instead adopted the dialectical approach to philosophical paradigms advocated by Greene 
and Caracelli (2003). It complements philosophical and methodological pragmatism by 
productively exploiting the tensions between opposed or contradictory ideas in the service 
of a better understanding of the phenomena under study: 
different paradigms do indeed offer different, and sometimes 
contradictory and opposing, ideas and perspectives. In dialectic mixed 
methods inquiry, these differences are valued precisely for their potential 
– through the tension they invoke – to generate meaningfully better 
understandings. (Greene and Caracelli 2003, 97) 
It has already been noted how quantitative measurement is combined with qualitative 
exploration, but Q-method is itself flexible with regard to questions of ontology. Ramlo 
(2011), for instance, argues that Q-method is compatible with both post-positivism and 
constructivism. Examining the same individuals’ viewpoint through both qualitative and 
quantitative lens enables the identification of generalised patterns (which are outlined in 
Chapter 4), as well the exploration of the many ambivalences and contradictions that 
underlie this patterning (Chapter 5). This is a significant advantage over solely quantitative 
studies and solely qualitative studies, since it goes beyond the former’s tendency to focus 
on the general but not the particular and over-emphasise consistency, as well as the latter’s 
tendency to over-emphasise particularity at the expense of generality. 
This ability to more fully describe our interpretations of and preferences for 
participation was a key reason for the selection of the integrated mixed model design for 
this project. When social phenomena are complex then it is necessary to be able to draw on 
different kinds of inference in order to properly understand them (Teddlie and Tashakkori 
2003). Each component of this study is intended to build upon the others to enrich our 
understanding of participation. The first stage theorises a typology of participation based 
upon the public transcripts that are produced by organisations and academics, drawing out 
the most prominent modes. The second stage tests whether these modes hold-up from the 
perspectives of individuals involved with these processes, and explores alternative 
understandings. The combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques to do so 
produces a richer description than could be achieved otherwise. The results of the different 
components of mixed methods studies may corroborate each other, and the qualitative and 
quantitative findings from this study are certainly employed in this regard, for instance; 
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part of the function of the interview is as a validity check on the Q-sort. They may also 
diverge and the findings from this study are used to problematise each other too, in the 
process, elucidating the multifaceted nature of participation preferences.  
There are a number of other reasons to employ mixed methods – Bryman (2008) 
lists as many as sixteen. The other important one for this project is in the process of 
instrument development. Carrying out the inductive thematic analysis in the first stage was 
a necessary pre-condition of developing the statements for the Q-method survey (as 
discussed in more detail in Section 2.32 below). 
The above discussion has attempted to outline the general methodological approach 
to this project and justify the overall research design. Attention is now turned to the 
specific components of that design, why they were chosen, how they were conducted, and 
what we can reasonably infer from them. 
 
 
2.2 Stage 1: Mapping the Landscape of Participatory Governance 
2.21 Purpose 
The first stage of this study was oriented towards achieving a broad understanding 
of the range of perspectives that exist in relation to public participation in social policy 
decisions, particularly with regard to the objectives of participation, conceptions of the 
participant, participatory practices, and evaluation criteria. This endeavour had two ends. 
The first was substantive. As is made evident in Chapter 3, there have been few attempts to 
contextualise participatory mechanisms and practices within broader theoretical 
perspectives, thus such an endeavour was intended to generate new substantive insights in 
this field. The second was instrumental. A broad overview of the different perspectives on 
participation was a necessary first step in developing the Q-method component of the 
project. To generate the Q-set of statements that participants are asked to rank, it is first 
necessary to have an understanding of the wider ‘concourse’ of statements; that is, “the 
ways in which a particular object of enquiry is represented” (Watts and Stenner 2012, 34). 
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2.22 Data collection 
A traditional academic literature review was carried out, encompassing a number of 
overlapping literatures including democratic theory and public administration theory, along 
with the more applied literature on democratic innovations, especially typologies of 
participation mechanisms and evaluation frameworks for participation. This was 
accompanied by a formalised thematic analysis of a corpus of 27 documents primarily 
drawn from a database the researcher had constructed for a previous project examining 
how different participatory ideologies impact on the evaluation of participatory policy 
initiatives (R. Dean 2012). The database contained a range of documents on participatory 
policy-making from national and local government, NGOs and academia, sourced using 
systematic searches that attempted to identify all UK publications in this area between 
2002 and 2012, following the procedures prescribed by the Evidence for Policy and 
Practice Information and Co-ordinating Centre (EPPI) (2010) protocol for conducting 
systematic reviews3. The advantage of using systematic searches is that it is a further way 
to reduce researcher bias. After laborious screening of thousands of search results, 79 
documents were identified from the academic and grey literature, consisting of academic 
case studies and evaluations of participatory initiatives, government and third sector self-
evaluations, as well as government and third sector guides on how to do participation. 
Accordingly, each provided insights into the values attached to participation and 
prescriptions for how it should be conducted.  
The scope of the PhD meant that there was insufficient time to comprehensively 
analyse all 79 documents4, so it was decided to randomly select one third of the documents 
for the full thematic analysis. Each document was given a number from one to 79 and a 
random number generator was then used to select 26 of the documents. Three of these 
documents were then de-selected because they did not pertain to the policy areas of interest 
for this study – health, housing, poverty and social security – since the earlier study for 
which the database was constructed had included more social policy domains. A further 
four documents were then added to this sample from outside the systematically sourced 
database, making the total of 275. The original intention of this study was to study 
                                                 
3 The generation of this database is only summarised here, but a detailed description can be found in Dean 
(2012). 
4 It is also questionable whether it would have been desirable to analyse all 79, given the law of diminishing 
returns in adding extra documents. I was satisfied after completing the analysis of 27 that I had reached 
saturation point, and that further analysis was unlikely to add further insight. 
5 These 27 documents are listed in Appendix 1 
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deliberative forms of participatory policy-making, and the searches were oriented towards 
identifying such instances of participation. However, it transpired that the searches 
identified a much wider class of participatory initiatives, and deliberative initiatives were 
only a small subset. Focussing solely on deliberative initiatives would thus exclude the 
greater part of participatory governance. This assessment was reinforced by the concurrent 
literature review, and it became apparent that some perspectives on participation were 
under-represented in the sample of documents, particularly a clear statement of the New 
Public Management approach that many people claim has been influential in shaping how 
participation is practiced (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007; Parkinson 2004; R. Rowe and 
Shepherd 2002), as well as the viewpoint of the radical participatory left. Three of the 
additional documents were included to redress this lacuna in the sample. The fourth 
addition was the Public Administration Select Committee (2013) Report on Public 
Engagement in Policy-Making, which was released whilst the analysis was ongoing. This 
was included because the other government produced documents pre-dated the change in 
government from New Labour to the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition. A change 
in government may have led to a change in perspective concerning participation, though 
the analysis did not reveal any substantial differences, perhaps because the Select 
Committee is cross-party. The inclusion of the four additional documents re-introduces 
researcher bias. However, since these four comprise a small percentage of the total, it 
could only be a minimal bias, which is outweighed by the added value each performs in 
addressing a potential omission. 
 
2.23 Data analysis 
The 27 documents were then subjected to a two-step process of deductive followed 
by inductive coding using a PDF analysis program called Qiqqa. It is good practice in 
thematic analysis to code line-by-line (Braun and Clarke 2006), however; most guides to 
thematic coding are focused upon researcher-generated data like interview transcripts. In 
naturally-occurring data, such as government reports, not all the material is likely to be 
relevant to the object of enquiry. The first step of deductive coding was, therefore, 
primarily to index for relevance.  
It was apparent from Chapter 1 that there is a significant amount of variation in the 
proposed objectives of participation, as well as conceptions of the roles of the participant 
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and their relationships with officials. Each of these has implications for the forms that 
participation takes and the types of participatory practices employed, as well as the ways 
that participation is evaluated. Accordingly, these four themes were taken to be the 
constituent elements of a mode of participation, and analysis focused on these four areas. 
Each document was carefully analysed to identify any lines of text that referred to the 
objectives of participation, conceptions of the participant, participatory practices, or 
criteria for evaluating participation. The appropriate lines were then highlighted and tagged 
according to their object of reference, for instance; evaluation.  
Following Ritchie and Lewis (2003), the second step was similarly an indexing 
process concerned with labelling what the lines were about. However, this step proceeded 
inductively in that codes were generated from reading the text, rather than text being 
assigned to pre-existing codes. The indexing was also at a much more fine-grained level. 
Consider that the text was referring, explicitly or implicitly, to an objective of 
participation. The next question was ‘which kind of objective of participation?’ If the 
objective was ‘improved accountability’ the question then became ‘how is participation 
improving accountability?’ Since seven different ways that participation was seen to 
improve accountability were identified, codes were assigned at multiple levels, for 
example: Objective  Improved accountability  Accountability through face-to-face 
dialogue. Once this inductive analysis was completed, the resulting codes were mapped 
using a mind-mapping type feature of the Qiqqa program.  
Four such maps were produced, one for each of the top-level codes: objectives, 
participants, practices, and evaluation. This process streamlined and systematised the 
coding framework by assisting in identifying and amalgamating duplicate codes and 
identifying families of codes. This final analysis stage thus ensured that the codes were 
coherent, consistent and distinct, as recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006). Similarly, 
following Braun and Clarke’s (2006) recommendation for good practice each of the 
resulting codes was matched with an illustrative example piece of text from one of the 
documents6.     
 
                                                 
6 The coding framework is reproduced in Appendix 2. 
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2.24 Inferences 
The outputs of this stage of the project were, as intended, two-fold. The thematic 
analysis was later employed as the basis of the Q-method concourse, with some of the 
statements that participants were asked to rank replicating the illustrative example pieces 
of text for particular codes. In addition, the new typology of participation presented in 
Chapter 3 was facilitated by conducting the thematic analysis alongside the literature 
review. Performing the two tasks simultaneously enabled analysis to move iteratively 
between theoretical literature and applied policy documents. This was productive in that 
the theoretical literature could assist in making sense of the insights that were being 
generated from the inductive thematic analysis. In Chapter 3, for instance, the contribution 
of Grid Group Cultural Theory to the new typology is described. Nevertheless, there was 
no pre-meditated intention to develop a typology along the lines of Grid-Group Cultural 
Theory. The typology was developed more through a process of coalescence between the 
empirical data and the theory. My observations from the empirical data began to resonate 
with the distinctions of other typologies, notably Christopher Hood’s (1998) typology of 
modes of public administration and Hartley Dean’s (2013) modes of social citizenship. 
Approaching the data through this theoretical lens then helped to analyse and structure the 
data, but the data also helped put flesh on the bones of my nascent theoretical ideas, both 
providing concrete examples to draw on and challenging me to adapt the theory where it 
did not fit, (hence, for example, why the typology of participation diverges from a straight 
Grid-Group Cultural Theory template). 
 
 
2.3 Stage 2: Understanding Participation Preferences 
2.31 Purpose 
Stage 2 of this study combined a Q-method survey with unstructured qualitative 
interviews in order to explore both the content and nature of people’s preferences for 
public participation in social policy decisions. Moreover, it aimed to examine the utility of 
the typology of modes of participation, developed in Stage 1, for understanding 
participation preferences. Based on the typology, the hypothesis was that participation 
preferences would mirror the alternative modes of participation, thus that the statistical 
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analysis would identify four principal components (or two bi-polar principal components), 
with substantive interpretations that fit the four modes of participation: knowledge transfer, 
collective decision-making, choice and voice, and arbitration and oversight. Nonetheless, 
Q-method provides more than a hypothesis test. If the statistical solution was as predicted 
it would also provide additional data, especially when combined with the material from the 
qualitative interviews, to enrich the understanding of the four modes of participation. If the 
statistical solution diverged from the prediction, then the data would be sufficient to 
develop an alternative participation typology, or amend the existing typology to take 
account of the results.  
The combination of Q-method and qualitative interviews, as described above, is 
particularly well-suited for these purposes. Q-method is commonly deployed in order to 
understand the subjective perspectives of individuals with regard to complex and socially 
contested concepts (Brown 1980; Watts and Stenner 2012). In addition, it has been 
successfully employed in cognate research projects. Dryzek and Berejikian (1993) have 
used it to explore discourses of democracy, and Theiss-Morse (1993) conceptions of the 
good citizen among the US citizens. Skelcher, Sullivan and Jeffares (2013) conducted a Q-
method study of public administrators’ interpretations of network governance, and Gaynor 
(2013) looked at stakeholders’ views of the role of Community Development Corporations 
in local government. Importantly, the ability to work with a small sample size (compared 
with traditional surveys) also made this methodological approach feasible within the 
resource constraints of a PhD research project. The rich qualitative information coupled 
with the objective quantitative data had a number of benefits too. It increased confidence in 
the inferences drawn from each component of the research, enabled a fuller understanding 
of the object of enquiry, and provided a new way of approaching a theoretical debate 
between quantitative and qualitative approaches to studying political preferences.    
 
2.32 Data collection 
Instrument development: The standard procedures for conducting a Q-method 
study are now widely agreed and have been clearly codified (Brown 1980; McKeown and 
Thomas 2013; Watts and Stenner 2012). The first stage of any Q-method study is to 
compose a ‘Q-set’ of statements, usually between 40 to 80, that the participants will be 
asked to rank. This Q-set of statements should be broadly representative of the concourse, 
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which itself is supposed to capture the full set of representations of the object under 
investigation. It was detailed above how Stage 1 of this project was oriented toward 
mapping the landscape of representations of participation in order to provide a concourse 
from which a Q-set of statements could be derived. The challenge was in reducing the 257 
codes into a manageable number of statements for participants to sort. Following Skelcher, 
Sullivan and Jeffares (2013) and Dryzek and Berejikian (1993), a sampling grid was 
employed in order to reduce the statements to an appropriately-sized Q-set, whilst 
maintaining diversity of representation. Given that one aim of the research was to test the 
typology of modes of participation, the four modes of participation provided one 
dimension of the sampling grid. The second dimension was the four components of 
participation – objectives, participants, practices and evaluation - identified as key 
constituent parts of a participation preference. Each intersection of these dimensions was 
awarded two cells – for instance; two cells for knowledge transfer type objectives –
accounting for 32 statements in total7. Then each of the four components of a preference 
were awarded some cells for ‘wildcard’ statements. These wildcard cells were used for 
statements that did not fit with one particular mode of participation, or when an important 
element of one of the modes would have been excluded by using only two statements.  
This structuring of the Q-set is what makes the study a test case for confirming or 
disconfirming the typology of four modes of participation. As Brown (1980) has noted, 
structuring the Q-set has a number of benefits; it can ensure balance, provide a focus and 
allow the researcher to explicitly state a theoretical position. Structuring the Q-set does not 
obtrude on the possibilities of the research participants expressing their own subjective 
viewpoints for the simple fact that there are so many possible combinations of statements, 
so it cannot be said to prejudice the approach in order that the researcher inevitably finds 
what he or she set out to find (Brown 1980, 38–39). Participants can arrange the statements 
in whichever way suits them, including contrary to the theory that structures the Q-set, for 
instance; in this case, if participants simultaneously highly rank statements connected to 
multiple modes of participation, it would not be possible to argue that they subscribe to one 
of the modes. Therefore, structuring the Q-set does not make it more likely that the 
                                                 
7 Whilst these distinctions were helpful in maintaining diversity, it is also worth noting that there are some 
similarities as well as differences between the four modes of participation, so, for some statements, though 
they were assigned to one category they can be seen to straddle the boundaries. Similarly the objectives of 
participation can be related to its evaluation and conceptions of participants connected to practices, thus there 
are some statements that straddle these neat conceptual boundaries too. 
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principal components identified through the statistical analysis will correspond to the 
theory that structured the statements. 
Statements were drafted in three ways. In a small minority of cases it was possible 
to reproduce statements exactly as they appeared in the 27 documents thematically 
analysed in Stage 1. For the most part, it was necessary to edit statements from these 
documents to ensure they more precisely referred to the relevant concept and were 
sufficiently succinct, but the general tenor of the original was retained. There were a 
further minority of themes that were implicit in the documents, or had been theoretically 
derived, where it was necessary to draft statements from scratch. The initial sampling 
process produced a Q-set of 55 statements. A number of statements within this Q-set were 
deliberately in opposition with one another. This was intended to reflect the tension 
between different plausible preferences and force participants into making choices about 
what they most valued.  
There are some important differences between the Q-method approach to the 
statements that comprise the Q-set and the approach of traditional quantitative attitudinal 
surveys, like the British Social Attitudes Survey, European Social Survey and World 
Values Survey, to their questionnaire items. Large-scale attitudinal surveys commonly 
draw inferences from a single survey item. Such inferences are dependent upon the survey 
items having fixed meanings for all survey respondents. Accordingly, much effort is 
expended on defining a priori the concept which is being measured and how to 
operationalise it in a survey item that is consistently interpreted by respondents. Some 
respondents may in practice interpret the survey question differently, but these deviations 
from the researchers’ definition are counted as error. This is part of the reason that such 
surveys need to recruit a large number of respondents, in order that significant differences 
can be separated from measurement error. The inferences from traditional attitudinal 
surveys then, usually, express a good deal of confidence in the robustness of the meaning 
of a survey item, but little confidence in the responses of the individual respondents – they 
trust their variables but not their cases. 
The Q-method approach is very different. Q-methodologists tend to reject the 
fixation on operational definitions of attitudinal concepts as the imposition of the 
researchers’ meanings upon the respondents (Brown 1980, 2–5). Q-method is open to the 
notion that “language-in-use is by its nature symbolic and self-referential” (Brown 1980, 
3), and thus different respondents will interpret the same statements differently. The 
researcher may have a working definition that guides the drafting of the statements, but, 
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when interpreting results, must be alive to the fact that respondents may interpret the 
statements differently, which should not simply be categorised as measurement error. The 
focus of Q-method is therefore on a posteriori interpretation of the meanings of statements 
based upon respondents sorting behaviour, rather than a priori definition of the statements 
according to the researcher’s presuppositions.  
This process of a posteriori interpretation is rooted in Q-method’s contextual 
principle: individual statements are situated within a broader nexus of propositions (Brown 
1980, 53). Inferences from single statements are eschewed in favour of a gestalt 
orientation. Inferences are based on upon the respondents Q-sort as a whole. Accordingly, 
the interpretation of individual statements cannot be abstracted from this whole and must 
take into consideration the context of its relations to other statements in the Q-sort. The 
result is that Q-method is a reverse of the common survey approach to inference. It is 
flexible with regard to the meanings respondents attach to individual statements, but 
inferences are tied to the gestalt, and at this level Q has much greater confidence in the 
robustness of its individual respondents. 
These differences in approach mean that the drafting of statements for the Q-set can 
at times depart from what is seen as best practice for the development of operationalised 
concepts that informs the design of attitudinal survey questionnaire items. Unlike survey 
items, some of the Q-set statements for this study contain multiple clauses for instance. 
Statements were drafted in this way when it was felt that additional contextual information 
was necessary to understand the normative clause of the statement, thus there are ‘mixed 
statements’ that combine a contextual clause with a normative clause. An example of this 
type of statement is: “Society will always contain conflict about what the right values are, 
as well as competing claims for resources. The aim of public participation should be to 
resolve these conflicts between competing interests”. The first part of the statement is 
contextual, the second part normative. This creates a potential conflict as respondents may 
agree with the contextual clause but not the normative one, or vice versa. However, this did 
not cause significant problems for ranking these statements, nor interpreting their ranking. 
Respondents were reminded that the process was intended to identify their normative 
viewpoint, so if they felt ambivalent about a statement they should privilege the normative 
clause. If participants’ ambivalence persisted then they could simply rank the statement in 
the neutral section. Since the analysis of the Q-sort data has a gestalt orientation the impact 
of a single statement on the results of the analysis is rather minimal, and because the 
principal components analysis is weighted in favour of the extremes of the distribution, this 
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is particularly true for statements that are neutrally ranked. In addition, the emphasis on a 
posteriori interpretation of a statement in the light of its relation to the other statements 
provides a means for unpicking the meaning a respondent (or set of respondents) attaches 
to a statement and thus why it is ranked as it is, and why it may generate conflicted 
feelings. There is also an opportunity to seek further information from respondents in the 
post-Q-sort interview. Participants’ ambivalence over statements with more than one 
clause can lead to discussion in the interview that helps to illuminate the nuance of their 
position, for instance; why they disagree with a common interpretation that a certain 
normative attitude follows from the contextual information. The opening part of the 
analysis in Chapter 5, for example, focusses on one such example of ambivalence, where a 
respondent struggles to reconcile the two parts of a statement, in the process illuminating 
how civil servants are conflicted about their role as neutral experts.         
Once the statements were drafted, the Q-set of 55 statements was then tested in six 
pilot surveys and interviews. Of course the pilot phase was not intended to test for 
robustness of operational definitions of the statements, as may be expected in the pilot of a 
traditional survey.  Instead it focused on more practical matters such as the intelligibility of 
the statements and whether participants are able to understand and perform the procedure. 
Feedback from pilot interviews indicated that there were a few too many statements, 
making the process a little overwhelming, and that some of the statements could be more 
clearly written, which instigated an editing phase. 19 statements were redrafted to make 
them more succinct and clarify concepts, and seven statements were removed either 
because the theme could be partly captured by the amendments to other statements, or 
because it was judged to be non-essential. This produced a final Q-set of 48 statements, 
consisting of the 32 core statements and 16 wildcard statements (see Table 2.31 below).  
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Table 2.31: Full Q-set of statements and related themes 
 Objectives Participants Practices Evaluation 
 Theme Statement Theme Statement Theme Statement Theme Statement 
Arbitration 
and 
Oversight 
Resolve 
conflict 
between 
competing 
interests 
Society will always 
contain conflict about 
what the right values are, 
as well as competing 
claims for resources. The 
aim of public 
participation should be to 
resolve these conflicts 
between competing 
interests. 
Impartial 
adjudicators 
Public organisations 
frequently act like just 
another interest group, 
so it is important to 
create roles in which the 
public can provide 
impartial oversight or 
adjudication on 
controversial issues. 
Adjudication / 
arbitration 
Participation should take 
a form that allows all 
those with a stake in the 
decision to present their 
claims, then there needs 
to be a clear and 
impartial mechanism for 
adjudicating between 
those claims. 
Conflict 
resolution 
The success of a 
participatory decision 
process should be 
assessed on how far it 
contributes towards 
resolving any conflict 
between competing 
interests or competing 
perspectives with regard 
to the decision being 
taken.  
Arbitration 
and 
Oversight 
Achieve 
decision 
legitimacy 
Participation is about 
improving the legitimacy 
of decisions by bringing 
decision-making out into 
the open from behind 
closed doors. By involving 
everyone with a stake in 
the issue, the public can 
see a decision is fair and 
does not favour vested 
interests. 
Activists/ 
unrepresenta-
tive 
Any participatory process 
needs to be actively 
managed (e.g. through 
participant selection and 
facilitation) in order to 
prevent an 
unrepresentative group 
from dominating the 
process and hijacking the 
decision.  
Defined 
participatory 
space 
Public participation 
initiatives should have a 
clear question that is 
being asked of 
participants. Participants 
need to be informed of 
what is in and out of the 
scope of the discussion, 
what is expected of them 
as participants, and what 
the limits of the process 
are with regard to its 
impacts on policy. 
Decision 
legitimacy / 
Fairness 
We should judge the 
success of a participatory 
decision process on the 
extent to which it results 
in a decision that is 
accepted by everyone as 
fair and legitimate. 
Knowledge 
Transfer 
Maximise 
information / 
capture lay 
expertise 
The objective of public 
participation is to 
improve policy decisions 
by ensuring that decision-
makers can access wider 
sources of information, 
perspectives and 
potential solutions. 
Experts 
Local people are the best 
source of information 
about their own 
neighbourhoods, poor 
people are the experts in 
poverty, and service-
users best know where 
the problems with 
services are. The public 
should be valued for the 
expertise it can bring to 
policy decisions. 
Public interest 
Public participation is not 
about who can shout the 
loudest for their own 
private interests. It 
should be directed 
towards finding the 
common good, rather 
than bargaining about 
who gets what. 
Decision 
quality / 
sponsor 
satisfaction 
The success of public 
participation should be 
judged by those who 
commissioned the 
process and whether they 
feel their decision has 
been enhanced by the 
involvement of the 
public. 
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Knowledge 
Transfer 
Improve 
substantive 
outcomes 
The aim of participation 
should be to improve 
policy and to improve 
services. If public 
participation does not 
result in noticeable 
improvements in policy 
and/or services then it 
has failed. 
Policy tool 
The best people to 
involve in any particular 
participatory policy-
making exercise are those 
who can contribute most 
to improving the 
particular policy that is 
under consideration. 
Authorities 
retain decision 
power 
To ensure accountability, 
it is important that 
elected representatives 
and public officials retain 
ultimate authority over 
any final decision. 
Agenda-based 
/ universal vs 
specific 
We cannot say there are 
a number of evaluation 
criteria that apply to all, 
or even most, public 
participation exercises. 
The assessment of 
success or failure must be 
based on the purpose(s) 
of the specific exercise 
being evaluated. 
Collective 
Decision- 
Making 
Collective self-
government 
The aim of participation is 
to enable citizens to take 
the decisions that affect 
their lives through 
collective discussion and 
decision-making. It 
should be about 
collective self-
government.  
Public 
reasoners 
Publicly debating social 
issues is the primary 
political act, so reasoning 
between people should 
be the guiding procedure 
for policy decision-
making. 
Collective 
dialogue and 
decision 
Though it may not always 
be possible, participation 
should always aim to 
make collective decisions 
based on group 
consensus. 
Negotiated by 
participants / 
participant 
control 
Participation should be 
evaluated based on how 
much control the 
participants have over 
the process, for instance; 
have the participants set 
the agenda, and how 
much control do they 
have over the final 
decision? 
Collective 
Decision- 
Making 
Participation 
as a right /end 
not means 
Participation may be a 
means to achieve better 
outcomes, but its 
principal objective is to 
realise people's right to 
participate in decisions 
about the society in 
which they live 
Social 
It is primarily bonds with 
others and shared social 
goals that motivate 
people to participate, so 
participation works best 
when it is woven into the 
fabric of people's 
everyday lives, for 
instance; situated in local 
communities. 
Independent / 
counter-
publics 
If it is to have any power, 
public participation 
should be independent 
from state institutions. It 
should be a space in 
which the public can 
articulate their own 
agenda and demands, 
before negotiating these 
with government and 
public organisations. 
Dialogue 
quality / 
mutual 
understanding 
Has there been an open 
and honest exchange of 
ideas and perspectives 
from all those involved? 
Has this resulted in 
greater mutual 
understanding? These are 
key criteria when 
assessing whether public 
participation has been a 
success. 
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Choice and 
Voice 
Capture public 
needs and 
wants 
Public services have to 
compete for customers, 
and politicians for their 
constituents. Therefore, 
the aim of participation 
should be to find out 
what people want and 
need, then deliver that. 
Consumers 
People don't want to 
attend endless meetings 
and discussions. The best 
way to enable the public 
to influence policies and 
public services is to give 
individuals options from 
which they can choose, 
whether that's a choice of 
service provider or a 
choice of different 
priorities for spending in 
their neighbourhoods. 
Private 
interest 
People are not motivated 
to participate in policy-
making for the health of 
democracy, but because 
they believe they have 
something to lose or gain, 
therefore; participation 
should enable individuals 
and groups to promote 
and defend their interests 
and values. 
Improved 
services / 
responsiveness 
To judge the success of 
public participation we 
need to look at the 
resultant policies and 
services and ask are they 
more responsive to public 
needs and public values. 
Choice and 
Voice 
Empower 
public through 
choice 
The objective of 
participation is to 
empower the public and 
the best way to do that is 
to give individuals a 
choice over which 
provider of services they 
can use. 
Multiplicity of 
publics 
There is no one 'public' 
with a general interest. 
Participation initiatives 
must bring together lots 
of overlapping little 
'publics', all with their 
own interests and values. 
Individualised 
It is more important that 
participation should give 
individual citizens a 
means to voice their 
preferences and have 
them heard by decision-
makers than facilitate 
discussions between 
citizens. 
Participant 
satisfaction 
The success of public 
participation should be 
assessed by asking the 
participants whether they 
are satisfied. 
Wildcard 
Remedy 
political/ 
social 
exclusion 
Participation should be a 
means through which the 
marginalised in society 
can challenge their 
political and social 
exclusion. 
Battle 
Citizens and the state 
only work together when 
their interests coincide. 
Most of the time they 
don't, so participation has 
to enable the public to 
battle public institutions 
to get what it wants. 
Tailor forms 
There is no right way to 
do participation. The 
particular form of 
participation should be 
determined by what is 
most appropriate to the 
particular issue under 
consideration. 
Subjective 
empowerment 
/system 
legitimacy 
A key measure for the 
success of participation is 
whether people feel they 
have any influence: Do 
they think they can affect 
decisions on policies that 
matter to them?  
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Wildcard 
Challenge the 
powerful 
The aim of participation is 
not to make decisions 
with policy-makers, but 
to hold them to account 
and exert pressure on 
them to make the right 
decisions. 
Partners 
Public participation in the 
policy process should 
create a new relationship 
between public 
institutions and citizens in 
which both are equal 
partners co-creating 
policy. 
Equal / Mutual 
respect 
It is important that 
participation initiatives 
cultivate an environment 
in which everyone has an 
equal opportunity to give 
their views. One 
particular way of 
communicating should 
not be privileged over 
others, and differences 
should be recognised and 
respected.  
Representa-
tiveness 
Public participation is of 
little value if those that 
participate are not 
representative of those 
that will be affected by 
the decision, therefore; 
representativeness is a 
key criterion for 
evaluation. 
Wildcard 
Community 
development / 
Big Society 
The point of public 
participation is to create 
cohesive communities, in 
which responsible citizens 
can work together to 
solve their own problems 
without relying on the 
state. 
Authorities as 
enablers 
Public organisations and 
public officials should not 
try to lead participation 
exercises, but play an 
enabling role. They 
should help the public 
achieve their own agenda 
by providing the skills and 
resources the public lack. 
Openness & 
Inclusivity vs 
restricted 
selection 
Participation initiatives 
should be open to all 
those who wish to 
participate. Participants 
should not be specially 
selected, though extra 
resources may need to be 
focussed on encouraging 
disadvantaged groups to 
participate. 
   
Wildcard 
Process 
legitimacy / 
System 
legitimacy 
The objective of public 
participation is to create 
a fairer process for 
making policy decisions 
and in turn a fairer 
democracy, one that is 
perceived to be 
legitimate by the public. 
    
Invited vs 
informal 
spaces 
If government or public 
service organisations 
want to talk to the public, 
they should do so by 
engaging with existing 
community organisations, 
rather than setting up 
and imposing new 
participatory structures. 
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Wildcard 
Voice and 
Responsive-
ness 
The aim of participation 
should be to give the 
public a voice that can 
influence decisions. 
Policy-makers need to 
listen, but must then 
exercise judgement in 
deciding what should be 
incorporated into the 
final decision. 
            
Wildcard 
Subjective 
empowerment 
The point of participation 
is to improve participants' 
skills; to give them a 
greater sense of 
confidence and of their 
own power to act and 
influence the decisions 
that affect them. 
            
Wildcard 
Transfer 
power 
The aim of participation 
should be to transfer 
decision power from 
elites in bureaucracies 
and public service 
organisations to the 
public, so the public can 
exercise some control 
over these institutions. 
            
 
  
48 
 
These 48 statements were then printed on a set of 6 cm x 5cm cards and laminated 
for face-to-face use, as well as uploaded to the specialised PoetQ online program (Jeffares 
and Dickinson 2016) for online use. A sample of the cards is reproduced below as Figure 
2.31. You can see that the statement is accompanied by a statement number from 1 to 48, 
which was randomly assigned to each card, along with a letter – either an E, F, O or P – in 
the bottom right corner. The numbers were to facilitate the quick recording of the results at 
the end of the survey and interview process, and later statistical analysis. The letters refer 
to the four components of a participation preference: evaluation, forms/practices, 
objectives and participants’ roles and relationships. They were included to facilitate 
quicker analysis by the researcher as the cards were being sorted, for instance; so that the 
researcher could quickly scan the distribution and see the location of all the objectives 
statements without having to read the whole statement.  
 
Figure 2.31: Sample of Q-sorting cards 
 
 
It was also necessary to decide upon the shape of the pre-set distribution grid onto 
which the statements would be ranked (see Figure 2.32). The sorting grid departs from the 
common Q-method practice of selecting a kurtosis that reflects a quasi-normal distribution. 
The justification for a quasi-normal distribution with longer columns in the middle of the 
distribution is that there will normally be more items that participants feel indifferent about 
than strongly about (Brown 1980).  However, this assumption is questionable with regard 
to the statements for this study, which were purposefully drafted to be provocative and in 
tension with each other. A flattened, platykurtic distribution was chosen for this study, 
which enables more fine-grained discrimination at the margins where the participants feel 
most strongly about the statements. This is more suitable for the particular Q-set and it has  
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Figure 2.32: Q-sorting grid and condition of instruction 
This study is looking at people’s opinions about public participation in decisions about social policy decisions (for instance, health, housing and social security 
policy). 
 
The cards you have been given contain common statements about participation. We want to know how you think participation should be, therefore please 
rank the statements based on how they reflect your opinions about how participation should be, not how it currently is. 
 
Please sort the statements into the following grid pattern. You can rearrange the statements as many times as you like until you are happy with the resulting 
distribution. 
 
 
Most 
Disagree 
 
       
 
Most 
Agree 
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been specifically recommended for use with knowledgeable participants, like the recruited 
key informants (Watts and Stenner 2012). 
After the pilot phase it was also decided that an interview topic guide was 
unnecessary, and that given the Q-sorting process is highly structured it would be more 
profitable to conduct open, flexible, unstructured interviews. Only one question was 
retained from the initial topic guide, which was the opening question: once the participant 
had completed the Q-sort, they were encouraged to challenge it and think about whether 
they considered that anything important was missing. This partly provided an opportunity 
to check the validity of the Q-set according to participants’ assessment of its 
comprehensiveness. More importantly, it was intended to open up the interview. The Q-set 
presented participants with a large number of ideas, and was generally experienced as 
intellectually challenging. Accordingly, it would be easy for participants to become fixated 
on the material of the Q-set at the exclusion of missing ideas that they would ordinarily 
raise as important. This first question was thus intended to be an explicit encouragement of 
dissent.    
 
Data collection process: The primary data collection process for this stage of the 
research, as aforementioned, consisted of a Q-method survey and an unstructured 
interview. A short questionnaire was also included to record demographic characteristics of 
participants and the ways they have been involved, if at all, in participatory policy-making 
(see Appendix 3). Participants were asked to allow 90 minutes to complete all three 
elements of the process. For the vast majority of the participants data collection was 
conducted face-to-face. They were first given a short description of the study and asked to 
sign a consent form (see Appendix 4). They then performed the Q-sort, which was directly 
followed by the interview. At the end of the interview the participants were asked to 
complete the demographic questionnaire, which only took one or two minutes, whilst the 
researcher recorded the results of their Q-sort and thanked them for their time in taking 
part. The duration of most participants’ Q-sorts was around 25-40 minutes, leaving 
between 50 and 65 minutes for the interview, however, there were a small number of 
particularly fast Q-sorters who completed the task in approximately 15 minutes and a small 
number of slow Q-sorters, with two participants taking 90 minutes to complete the Q-sort.  
The face-to-face Q-sorts began with the researcher’s description of the task at hand, 
and the ‘condition of instruction’, advising participants of the basis on which to sort the 
statements. Participants were sat in front of the Q-sort ranking grid (Figure 2.32). The 
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researcher held in hand the set of cards containing the Q-sort statements (Figure 2.31), 
whilst explaining the task, so that the participant’s attention was fixed on the explanation, 
not on the statements. The explanation took the following form: 
I have a set of 48 cards containing common statements people make about 
public participation in social policy decisions. There is one card for each 
cell on the grid in front of you and by the end of this process you should 
have sorted each card into a cell, based on your opinion about public 
participation, particularly concerning health policy, housing policy, 
poverty policy or social security policy. I am interested in your opinion 
about how participation should be, not how it currently is, so please rank 
each statement based on how much you agree or disagree with it based on 
how participation should be. 
 
Most people find it a bit overwhelming to place the statements straight 
onto the grid, so first off, it is best to do a quick sort into three piles based 
on whether you agree, disagree or feel neutral or are not sure about them, 
then work from there. 
The purpose of this explanation was to set the scope: it is about participation in social 
policy decisions in health, housing, poverty and social security policy, not for instance co-
delivery of services in education policy. There was also an emphasis that it was the 
participant’s normative opinion that was sought, not their description of how participation 
currently works. As can be seen from Figure 2.32, this condition of instruction was 
reproduced above the sorting grid, so that participants could refer to it as they conducted 
the sort if necessary. Then, following Q-method best practice, there was the suggestion that 
participants began sorting the cards into three piles, a recommendation that not all 
participants followed, some preferred to work straight onto the grid. Either once the 
participant had finished the initial sort, or if they began sorting straight onto the grid, some 
further explanation was provided. Participants were advised that 
The ranking process usually works best if you sort from the ends of the 
grid and work your way into the middle. So, first select the five statements 
that you most agree with, then the five you most disagree with, and work 
inwards from there. 
 
You can move the statements around as much as you want until you are 
happy with the distribution. 
 
The most agree to most disagree scale is a relative scale. It is about your 
relative rankings of the statements in comparison to one another, rather 
than whether you absolutely agree or disagree with a statement. 
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The first of these three instructions again follows Q-method best practice, and it was 
noticeable that those participants who followed this advice found it significantly easier to 
complete the task. The final instruction also proved very significant because a number of 
participants had a positive skew to their rankings thus were reluctant to place statements on 
the left of the distribution until it was reiterated that it doesn’t matter if you agree with a 
statement, you can place it in a ‘disagree’ column as long as you agree with it less than the 
other statements you agree with. 
The interview approach was technically unstructured in that there was no topic 
guide of questions that the researcher followed. The researcher tried to ensure that the 
interviews were comprehensive in covering the four constituent components of a 
participation preference, so that there was some data on the participant’s opinions on the 
objectives of participation, conceptions of the participants, participatory practices and 
evaluating participation. Nevertheless the interview was flexible within those parameters 
based on what the interviewee was most interested in, for instance, with regard to which 
objectives of participation were focused on, and how much time was spent talking about 
participation practices versus evaluation criteria.    
The preceding Q-sort also implicitly provided a structure for the interviews, and a 
number of techniques were used to generate questions out of the participant’s experience 
of the Q-sort. Participants would often spontaneously explain why they had placed 
statements in particular columns, particularly those at the extremes of the distribution that 
they most agreed or disagreed with, but when they did not the researcher would probe this 
and ask the participant why she felt most strongly about those statements. The researcher 
also probed when statement placement appeared to be incongruous, for instance; when 
seemingly contradictory statements were ranked close to one another, or where statements 
seemingly of a similar nature were placed at alternate ends of the spectrum. This provided 
deeper understanding of the participant’s viewpoint, elucidating the meanings that 
participants’ attached to particular statements and how they related to one another. The 
researcher attempted to minimise conversations during the Q-sort, unless they were points 
of clarification, so as not to influence the participant’s sorting of the statements. 
Nonetheless, participants would often make comments about the statements as they were 
sorting them, either to themselves or to the researcher, and this was a further way that 
questions were generated from the experience of the Q-sort; by noting comments and 
returning to them later during the interview. 
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This close connection between the Q-sort and the interview potentially creates a 
risk that the interview is dominated by the researcher’s concerns at the expense of the 
perspective of the participant. However, the Q-set of statements is intended to be 
representative of the opinion domain on the research questions at-hand, thus the implicit 
structure provided by the Q-sort should not be overly restrictive of appropriate topics. In 
addition, the researcher was attentive to this problem, and, as aforementioned, the one 
consistent question that was posed to participants, always the first question of the 
interview, was an attempt to open up the process and encourage the participant to think 
about any topics they felt were missing, or any issues that they felt couldn’t be expressed 
through the Q-sort and were deserving of discussion. Despite this opportunity, participants 
did not raise undue concerns in this regard, were generally satisfied that the Q-sort was a 
good representation of their opinion, and happy to return the discussion to it. This suggests 
the Q-set of statements was relatively comprehensive in capturing the diversity of 
perspectives on participatory governance. If the Q-sort is viewed as akin to a process of 
participant-led topic prioritisation, then generating questions out of the Q-sort, rather than 
breaking from this process and introducing an additional researcher-defined interview topic 
guide, is actually an effective way of keeping the interview close to the participant’s 
concerns. Probing the statements that participants have placed at the extremes of the 
distribution ensures that a major part of the interview tackles the topics on which the 
participant feels most strongly, for instance. Returning to the comments that participants 
had made during the Q-sort was also an attempt to keep the interview close to the 
participant’s initial reactions.  
For six of the 34 participants the Q-sort and interview process substantially 
diverged from this template. It was not possible for three of the participants to meet in 
person, thus the process was conducted remotely. Participants completed the Q-sort using 
the online PoetQ software. Once completed, the researcher took 30 minutes to access and 
examine the results before contacting the participant on Skype to conduct the interview. 
The PoetQ software models the same process that face-face Q-sorts take. Participants are 
first presented with each statement one-by-one and asked to sort them into one of three 
columns, based on whether they agree, disagree or feel neutral about the statement. They 
then go through two stages of refinement. First they are presented with all the statements 
they agree with and asked to select the five statements they most agree with, then the same 
for most disagree, alternating until they have filled the entire grid. Participants then get an 
overview of their final grid and can make any revisions by moving statements around using 
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drag and drop, like in a game of solitaire. There were two differences from the face-to-face 
process. The limitations of the program meant the questionnaire had to be included at the 
beginning rather than the end of the process. Also, the final page that participants see asks 
them to write free text explanations for why they most agree/disagree choice of statements. 
Participants were informed in advance that they were not required to complete this phase, 
since they were to be interviewed, but all three completed it anyway. Time to complete the 
online Q-sort mirrored the variety of the face-to-face Q-sorts, with the three participants 
completing the task in 23, 60 and 92 minutes, suggesting that the nature of the participant 
is more important than the process of data collection in this regard. The duration of 
interviews with these participants were 67, 66, and 48 minutes respectively.  
The other three departures from the standard template were due to the exigencies of 
collecting qualitative data. One participant was able to complete the Q-sort, but other work 
pressures meant the process had to be cut short, thus there is no interview with this 
participant. As already noted, one of the face-to-face participants used the entirety of the 
allotted 90 minutes to complete the Q-sort. As a result, she offered to return to complete 
the interview at another time. A new interview time was scheduled, but this was not 
possible to arrange until 25 days after the original Q-sort. During the return interview the 
participant was re-presented with her original Q-sort, given some time to re-familiarise 
herself with it and revise it (though she chose not make any revisions), before beginning 
the interview. The final divergence was a result of audio recorder failure which meant that 
almost the entire audio recording of the interview was lost. Again, the participant offered 
to be re-interviewed and a telephone interview was re-scheduled for 15 days later. The 
participant was sent a copy of his original Q-sort before the telephone interview, and once 
again no revisions to the original were requested8. The interview approach was not 
substantially different for any of these interviews, though the greater time for researcher 
reflection meant that follow-up questions received more thought than the more 
spontaneous probes in the other interviews. This variability in data collection is not ideal, 
particularly for the latter two participants who most likely had to reconstruct the reasons 
they originally ranked the statements in the way that they did. Nonetheless, there was 
nothing to suggest from either the statistical results or the content of the interviews that this 
                                                 
8 This is an indication, though a weak one, that the Q-method results are reliable and would not fluctuate 
wildly if re-tested. 
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data should be discarded as non-comparable with the data collected through the standard 
process.  
 
Sampling and recruitment: The research approach selected for this project does not 
require a large random sample, or representative quota sample. A small sample provides 
sufficient statistical power for the principal components analysis to provide meaningful 
results. It is conventional to carry out Q studies with samples of around 30-50 participants 
(McKeown and Thomas 2013, 32), though considerably less is perfectly acceptable (Watts 
and Stenner 2012, 73). Moreover, it is sufficient for the aims of this study, which intends to 
explore the variety in participation preferences, not make probabilistic statements about 
their distribution in the general population. It was originally intended that this study would 
be open to everyone, however; after the pilot interviews it was decided to restrict the study 
to key informants9. Key informants are individuals who are recruited because of their first-
hand knowledge, expertise and understanding of the phenomenon under investigation 
(Tremblay 1957). In this case, a key informant was conceived of as a person who has been 
involved in some way in a participatory policy-making process in the relevant policy areas. 
The population of interest was thus unknown – there is no database of people involved in 
participatory governance from which a random sample could be drawn, even if it was 
desirable. This is not, of course, to say that the careful selection of research participants is 
unimportant, however; this study took a purposive sampling approach that is more 
commonly associated with qualitative research, following Bauer and Aarts’ (2000) criteria 
for successful corpus construction.  
Given that the objective of the project was to uncover the range of different 
understandings of and preferences for participation, research participants were purposively 
sampled with the aim of generating maximal heterogeneity in this regard. There is, 
however, only minimal guidance to draw on in the existing literature regarding the type of 
factors that influence participation preferences, and thus how to select for heterogeneity. A 
previous analysis of evaluations of participatory initiatives, drawing on the database 
                                                 
9 Two pilot interviews were carried out with people with little education, little political interest and no 
experience of participation, as a hard test case for whether the method would work with a general population. 
Both were able to complete the Q-sort but they quickly became very frustrated by the intensiveness of the 
method, since they were forced to spend a long time ranking statements saying how participation should be 
done, when they were not very interested in participation being carried out at all, let alone how it is carried 
out. It was decided that the methods were not well-suited to research with the general population and the 
decision was thus taken to focus on key informants. I will return to a discussion of the implications of this 
choice in the ‘inferences’ section of this chapter. 
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employed in Stage 1 of this project, suggested differences in conceptions of participation 
between different organisation types, particularly between governmental and civil society 
actors, such as academics and NGOs (R. Dean 2012), and the practices of social 
movements such as Occupy and UK Citizens also suggest they may have a distinct 
viewpoint. These different organisation types also provide a proxy for the different roles 
that those involved in participatory governance may play. Public officials are more likely 
to be involved in commissioning the process, civil society actors involved as brokers or 
organisers, and citizens and activists more likely to be on the receiving end of such 
initiatives.  
It is plausible that policy focus may influence conceptions of participation too, so 
three broad policy areas were selected that appeared to have subtly different discourses of 
participation surrounding them. UK healthcare policy has seen the rise of an 
individualised, consumerist notion of the ‘service-user’, based on the mantra ‘no decision 
about me without me”, which originated out of disability rights movements but has since 
taken on consumerist overtones in official policy circles,  
We consider that greater patient involvement and greater patient choice 
are all part of the same goal: to ensure that “no decision about me, without 
me” becomes the norm. (Department of Health 2012, 1) 
Given the same teams often carry out both patient and public participation in the NHS and 
for the Department of Health, it was thought likely that this kind of discourse would cross-
pollinate into public participation. Whilst there is an element of consumerist thinking in 
housing policy and tenant involvement, the tenor of housing and local governance policy is 
often about participation as an instrument to solve intractable problems; participatory 
budgeting, for instance, is promoted as a creating “greater community cohesion, as diverse 
groups of people come together” (PB Unit 2008, 8). People experiencing poverty or 
claiming benefits are rarely viewed as consumers in the fashion that NHS patients are. 
They are more often viewed as a problem to be solved or disciplined. Nevertheless, there 
has been an attempt to promote the participation of those experiencing poverty by claiming 
they possess an expertise that policy-makers lack – as the Commission on Poverty, 
Participation and Power intones, “Looking at policies on poverty? Involve the real experts” 
(2000, 46).  
The purposive sampling approach thus began by recruiting people in order to fill 
cells in a 3 x 3 table of organisation type by policy focus (see Table 2.32). Of course, these 
distinctions between organisation type and policy area are somewhat crude and Table 2.32 
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is only intended to be a heuristic. It guided the initial recruitment process, but there was a 
significant amount of craft involved; in accordance with Bauer and Aarts' Rule 1, the 
process “proceed[ed] stepwise: select; analyse; select again” (2000, 31). Since the factors 
influencing participation preferences were unknown, a variety of other potential factors 
were also recorded, primarily using the survey questionnaire. These included, sex, age, 
ethnicity, income, level of education, voting intention and geographical location. The 
questionnaires were analysed as the data collection progressed to ensure that there was 
diversity across all of these characteristics, though, once again, there was no attempt to 
ensure the sample was strictly representative of the population of England and Scotland. 
The sample is broken down by each of these factors below. 
Initial sampling matrix: Table 2.32 demonstrates that the sampling achieved a good 
spread across the different cells of the initial sampling matrix. There are equal numbers of 
public officials, citizens/activists and civil society actors. There is diversity across policy 
focus, though there is some under-representation of the housing and local governance 
policy area, especially with regard to public officials. However, this only considers the 
participants’ ‘main’ role, as defined by the researcher. Many of the participants were 
involved in participatory governance in more than one guise, and when the participants 
were allowed to choose multiple options this seeming under-representation of housing and 
local governance disappears (Table 2.33).  
 
Table 2.32: Number of participants by organisation type and policy focus (main role, as 
defined by the researcher) 
 
Public 
Officials 
Citizens/Activists Civil Society Totals 
Healthcare 5 5 3 13 
Housing & Local 
Governance 
1 2 4 7 
Poverty & Social 
Security 
6 4 4 14 
Totals 12 11 11 34 
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Table 2.33: Number of participants by organisation type and policy focus (multiple roles, 
as self-defined by the participants) 
 
Public 
Officials 
Citizens/Activists Civil Society Totals 
Healthcare 8 13 9 30 
Housing & Local 
Governance 
8 18 10 36 
Poverty & Social 
Security 
11 18 10 39 
Totals 27 49 29 
 
 
Sex: The sample was relatively evenly divided by sex. Men made up 44% (15) of 
the participants and women 56% (19).  
Ethnicity: Five participants (15%) denoted their ethnicity as black or minority 
ethnic, which is close to representative of the UK population total of 13%, and each of 
these five people reported a different ethnicity from each other.  
Disability: At least five people (15%) with disabilities were involved in this study, 
which is a little under, but close to representative of the UK population total of 19%. 
Disability was not formally recorded for the study, so the exact number is undetermined, 
since it is only known if the participant mentioned it in interview or had a visible 
impairment.  
Age: Adults of a wide variety of ages were involved in this project. Age ranged 
between 24 years and 84 years, with a mean age of 45 years. As Table 2.34 demonstrates, 
participants were distributed across different age ranges. 
Table 2.34: Distribution of participants by age 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 20-29 years 5 14.7 
30-39 years 6 17.6 
40- 49 years 10 29.4 
50-59 years 9 26.5 
60+ years 3 8.8 
Total 33 97.1 
Missing Missing 1 2.9 
Total 34 100.0 
59 
 
 
 
Location: Participants from diverse geographical locations were deliberately 
targeted in order to capture some of the diversity of political cultures in Britain, which 
could influence preferences for participation. As the study was based in London and this is 
where a large number of government departments and policy NGOs are based, London 
residents unsurprisingly comprised the largest group of participants (15), but this is still 
less than half of the sample. Residents of 10 different cities and towns from the North, 
South, and Midlands of England took part, as well as residents from Glasgow and 
Edinburgh in Scotland, and two residents of rural areas (one England, one Scotland).  
Income: Personal incomes were diverse but skewed towards the poles, particularly 
the well-paid (see Table 2.35 above). This is perhaps not surprising given the target 
population of key informants included a large number of policy elites on London salaries, 
but also individuals experiencing poverty and/or claiming benefits. Despite the polarised 
sample, there is full coverage of the salary range, with a minimum of two people in each 
salary category.  
 
Table 2.35: Distribution of participants by self-reported personal, annual pre-tax income 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid less than £14,999 5 14.7 
£15,000 - £24,999 3 8.8 
£25,000 - £34,999 2 5.9 
£35,000 - £49,999 8 23.5 
More than £50,000 13 38.2 
Total 31 91.2 
Missing Missing 1 2.9 
Don't want to answer 2 5.9 
Total 3 8.8 
Total 34 100.0 
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Education: There was a lack of diversity with regard to level of education, with 
only one participant having achieved less than further education, and 29 participants 
having a university degree or higher. Since two thirds of the sample is made up of elites in 
roles where a high level education would be a job requirement, a bias in this respect was 
not unexpected, yet more diversity in education level of citizens and activists would have 
been preferable. Nonetheless, participation in political activity is positively correlated with 
education level in Britain, and this includes participatory initiatives, which is one of the 
reasons such initiatives sometimes use random selection or other methods to correct this 
bias (G. Smith 2009). As such, high education levels do reflect the population of the key 
informants sampled for this study. In addition, the paucity within the sample of those with 
little education did not preclude the inclusion of people with very different life 
experiences, which included those who would be considered in the very elite strata of 
society to those with substantial experience of poverty, as is reflected in the income data. 
Voting intention: The most troubling lack of diversity concerned participants voting 
intention, which was measured as a proxy for political outlook (Table 2.36). By the end of 
the first round of recruitment, none of the participants had indicated support for a right-
wing political party, such as the Conservatives or UKIP, though more than a fifth of 
participants did not profess a definite preference, and it is possible that some of these 
people may have a right-wing political outlook. Given it is plausible that one’s procedural 
preferences would be related to one’s political preferences, recruitment was substantially 
prolonged to try to address this bias, though with only limited success. Despite a targeted 
recruitment phase it was extremely difficult to identify people of a right-wing political 
outlook involved with participatory policy-making, and, once identified, recruit them to 
participate. The final sample only included one Conservative voter, plus one person who 
declined to answer the question but was employed in a right-wing think-tank. Greater 
diversity in this respect would have been desirable, however; the difficulty in even 
identifying people with a right-wing political outlook involved with participation activities 
in the policy areas under consideration suggests that this field is dominated by people with 
the kind of outlook expressed by the recruited study participants10. Once again, the bias 
most likely reflects the bias within the population of key informants. In addition, the very 
limited sample of right-wing participants who were successfully recruited did not suggest 
                                                 
10 Data collection has recently been replicated in the US with a similar sample bias, with Republican voters 
massively outnumbered by Democrats, which is further evidence for this claim. 
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there was a specifically right-wing perspective that was missing from this study. Neither 
expressed unique views that differentiated them from the other participants, and each 
participant’s viewpoint was more similar to other participants than they were to each other 
– for instance, the statistical analysis showed they each loaded onto different principal 
components. Accordingly, the participation preferences described by this study are likely 
representative of those who dominate the practice of participatory policy-making.   
 
Table 2.36: Distribution of participants by voting intention11     
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid Conservatives 1 2.9 
Green Party 4 11.8 
Labour 15 44.1 
Liberal Democrats 3 8.8 
Scottish National Party 3 8.8 
UKIP 0 0.0 
Other 0 0.0 
Would not vote 0 0.0 
Total 26 76.5 
Missing Missing 1 2.9 
Don't want to answer 5 14.7 
Don't know 2 5.9 
Total 8 23.5 
Total 34 100.0 
  
Participants were recruited to take part in this project through one of two methods. 
Either they received a personalised invitation from the researcher requesting their 
participation, or they viewed an advertisement about the research and contacted the 
                                                 
11 Participants were asked the question “If there was a general election tomorrow who would you vote for?” 
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researcher to participate. Key informants who should be invited to participate were 
identified by attending many events and workshops on participatory policy-making and 
using these opportunities to network and seek-out relevant people, by searching for 
ongoing or recent initiatives online and any named people who were involved in those 
initiatives, and by drawing on existing and newly-made contacts to suggest potential 
participants. In the first instance, the researcher approached potential participants at the 
event to ask if they may be interested in the study and later followed up with an invitation 
email. In the second instance, the potential participant received a ‘cold’ email from the 
researcher. In the third instance, in some cases the potential participant was introduced to 
the researcher by the third-party, and the researcher then followed-up, or the potential 
participant received an email invitation directly from the researcher but referring to the fact 
they had been suggested by a third-party. These personalised invitations proved very 
effective in the first phase of recruitment. Of the 38 people invited, 32 responded to 
indicate a willingness to participate, a response rate of 84%. Of these 32 respondents, 27 
participated in the study. Three participants were lost simply due to scheduling issues, 
however; two of these people suggested substitutes who did participate. Two further 
people expressed interest in participating but this was at a time when the recruitment 
process was focused on trying to improve the diversity of the sample, and it was not 
considered that they would add to the sample diversity. 
Advertising proved less fruitful. In order to advertise the research, a webpage 
explaining the project and containing a form that readers could use to contact the 
researcher and signify their interest to participate was created on the researcher’s personal 
website. This webpage was also used to advertise on social media, primarily Twitter using 
relevant hashtags that interested people would follow, for instance the #demopart hashtag. 
Initially, the study lacked public officials working in the area of poverty and social 
security, so existing contacts were leveraged to have the research advertised on appropriate 
government mailing lists, which attracted a small number of participants. In total nine 
people contacted the researcher because they had seen the project advertised, five of whom 
were asked to, and did then, participate. Four of the nine were politely declined; one 
because he did not work in the right policy area, one because she was not based in the UK, 
and two because they responded quite late in the process, at the time when focus was on 
diversifying the sample, and it was not considered that they would add to the sample 
diversity.  
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Figure 2.33: Overview of participant recruitment 
Response rate calculated as no. of respondents/no. of invitations x100. Participation rate calculated as no. of participants/no. of invitations x100. 
* Response and participation rates for totals are only based on figures for personal invitations as the denominator is unknown for adverts. 
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The 32 participants recruited in the first recruitment phase were surveyed and 
interviewed in the summer of 2014. 31 of the interviews took place between 4 June and 29 
August 2014, but one interview had to be postponed from the original appointment date, 
thus took place at the end of September. A second phase of recruitment then began to 
attempt to remedy the seeming left-wing bias of the sample. This proved to be a long 
process, partly because it was difficult to identify and recruit people with a right-wing 
outlook involved in participatory policy-making in the relevant policy areas, and partly 
because the researcher spent some months on a visiting fellowship in the US, which  
stymied UK recruitment. The same methods were employed: personal invitations and 
advertisements but targeted to right-wing individuals and organisations. It was of course 
impossible to pre-judge the political outlook of public officials given they are required to 
be publicly politically neutral, making them very difficult to target directly. The most 
prominent right-wing social policy think-tanks appeared to have little focus on 
participatory governance. A number of the key informants that I contacted asking for 
recommendations of people to recruit couldn’t name a single person involved in 
participatory policy-making of a right-wing political persuasion. Accordingly, the 
definition of key informant was relaxed a little to encompass people interested in 
participation, as opposed to involved in. 17 people were identified for personal invitations, 
but the response rate was considerably lower than for the first phase with only three 
respondents, an 18% response rate. Two of these respondents participated in the study, but 
one did not attend the scheduled interview. Tweets and emails were sent to the official 
Conservative, Young Conservative and UKIP accounts, asking them to circulate the study. 
A named person, or the official address at the major right-wing think-tanks (Policy 
Exchange, Centre for Social Justice, Civitas, Adam Smith Institute, Institute for Economic 
Affairs) was also approached and asked to promote the study, but these requests were not 
acknowledged. No-one contacted the researcher during this period claiming to have seen 
the study advertised, and so no participants were recruited through this method in the 
second phase of recruitment. The final two participants resulting from this second 
recruitment phase were surveyed and interviewed in July of 2015. 
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2.33 Data Analysis 
The data provided by the participants in this study was subject to three analyses. 
The Q-method survey data was investigated using a statistical procedure called principal 
components analysis. The interview data was first explored using Framework Analysis 
(Ritchie and Lewis 2003), and then further interrogated using techniques from discourse 
and rhetorical analysis (Billig 1991; Gee 2011; Potter 1996). Each of these approaches is 
explained in turn below. 
 
Principal components analysis: The aim of the principal components analysis 
(PCA) was to compare the similarities and differences between each participants’ 
preference, as represented by their Q-sort, and reduce them to a smaller set of shared 
preferences. PCA is thus in essence a data reduction technique; it calculates a descriptive 
summary of the data through a linear transformation. This distinguishes it from factor 
analysis techniques that are concerned with estimating latent variables (factors) that 
underlie the observed variables (which in this case would be an individual Q-sort). There is 
an ongoing debate among Q-methodologists regarding whether to employ PCA or a 
technique called centroid factor analysis (CFA) that has fallen into disuse outside of Q-
method. The preference for CFA over PCA is commonly justified on the grounds that CFA 
allows the researcher greater latitude to explore theoretical hunches (Brown 1980; 
McKeown and Thomas 2013; Watts and Stenner 2012), however; this only appears to be 
the case if one laboriously conducts the factor extraction process by hand, thus can 
introduce variation in the ’reflecting process’ – something that is rare given the advent of 
modern computing software that runs the process automatically. PCA is disavowed on the 
grounds that it produces “a single, mathematically best solution” (Watts and Stenner 2012, 
99), depriving the researcher of their own judgement in the factor rotation process, but 
principal components can be rotated in an infinite number of ways, just like centroids. 
What PCA does specify is a clear criterion for the extraction of components - that 
components should account for maximal variance – something that CFA lacks and can 
open it up to criticisms of arbitrariness. Furthermore, CFA has to make some rather heroic 
assumptions concerning unknowns that are not necessary for PCA, for instance; CFA 
simply assumes test-retest reliability scores of 0.8, without actually going to the effort of 
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testing this for each specific application. PCA was therefore selected for this project, as a 
result of these significant advantages over CFA12.   
The PCA was carried out using the specialised Q-method software, PQMethod 
(Schmolck and Anderson 2014). The first step in this analysis is to give each statement in a 
participants’ Q-sort a score based in its placement in the Q-sorting grid. For this study, the 
five statements in the most agree column were awarded a score of +4, the five statements 
in the second most agree column were assigned a score of +3 and so on down the scale to 
the most disagree column, for which the five statements were assigned scores of -4. 
PQMethod uses these scores to compare the different Q-sorts with one another. The 
differences in scores for each statement between two Q-sorts are squared and then 
summed. The ratio of this ‘sum of squared differences’ to the ‘sum of squares’,13 
subtracted from one, generates a correlation co-efficient that demonstrates the extent of 
similarity between the two Q-sorts. This procedure is used to calculate a correlation matrix 
indicating the similarity of each Q-sort to every other Q-sort, (with a correlation of 1.0 
meaning the two Q-sorts are exactly identical, and -1.0 signifying they are exact 
opposites).  
This correlation matrix is the basis from which PCA extracts common variance 
amongst the participants as principal components (PCs). Each PC captures a portion of 
common variance, beginning with the largest slice, until all the variance is accounted for. 
The researcher then has to decide how many PCs to retain and the method of rotating them. 
There are a variety of tests that Q-methodologists have employed to determine how many 
factors should be extracted, all based on calculations on the unrotated matrix of PC 
loadings. These include: whether a PC has two or more significantly loading Q-sorts; 
Humphrey’s rule that PCs should be selected if the cross-product of the two highest 
loadings are greater than twice the standard error; the Kaiser Guttman criterion, which 
suggests retaining all PCs with an eigenvalue greater than 1; and the scree test, where 
eigenvalues are plotted on a line graph, and PCs are retained up to the ‘elbow’ of the 
graph, when the line begins to flatten (Brown 1980; Watts and Stenner 2012). 
Nevertheless, all these tests have their issues, the first two involve some circular logic in 
that they are based on PC loadings on the unrotated matrix, which alter substantially once 
                                                 
12 I’m grateful for email exchanges with Peter Schmolck and Max Held that helped to clarify my reasoning 
on these points. 
13 The statement scores for the two Q-sorts squared and summed (42+42…-42+-42) then added together, which 
in this case equals 600. This is equivalent to 2 * the variance in Q-sort scores, which since the scores are pre-
determined by the sorting grid is a constant for the study. 
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the PCs are rotated. One cannot use the loadings from the rotated PCs since it is necessary 
to know how many PCs to retain before rotating them. The latter two tests are both 
borrowed from conventional factor analysis, and are based on the notion that there is one 
correct solution, a notion that most prominent Q-methodologists reject. In addition, Q 
textbooks suggest using these tests as a guide, but stress the importance of the researcher’s 
judgements of the substantive interpretations of the PCs as the real test of the solution 
(Brown 1980; McKeown and Thomas 2013; Watts and Stenner 2012). Since for this study 
each of the tests suggested a different number of PCs to retain – between two and eight 
PCs depending on the test - they did not provide much guidance (see Table 2.37).  
 
Table 2.37: Summary of PC selection tests   
Test Suggested no. of 
PCs to be retained 
Humphrey’s rule 3 
Two significantly loading Q-sorts 5 
Kaiser Guttman Criterion 8 
Scree test 2 
 
Given the unhelpfulness of the test results, the assessment of how many factors to 
retain was based primarily on the researcher’s judgement of the value of different rotated 
PC solutions. The initial unrotated solution is just one of an infinite number of potential 
solutions, and is by no means the most appropriate solution. It is possible to rotate the axes 
of the principal components based on various criteria. It can be rotated by hand based on 
the researcher’s theoretical presuppositions about the best solution, or rotated according to 
statistical criteria, such as varimax, equimax and quartimax. The aim of the Q-method 
component of this project was to clearly model the different participation preferences of 
the participants as ideal types, so the PCs were varimax rotated in order to achieve a simple 
structure; that is maximise each participants loading on one PC and minimise their 
loadings on other PCs. The varimax rotated solutions for two PCs, three PCs, four PCs and 
five PCs were compared with one another to find the most appropriate solution. This is 
consistent with Abdi’s (2003) recommendation that since the number of PCs selected 
strongly influences the rotation process, one should try several different solutions in order 
to assess the robustness of the rotation. The alternate factor solutions were assessed based 
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on the trade-off between comprehensiveness and parsimony, thus additional complexity 
(an additional PC) was only accepted if it contributed additional value. This additional 
value was measured according to the percentage of explanatory variance accounted for by 
the solution, the size of the participants’ PC loadings and their meaningfulness, and the 
clarity of substantive interpretation of each PC.  
The four and five PC solutions were discarded on the basis of diminishing returns. 
They added small amounts of explanatory variance, but at the cost of diluting the clarity of 
interpretation of the other three PCs and the meaningfulness of the participants PC 
loadings. The qualitative interviews meant that there was another source of material on 
which to judge the similarity of participants’ views, and the four and five PC solutions 
paired people with seemingly very different views on the same PC, thus were considered to 
be a statistical artefact. The three PC solution was selected because it added to the 
percentage of explanatory variance accounted for compared to the two PC solution, 
without diluting the percentage of variance explained by the other two PCs or their clarity 
of interpretation. Adding a third factor also meant that all participants in the study have a 
statistically significant loading (5% level) on at least one PC, thus this solution was 
comprehensive in covering all the participants. The interpretation of the third PC was 
theoretically meaningful and substantively different from the other two PCs too.  
There were however some doubts concerning the third PC. As aforementioned, one 
of the reasons for running multiple solutions was to check the robustness of the rotation. 
Varimax rotated centroid factor analyses were also run for two, three and four factor 
solutions as a supplementary robustness check. The first two PCs were robust across all of 
these different PC and factor solutions, which always produced two PCs/factors with the 
same substantive interpretation. This was not the case for the third PC/factor, which was 
markedly altered depending upon the number of PCs/factors and the type of analysis. 
Accordingly, there is a much greater likelihood that the third PC is a statistical artefact, 
thus it should be treated with caution. Promisingly, a more recent, related study on 
conceptions of accountability in local governance that the researcher has carried out with 
colleagues at Manchester and Birmingham Universities has found provisional results that 
suggest there is something meaningful about the scepticism of solidarism represented by 
the third PC. In summary then, the three PC solution that was finally selected was 
comprehensive in covering all of the participants in the study, accounting for 45% of the 
total variance in Q-sorts, and resulted in three PCs that were believed to be substantively 
meaningful and unlikely to be statistical artefacts.  
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The substantive interpretations of the PCs presented in Chapter 4 were derived 
from the PC arrays. The PC array is calculated from the weighted average statement scores 
of all those who significantly load onto that PC. These z-scores are used to create an ideal 
Q-sort that matches the distribution of statements to achieve a PC loading of 1.0 for the 
respective PC. This PC array represents the shared viewpoint captured by the PC. Through 
analysing the gestalt distribution of statements, which are located in the agree columns and 
which are in the disagree columns, especially focusing on those statements at the extremes 
of the distribution, it is possible to describe the content of this shared viewpoint. 
PQMethod also calculates distinguishing and consensus statements that aid interpretation. 
Distinguishing statements are those where the differences in statement z-scores between 
the different PCs are larger than can be expected by chance. Whereas consensus statements 
are those statements which have no statistically significant differences in z-scores between 
PCs. These statements enabled the researcher to zero in on the similarities and differences 
between the respective PCs.  
To further assist the interpretation of the PCs, the thematic analysis of the interview 
data was grouped according to participants’ PC loadings. Participants’ PC loadings show 
how closely their actual Q-sort matches the ideal Q-sort for that PC, with a loading of 1.0 
signifying an exact match, -1.0 an exact inversion, and 0.0 signifying no correlation. A 
statistically significant loading is one that demonstrates the correlation between the actual 
and ideal Q-sort has less than a 5% (or 1%) probability of occurring by chance. Three 
groups were created, one for each PC, and participants’ interview data was included if the 
participant had a significant loading on the respective PC. The grouped qualitative material 
was then used both to check the overall thrust of the interpretation and provide deeper 
insight, for instance; to explore apparent anomalies in the distribution of statements, as 
well as the different ways participants loading on different PCs had interpreted the same 
statements. 
 
Thematic analysis: All 33 of the post-Q-sort interviews were transcribed verbatim 
from the audio recordings and uploaded to the qualitative analysis software Nvivo, along 
with participant characteristics obtained from the questionnaire, and later, when the PCA 
was completed, the participants’ PC loadings. Ritchie and Lewis (2003) have suggested 
there are three forms of activity in qualitative thematic analysis, situated at different levels 
of the analytic hierarchy, 
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The analytic process requires three forms of activity: data management 
in which the raw data are reviewed, labelled, sorted and synthesised; 
descriptive accounts in which the analyst makes use of the ordered data 
to identify key dimensions, map the range and diversity of each 
phenomenon and develop classifications and typologies; and explanatory 
accounts in which the analyst builds explanations about why the data take 
the forms that are found and presented. (Ritchie and Lewis 2003, 217) 
The data management phase was a key part of making sense of what at first felt like an 
overwhelming and messy set of data. The initial step in this process was to index the data 
(Ritchie and Lewis 2003). Each transcript was read through in its entirety to re-familiarise 
with the overall sense of the interview, before beginning again and carefully coding the 
transcript line-by-line, simply based on the topic of the line, for instance; the topic of the 
line may have been ‘participants expertise’. Of course, in real conversations it is common 
that the speaker weaves together many subjects at the same time, so the same line was 
often multiply coded and it proved a significant intellectual effort to unpick the multiple 
subjects of most paragraphs; on average it took between half to a full working day to code 
an interview in this way.   
In many ways the thematic analysis of the interviews in this project is somewhat 
unusual in that it is taking place in the context of an already completed thematic analysis of 
documents (Stage 1 of the project) that was used to generate a descriptive-explanatory 
typology, as well as a Q-method survey that attempted to systematically model this 
typology and the relationship between its different constituent themes. If the PCA had 
found quite different results, with PCs that did not fit the existing typology, then the 
qualitative material would have been a valuable source of inductively generating 
alternative theoretical types. However, given that the initial evidence of both the Q-sorts 
and the interviews supported the prior theorising, a more deductive coding approach was 
employed. A code was generated for each Q-sort statement to capture any direct references 
to one of the statements in order to facilitate an analysis of participants understanding and 
interpretation of the statements, as well as why they sorted them as they did. In addition, a 
top-level code was created for each of the four components of a participation preference, 
each of which had multiple sub-codes: objectives (22 sub-codes), participants (22), 
practices (21) and evaluation (22). These sub-codes were based upon the themes of the Q-
sort statements, which were of course drawn from the prior thematic analysis of 
documents, and an ‘other’ code was also included for material that did not fit the pre-
determined codes. The coding process mainly progressed by assigning lines of the 
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interview transcripts to these codes, however, with sensitivity to potential inductive 
insights too. Some additional codes were created on-the-hoof to take account of recurring 
themes across interviews, for example; a ‘relationships’ sub-code was created under the 
participants code in order to assign text concerning the relationships between participants 
and officials that was not well-described by the existing sub-codes. Nonetheless, the pre-
determined codes described the vast majority of the interview data, and this initial stage of 
analysis did not suggest that the conceptual schema being applied was inappropriate or in 
need of substantial alteration.  
Once the line-by-line coding of each transcript had been completed, the Framework 
Analysis function of Nvivo was used to create four ‘framework matrices’ (Ritchie and 
Lewis 2003). One matrix was created for each top-level code, thus one framework matrix 
contained all the material pertaining to objectives of participation, and so on. Each row of 
the matrix represented a participant and each column one of the sub-codes. Each cell 
therefore contained all the material for a single participant upon a single sub-code. Ritchie 
and Lewis (2003) advise that the final stage of data management should be to summarise 
and synthesise the original data. For some sub-codes participants may have only said a few 
words, but for many sub-codes the material even from a single participant was extensive, 
so, following this technique, the material within each cell was summarised and 
synthesised, while retaining the language of and links back to the original data (Ritchie and 
Lewis 2003). For example, consider the sub-code of participatory practices labelled 
‘decision mechanism’, which was a key point of contention between different preferences 
for participation. Participants’ discussions could run to thousands of words when different 
fragments of the interview were brought together into a cell (some of this material is 
presented at length in Chapter 5). Their comments were therefore summarised into short 
bullet points that tried to encompass their arguments, as in the below example of one 
participant’s ‘decision mechanism’ cell.  
1. Participation involves making sure that the general public are decisions 
makers, not an arbitrary hierarchy between people who can participate and 
decision-makers. 
 
2. People who may be decision-makers in one sphere may be participants 
in another sphere, so it is arbitrary to set up a divide. It is more fluid. And 
it should be iterative, people will participate more than once, so may have 
previous experience of decision-making. 
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3. There needs to be someone who is accountable for the decision and 
responsible for implementation. They should be involved in the decision 
on equal footing with others. They shouldn't own the decision as this 
disenfranchises the participants. 
 
4. You build a consensus of priorities through the process, by getting a 
shortlist that everyone has a hand in, and work with the accountable person 
to champion the decisions. 
Once these summaries were completed it was possible to look down the columns of the 
matrix and quickly aggregate all the arguments that the participants had made about the 
topic of any sub-code. One could also look across the rows for a summary of everything a 
single participant had said across different sub-codes, as well as easily identify the sub-
codes that had not been spoken about at all. 
These matrices were then employed to check and provide greater depth to the PCA 
analysis (as described in Chapter 4). It was possible, for instance, to check the PC solution 
by looking across a row at the summarised views of a participant to see if they concurred 
with what would be expected from their PC loading. Looking down the column on the 
‘decision mechanism’ sub-code enabled the identification of all the different reasons that 
some participants supported public officials retaining decision power, thus provided some 
explanation for the results of the PCA. Looking down the column on ‘participants as 
experts’ helped enrich understanding of the PCs by showing that though the Q-sort 
statement on this theme (statement S09) was highly ranked for both PC2 and PC1, it 
appeared to be interpreted in subtly different ways. These framework matrices, when 
combined with the results of the PCA, were therefore sufficient to provide the material to 
describe and explain cross-cutting themes. Given the correspondence of the findings from 
the PCA and thematic analysis, along with the earlier documentary analysis, there was no 
attempt to go beyond these matrices and organise sub-codes into more formalised 
explanatory schema, since this would have been an unnecessary recapitulation of the 
earlier work, and thematic structure is rendered in the principal components.  
 
Discourse/rhetorical analysis: The PCA and thematic analysis were primarily 
targeted to mapping out the cross-cutting themes and developing ideal types of 
participation preferences. Through this process of analysis it became apparent that most 
participants expressed substantial ambivalence and conflict in their preferences. The mode 
and presentation of previous stages of analysis underplay this intrapersonal ambivalence to 
focus on interpersonal similarities and differences. Accordingly, an additional phase of 
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analysis was instigated in order to explore the intrapersonal ambivalence of participants 
that, rather than breaking down the text into a few lines indicating discreet themes, focused 
on longer passages and how themes developed and changed as they were spoken.  
The preceding PCA and thematic analysis informed the selection of passages to be 
analysed. The PCA illustrated the core differences between alternative participation 
preferences. Between PC1 and PC2, this was the distribution of decision power; and for 
PC3 compared to PC1 and PC2, it was the role of self-interest versus more solidaristic 
motivations. These topics were selected for further analysis due to their import as core 
components of the identified participation preferences and core themes of the theoretical 
typology of modes of participation. Moreover, they provided an interesting test of the 
depth of ambivalence. Social representations theorists such as Gaskell (2001) have 
suggested that attitudes are ambivalent at their periphery but not their core, whereas the 
initial reading of the data for this project implied ambivalence even on these core topics. 
Once topics for further analysis were selected, it was a simple task to use the Framework 
matrices to identify possible candidate passages for further analysis. Three extended 
passages were selected that reflected typical kinds of ambivalence experienced by 
participants, one for each side of the distribution of the decision power debate, and one to 
demonstrate ambivalence between ideas of self-interest and solidarism. These passages 
were then subject to more in-depth analysis and the themes identified were supplemented 
with additional short quotations.  
A combination of discourse and rhetorical analysis inspired the techniques 
deployed to interrogate these passages. Discourse analysis can mean many things so it is 
important to be clear how it was employed here. The project is cross-sectional rather than 
longitudinal and the object of analysis was intrapersonal, so the Foucauldian type of 
discourse analysis that investigates dominant societal discourses and describes how they 
alter over time (Foucault 2007) was of course inappropriate. As this phase of analysis was 
added after transcription, the interviews were not transcribed according to the Jefferson 
Transcription System that is commonly considered essential by discourse analysts (Potter 
1996; van Dijk 1997) and provides a much greater level of specificity about the way things 
are said than the transcripts available for this project. This is why the analysis was 
described as deploying discourse analysis inspired techniques rather than as a discourse 
analysis. It is inspired so in its orientation to what is expressed by the participants. The 
passages are treated as discursive, as opposed to factual descriptions reflecting a concrete 
object. Following Billig (1991), they are specifically treated as rhetorical and 
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argumentative. The analysis therefore focused on what arguments are being presented and 
how they are made persuasive (Billig 1991; Potter 1996). Gee (2011) details 22 discourse 
analytic tools, a number of which were used to interrogate these passages, for instance: to 
ask not just what the speaker is saying, but what they are doing; to ask why the speaker has 
chosen these ways of representing the phenomenon and not others; to ask how words and 
grammatical devices are being used to build or lessen the significance of certain things; 
and to be sensitive the discursive context, the way the argument flows through the passage, 
how what is said relates to what was said before, and how the speaker attempts to achieve 
cohesion. In using these techniques the objective was to describe and explain the types of 
ambivalence that had been observed amongst the participants.  
 
2.34 Inferences 
The inferences from Stage 2 of the project are primarily presented in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5. Chapter 4 draws on the survey results and interview data to develop a discreet 
set of participation preferences, and Chapter 5 focuses on the qualitative data in order to 
explain ambivalence in those preferences. The final chapter of the thesis further expands 
on the implications of these inferences and draws out some meta-inferences. Teddlie and 
Tashakkori (2003) have proposed ideas of inference quality and inference transferability 
for assessing mixed methods inferences. The former comprises design quality and 
interpretive rigour and is linked to ideas of internal validity in quantitative research and 
credibility in qualitative research. The latter is linked to notions of external validity in 
quantitative research and transferability in qualitative research. 
Much of the above has been dedicated to demonstrating the design quality of the 
research methods - that they follow from the research questions, the rationale for design 
choices such as sampling, and that each component of the design and analysis contributes 
to a better understanding of the phenomenon. Sufficient detail to enable the reader to make 
their conclusions concerning design quality has thus already been presented and will not be 
repeated here.  
One of the reasons previously alluded to for the choice of Q-method with 
qualitative interviews was the strength of interpretive rigour. The transparent and objective 
data structure produced through PCA forces the researcher’s interpretation to stick closely 
to the data, thus that inferences are consistent with the data analysis. This increases the 
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transparency and accountability of interpretation compared with qualitative data alone. The 
inclusion of the interview element means that unlike survey research, where interpretation 
of responses is often determined by the researcher a priori in the operational definition of 
an item, Q enables the participant to render their own subjectivity, which is interpreted a 
posteriori. This again helps to ensure a close connection between the data and the 
inferences. There has also been an attempt to transparently present the data and how the 
inferences were drawn from it in order to facilitate readers’ judgements of whether the 
inferences are supportable, for instance; by presenting the full PC arrays and the extended 
interview passages along with their narrative interpretations.  
The interpretations of different modes of and preferences for participation were 
consistent across the different data and analysis types employed in this research which is 
evidence of their robustness. Combining phased documentary, survey and interview 
approaches also meant there were in built opportunities for ‘member-checking’. 
Participants had a number of chances through the survey and interview to reject the 
typology of participation modes. As detailed above, structuring the Q-set of statements 
according to theory does not produce circularity, but enables a clear assessment of the 
typology as participants are able to sort statements in ways that contradict the modes of 
participation. The results, however, mainly support it, as do the assertions of the 
participants that the Q-method statements, which were built upon the typology, were 
comprehensive and could accurately represent their viewpoint. Participants were also sent 
follow-up information in the form of a 1000 word blog written for a general audience, 
along with the full academic paper (reproduced as Chapter 3 of this thesis), outlining the 
typology of four modes of participation. This included an invitation to provide feedback to 
the researcher and responses to date have only been positive. Finally, the inferences are 
situated within the existing research literature. Though they challenge some current 
thinking, presentations at appropriate academic conferences and workshops have been 
well-received and there has been no challenge that the results are unbelievable or 
inconsistent with the current research evidence. Accordingly, this research satisfies the 
common dimensions that underpin the notion of interpretive rigour.  
It was stated at the beginning of this chapter that the aim of this study was not to 
make probabilistic statements about the distribution of participation preferences within the 
population, but to map the range of different understandings of and preferences for 
participation. The question of inference transferability thus becomes one of whether the 
range of participation preferences and the associated ambivalences can be generalised to 
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the study population and other populations. The sample for this study was selected from a 
population of key informants who had both an interest and experience of participatory 
governance in social policy in England and Scotland. There is good reason to believe that 
the empirical findings can be generalised to the larger population of those deeply involved 
in participatory policy-making. The sample comprises a diverse set of such people, 
including some very influential actors that are likely to set the tone of the field. The data 
collection appeared to reach the point of saturation and it was not felt that adding new key 
informants would have surfaced new viewpoints. Though the sample is biased, particularly 
with regard to political outlook, it is biased in ways that reflect the biases of this 
population. Knowing that this population are likely to adopt one of a knowledge transfer or 
collective decision-making approach, perhaps with some minor additional scepticism or 
pluralism mixed in, is useful in that these are the people more than any others who are 
determining the practice of participatory governance.  
We may also be interested in whether the empirical findings could be generalised 
more widely, to the general population of the UK for instance. This is much more 
debateable. The sample is not representative of the population of the UK. The lack of right-
wing participants, as well as the lack of the politically disinterested and those who do not 
favour participation is problematic in this regard, since there is reason to believe these 
people may hold qualitatively different views than those sampled. Nonetheless the 
theoretical work on the four modes of participation does fill in some of the missing detail, 
so even though the empirical grounds are weak, there is a case to be made for theoretical 
generalisability. Of course the politically disinterested may make the argument for a 
unique position of non-participatory governance – that decisions should be left to experts 
or politicians for example. However, this study was oriented to finding different modes of 
participation, which is predicated upon the idea that there should be at least minimal 
participation, so such a position would fall outside the remit of this work. Each of the four 
modes of participation is located within one of the main strands of political thinking, thus 
in order to come up with an alternative approach to participation an individual would have 
to innovate outside of mainstream of political thought. It seems unlikely that a non-
interested participant would generate a new approach when the thought-leaders in this field 
did not. The four modes of participation may be comprehensive regarding the ways of 
doing participatory decision-making even if they are not comprehensive of the ways of 
doing decision-making.  
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There are also empirical and theoretical reasons to think that the range of modes of 
and preferences for participation may be generalizable to other contexts, for instance other 
countries or policy contexts. The above argument that the four modes may encompass the 
main theoretical possibilities applies here too. They are generated out of theories spanning 
centuries and international borders. In addition, the typology is based upon dimensions that 
have proved useful for other general theories of related phenomena from approaches to 
public administration (Hood 1998), to modes of social citizenship (H. Dean 2013) and 
policy preferences (Gastil et al. 2011). Empirically, the many study participants involved 
in more than one domain of participatory policy-making did not express a view that 
participation should be very different in different policy domains. Further work by the 
researcher, in collaboration with Liz Richardson and Catherine Durose, has found similar 
results in a new study of democratic innovation in local governance. Together this suggests 
the inferences may be transferrable to other policy contexts, although this will depend to a 
large extent on the congruence between contexts. Previous research has shown similarities 
between procedural preferences in different countries (Bengtsson 2012; Font, Wojcieszak, 
and Navarro 2015). Work has also begun on replicating this study with key informants in 
the US. Though the results are not yet available for comparison within this thesis, the 
seamless replication of the Q-method survey with participants in another country is 
suggestive of the applicability of the concepts underlying the statements to other national 
contexts.  
There are theoretical reasons for believing that the ambivalence associated with 
different participation preferences may be generalizable more widely as well. The 
participants in this study are an ideal test case of ambivalence. Zaller and Feldman (1992) 
note that people exhibit more stability in their responses to survey questions on items that 
are salient for them and they have thought about. Accordingly, the ambivalence and 
conflict in preferences expressed by the key informants of this research is likely to be even 
more pronounced in less informed populations. In summary, though the composition of the 
sample means that the empirical findings should be interpreted with care when drawing 
lessons for other populations and other contexts, there are a number of inferences that may 
resonate in other policy and national contexts.  
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2.4 Ethical Issues 
Since a large part of this research involved the survey and interview of human 
participants a full consideration of the ethical implications of their involvement was 
necessary. Ethical considerations for this type of research can be broken down into four 
main areas: “whether there is harm to participants; whether there is a lack of informed 
consent; whether there is an invasion of privacy; whether deception is involved” (Bryman 
2008, 118). This project did not involve any deception – participants were made fully 
aware of the process by which they would participate, and the researcher’s genuine 
objectives for their participation both when they were invited to participate and before the 
Q-sort began. The issue of invasion of privacy was also minimal for this project as the 
researcher did not have access to any information that participants did not explicitly 
provide in the research context. Participants were asked questions - for instance, about 
income and voting behaviour they may have considered private – but it was made clear 
they did not have to answer any questions they did not want to, both verbally and through a 
non-response option on the survey. The high non-response to the question of voting 
intention suggests that participants did feel able to decline to answer questions if they did 
not want to. The main focus of the research – people’s normative conceptions of 
participation – was not considered to be a sensitive topic in this regard. A very small 
number of participants did request that one or two of their statements in the interview not 
be made public, and in these cases the participants’ wishes have been respected.  
The main ethical considerations for this project were in relation to informed 
consent and harm to participants. As aforementioned, participants were made aware of the 
objectives of the research and the process of their participation when they were invited to 
participate and this was then verbally explained before the Q-sorting and interview began. 
Participants were also given a consent form (see Appendix 4) to sign before the Q-sort 
began that explained this, along with how the information provided would be used, and 
stressing that the participant was free to withdraw from the research at any time without 
giving a reason. Since some of the participants were referred to the researcher through a 
third party, it was also stressed that the participant should feel under no obligation to 
participate because of their relationship with the third party and their participation would 
not be discussed with the referring person/organisation. 
The potential for harm to participants was also quite minimal for this study. The 
topic of the Q-sort and interview was not expected to cause the participants any significant 
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psychological distress. The participants did often experience the process as an intellectual 
challenge and at times experienced some cognitive dissonance in regard to their views. 
Nonetheless, most said they found the process interesting and enjoyable, and the 
willingness of participants to go beyond the initial requirements - by returning to interview 
when the audio recorder failed, or their Q-sort took longer than expected, filling out 
additional, non-mandatory information on the online version, and recommending other 
people to take part – is indicative that the process was not unduly stressful or burdensome 
for participants.  
There was potential for harm in terms of reputational damage for participants, for 
instance; if a participant’s comments were unpalatable to his/her colleagues or superiors. 
This varied by participant; some were keen to be assured their participation would remain 
anonymous, while others were happy for their real names to be used. Given this potential 
for harm, as well as required practices for data protection following the 1998 Data 
Protection Act, every effort was made to protect participants’ anonymity. Participants real 
names were only collected on the consent forms, which were kept separate from all other 
data in a locked drawer. Participants were given a reference number that was used for their 
quantitative data and interview audio files and transcripts, so that in the unlikely event of 
any of the projects paper or electronic files becoming publicly available they could not be 
used to identify participants. As Bryman (2008) notes, anonymising qualitative data is 
more difficult than quantitative data. Participants’ comments may reveal their identity 
through connections to places or particular initiatives. Accordingly, care has been taken to 
avoid inadvertently revealing a participants identify by removing potentially identifying 
information from quotes, or not using certain quotations at all where this was not possible. 
Small details about the participants have also sometimes been changed, (in ways that 
would not affect the substantive interpretation of the findings) and demographic 
information has mainly been presented in aggregate, so as not to give enough information 
about a certain individual that they would be identifiable.  
The LSE’s ethics procedures were followed and the completed ethics 
questionnaires are available on request. After completing these forms and following 
discussion with the two research supervisors of this project, it was decided that self-
certification was most appropriate and the forms were not forwarded to the ethics 
committee.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the methodological approach to this project, the research 
design choices that were made, and given a detailed account of how the empirical work 
was conducted. It has made apparent how the upcoming chapters are linked to different 
aspects of the research design. Chapter 3 is the output of a process of theory building that 
took place during Stage 1 of the research process. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 focus on the 
empirical data that was generated through Stage 2 of the research. Chapter 4 possesses a 
more quantitative bent in demonstrating interpersonal similarities and differences in 
participation preferences, whilst Chapter 5 concentrates on the qualitative material to 
investigate intrapersonal ambivalence within such preferences. Chapter 6 is the least tied to 
research design described herein, thus receives little attention above. Rather than being 
associated with a discreet part of the research design, it takes the insights and implications 
of the preceding three chapters to engage in a further stage of theory building. It paints a 
picture of what participation in complex policy systems could look like if it took account 
of the heterogeneity of people’s participation preferences. First, though, Chapter 3 outlines 
the new typology of four modes of participation generated out of the documentary analysis 
and literature review that comprised Stage 1.   
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Chapter 3 
Four Modes of Participation in Social Policy Decisions 
 
Liberals, radicals and authoritarians all favour participation, a tribute to the 
term’s symbolic potency and semantic hollowness. 
 
Murray Edelman, Political Language  
 
 
If participation is attractive across the political spectrum, how should we make 
sense of this? Is the same form of participation attractive to liberals, radicals and 
authoritarians? Or do they conceive of it quite differently? The multitude of ideological 
influences that underpin the rise of participation in governance is rarely reflected in the 
participatory governance literature. Classifications of participatory mechanisms and 
frameworks for evaluating them have most commonly been theorised from within a 
participatory democratic or a deliberative democratic tradition. This is apparent, for 
instance, in Arnstein’s influential ladder of participation, for whom “citizen participation is 
a categorical term for citizen power. It is the redistribution of power...” (1969, 216). 
Existing typologies of participation mostly take one of two approaches: either they follow 
Arnstein’s method and assume one particular normative basis then categorise participatory 
forms along a continuum from most to least legitimate (e.g. Arnstein 1969; White 1996; 
Pretty 1995); or they categorise by institutional design features without reference to the 
broader social and political ideology that informs the use of these designs (e.g. Fung 2003; 
2006; 2015; Smith 2005; Rowe and Frewer 2005).Those who propose frameworks for 
evaluation often note the competing imperatives driving participation, but only as a 
problem standing in the way of the realisation of genuinely democratic designs, thus they 
do not filter into the proposed evaluation criteria (e.g. Abelson et al. 2003; Papadopoulos 
and Warin 2007). This chapter outlines a different approach. It treats participation as an 
essentially contested concept, thus takes seriously the different ideological influences on 
the ways that participation is constructed. 
The majority of the chapter is devoted to proposing a new typology of four modes 
of participation, which are termed: knowledge transfer, collective decision-making, choice 
and voice, and arbitration and oversight. These modes consist of a rationale for 
participation with an associated set of participatory practices, situated within, though not 
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necessarily bound to, a particular mode of governing. In describing these modes of 
participation the chapter attempts to unravel the most common ways of constructing 
participation as a means to influence and/or take policy decisions, connecting these ideas to 
the broader theories of public administration and social and political theory that have 
tended to be neglected by current approaches. A systematic typology that makes explicit 
what are often implicit assumptions when we construct notions of participation can help to 
clarify our understanding of participatory practices, which frequently aren’t solely driven 
by participatory or deliberative democratic thinking. It provides a useful heuristic that can 
be deployed to inform participatory design choices, as well as decisions about whether to 
participate, in order to make them more clear-sighted. However, before outlining the new 
typology, this chapter will first offer a detailed critique of existing participation typologies. 
 
 
3.1 Current Approaches to Participation Typologies 
First published more than forty years ago, Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen 
participation has been influential in shaping the way academics and policy-makers think 
about participation (Cornwall 2008; Tritter and McCallum 2006). Its legacy is still 
apparent in typologies that similarly rank different mechanisms of participation from best 
to worst (Pretty 1995; White 1996), as well as in practitioner classifications (IAP2 2014; 
NHS England 2013; NHS England 2015). Arnstein views participation with an activist's 
eye, as an insurgency against government power. She proposes a ladder with eight rungs 
based on the extent of citizen power. ‘Citizen control’ is the apogee of the eight rungs, and 
a number of the other forms she identifies are presented with connotations of illegitimacy; 
the bottom five rungs are classified as ‘non-participation’ or ‘degrees of tokenism’ 
(Arnstein 1969, 217).  
An overt normative basis is a common feature of the ‘continuum model’ for 
classifying participatory mechanisms (Bishop and Davis 2002). Pretty's (1995) typology 
moves through several stages from manipulative participation to self-mobilization, whilst 
White's (1996) categories range from nominal to transformative. As with Arnstein, there is 
an explicit signal about what is the right and what is the wrong type of participation. 
However, the use of strongly normative typologies of participation is inherently 
problematic when participation is subject to competing definitions (Bishop and Davis 
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2002). A typology normatively skewed towards a single notion of participation is unlikely 
to do justice to the variety of alternative ways it can be constructed. While it may be 
tempting to dismiss all those forms of participation that do not fit with one's own preferred 
practices, this limits the use of the typology and also restricts our understanding of 
different forms of participation; it makes no genuine attempt to discover why these other 
forms of participation are legitimate within the theoretical framework in which their 
advocates operate; it only denigrates them and, as such, is unlikely to meet with 
widespread acceptance in more than a superficial sense.  
The problem of this strong normative basis plays out in the practitioner adaptation 
of these typologies. Practitioners frequently employ typologies that are both based in 
Arnstein’s ladder (see Figure 3.11), but reject its strong normative implications (e.g. 
Involve 2005; NHS England 2015; IAP2 2014). They recognise that informing and 
consultation can be valuable and are not simply ‘degrees of tokenism’; that “different 
levels of participation are appropriate in different circumstances” (Involve 2005, 18), and 
“activity on every step of the ladder is valuable, although participation becomes more 
meaningful at the top of the ladder” (NHS England 2015, 14). However, to deny the 
normative assumptions of Arnstein’s ladder does not stop them from underpinning the 
categories. The ladder makes sense for Arnstein precisely because it is a proposition about 
what to do; to aim for citizen control and participatory democracy. To deny this 
implication is not to remove it, but simply conceal how the commitment to participatory 
democracy informs the ladder. It makes it harder to fathom the omissions, for instance; 
why there are no forms of adversarial participation. If the typology is viewed as a 
manifestation of participatory democracy based on solidarity and mutual respect this is 
understandable. It becomes a significant omission when the intention is to adopt it to a very 
different agenda, the pragmatic participatory reform of the institutions of liberal 
democracy.      
A lack of recognition of the normative assumptions that underpin these typologies 
and their implications often has a negative influence on debates in the academic literature 
in this field. In an extensive critique of Arnstein's ladder, for instance, Tritter and 
McCallum argue, “it conflates means and ends, implying that user empowerment should be 
the sole aim” (2006, 162). The substitution of the term user empowerment for citizen 
control itself hints that Tritter and McCallum are operating with an alternative conception 
of participation. More importantly, Arnstein would likely reject their claim outright. For  
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Figure 3.11: Ladders of participation, then and now 
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Arnstein, citizen control is an end-in-itself and this is integral to her conception of 
participation; Tritter and McCallum's rejection of this simply demonstrates they are 
working with a more instrumental conception than Arnstein. In addition, the continuum 
approach has had the effect of preventing proper consideration of other approaches to 
participation. Damgaard and Lewis (2014), for example, use Arnstein’s ladder as a 
framework for producing a taxonomy of participatory accountability. In an effort to retain 
the form of the ladder they exclude choice and competition from their taxonomy despite 
noting its growth across multiple policy areas and countries.  
An alternative, less overtly normative, method for classifying participatory 
mechanisms is to generate a typology based on a range of institutional design features, 
such as the direction of information flow, the participant selection method, and the extent 
of decision power afforded to participants (e.g. Fung 2003; 2006; 2015; Smith 2005; Rowe 
and Frewer 2005). Smith (2005) takes the most rudimentary approach by straightforwardly 
listing different types of democratic innovation and classifying them into six broad 
categories: electoral innovations, consultation innovations, deliberative innovations, co-
governance innovations, direct democracy innovations and e-democracy innovations. He 
produces an impressive list of 57 different types. Rowe and Frewer (2005) take a more 
abstracted approach. First they identify three broad classes based on directional flow of 
information: from sponsor to public, from public to sponsor, and two-way. These are then 
further divided based on six salient features of their institutional design, such as the 
participant selection method, into fourteen sub-categories. Fung (2006) employs a similar 
but more parsimonious approach to create a three dimensional conceptual space he calls a 
‘democracy cube’. Each side of the cube represents one of three dimensions: the type of 
participants, the authority and power they wield, and the communication and decision 
mode. Individual mechanisms of participation are located within the cube based on these 
three dimensions. 
The decoupling from a normative basis for participation of these typologies is a 
potential benefit in that it is not prescriptive about types of participation and thus is 
potentially more widely acceptable. Fung’s democracy cube is explicitly based upon the 
notion that there is no canonical form of participation in contemporary governance and that 
it may be used to advance multiple purposes and values. However, this decoupling also 
reduces the amount of information provided by the typology. The continuum model 
implicitly provides us with a description, though only partial, of which institutional forms 
are compatible with which normative claims, whereas there is no comparable information 
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within the typologies by institutional design features, as they are somewhat disconnected 
from the wider debates regarding what constitutes legitimate participation. It could be 
argued that this approach fails to take participatory ideologies seriously. Fung (2006) for 
instance frames participation as a means to address deficits in existing institutions, rather 
than as a programme to remould them. This takes the status quo for granted with 
participation as a desirable supplement, and would be unlikely to appeal to those such as 
Arnstein, nor perhaps those who have challenged the existing bureaucratic arrangements 
from a market perspective.  
The institutional design approach to classification also fails to highlight how 
similar institutional designs may be employed in significantly different fashions when they 
are differently conceived. This has typified the spread of participatory budgeting around 
the globe. The original case of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre was instantiated by 
a radical left party with strong connections to social movements as a means for achieving 
its aims for social justice and fair resource distribution, and this was designed into the 
process. This has not been the case in other countries which has affected both the design 
and outcomes of the participatory budgeting processes (Pateman 2012). The experience of 
participatory budgeting around the globe has been characterised by its multiplicity, so 
much so that it has necessitated its own taxonomy (Sintomer, Herzberg, and Röcke 2008; 
Sintomer et al. 2012). Some have even argued that it is the ambiguity and malleability of 
the process that has facilitated its diffusion to different contexts (Ganuza and Baiocchi 
2012). This adaptation in the process of translation to different contexts has not been 
confined to participatory budgeting. Comparative studies have shown that the 
administrative traditions in different countries affect the level and reasons for supporting 
participation (Huxley et al. 2015), and that mini-publics have often been variously shaped 
by the different political cultures of national political systems (Dryzek 2010, chap. 8). A 
typology of modes of participation that connects particular participatory practices to the 
mode of governing from which they draw their meaning would help address this lacuna. 
Bishop and Davis go some way towards a typology of modes of participation, each 
of which “has a public rationale, and a characteristic set of policy instruments” (2002, 26). 
They argue contra the continuum model on the basis that there is no shared theoretical 
base for participation, so no single dimension such as citizen control upon which different 
forms can be ordered. They take an explicitly ad hoc approach, identifying five types of 
participation: consultation, partnership, standing, consumer choice, and control. Such ad 
hoc identification of types raises a number of questions as to the extent the types are 
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discreet, mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive and of a similar kind. There are some 
reasons to doubt whether Bishop and Davis' (2002) typology meets these conditions, for 
instance; they point to the use of one of their categories (consultation) within another 
category (consumer choice), suggesting that the categories may not be mutually exclusive 
or of the same kind. In addition, the fact that there is no shared theoretical basis for 
participation does not entail that there are no underlying dimensions which can provide 
some comparative order to illuminate the similarities and differences between the different 
bases. Bishop and Davis (2002) give little attention to these theoretical bases, thus how 
their different forms of participation are situated in different normative commitments to 
alternative modes of governing.  
The next section of this chapter outlines a typology that attempts to address these 
issues with existing participation typologies. This new typology refrains from categorising 
participation mechanisms according to one normative basis. It instead explores the 
plurality of modes of participation, connecting particular rationales and sets of 
participatory practices with particular normative commitments that are associated with 
broader modes of governing. Rather than an ad hoc process of identification, these 
archetypal modes of participation are ordered along persisting theoretical dimensions that 
help facilitate comparisons between the modes. 
 
 
3.2 A New Typology of Four Modes of Participation 
The typology represented in Figure 3.21 posits four archetypal modes of public 
participation in policy decisions, organised on two, intersecting dimensions: sociality and 
negotiability. It draws inspiration from two recent similar typologies, namely; Christopher 
Hood’s (1998) classification of modes of public administration and Hartley Dean’s (2013) 
taxonomy of modes of social citizenship. Accordingly, the dimensions resonate with those 
of ‘grid’ and ‘group’, originally proposed by anthropologist Mary Douglas (1970) in order 
to categorise traditional societies, and since popularised in political and policy studies 
primarily by Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990).  
The horizontal, sociality dimension of the typology concerns the extent to which 
the participatory space is agonistic or solidaristic. An agonistic participatory space is 
conflictual with individuals and groups predominantly concerned with promoting and 
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defending their own interests and values against other participants. In a solidaristic 
participatory space, on the contrary, participants view themselves as interdependent 
members of a social collective and participation is oriented towards collective ends and the 
common good.  
 
Figure 3.21: Typology of four modes of participation 
 
 
Whether humans are predominantly cooperative or competitive, and thus whether 
social relations are essentially agonistic or solidaristic has been a point of contestation in 
political and social theory for hundreds of years. It divides Hobbes from Rousseau and 
more latterly Foucault from Habermas. Compare, for instance, Habermas’ (1996) 
normative project to root the legitimacy of law in its generation out of a public sphere 
characterised by relations of mutual understanding free of coercion to Foucault’s inversion 
of Clausewitz’s aphorism, “politics is the continuation of war by other means” (2004, 15). 
It has been at the centre of recent democratic debates. The deliberative democratic critique 
of liberal democratic theory rejected the idea of democracy as a process of aggregation of 
individuals’ egocentric, pre-political interests (Dryzek 2000; Mansbridge et al. 2010). 
Deliberative democrats have in turn been criticised for neglecting the role of conflict and 
self-interest in democracy (Mouffe 2000; Mansbridge et al. 2010; Shapiro 1999). 
Moreover, sociality has been a prominent concern in recent programmes for market- and 
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other individual incentive-based reforms of public services and public administration. 
Proponents have based their proposals on challenging the idea of altruistic public service 
motivation of officials (Le Grand 2003), whilst critics have retorted that the proposals are 
likely to create a public sector ‘workforce of cynics’ (Moynihan 2010) and damage welfare 
norms that underpin support for vulnerable groups (Taylor-Gooby 2008). 
“Solidarity versus conflict” has been described as one of the primary tensions of 
participation (Walker, McQuarrie, and Lee 2015, 14) and the dimension also captures 
something of Mansbridge’s (1980) distinction between adversary and unitary democracy, 
and their associated practices of citizen participation. There is increasing interest, 
following Mouffe (2000), in agonistic conceptions of democracy. Despite this, the 
literature that focuses more specifically on the institutional practices of public 
participation, as detailed above, tends towards a presumption in favour of solidaristic forms 
and neglects their agonistic counterparts. This is perhaps why market-based mechanisms 
for empowering the public are rarely portrayed as participatory reforms by either their 
advocates or critics, despite the critical importance of the participation of citizen-
consumers for this theory of public administration. Accordingly, the typology elaborated in 
this chapter should help to remedy this neglect of agonistic forms of participation. 
The vertical, negotiability dimension concerns the extent to which the participatory 
space is prescribed or negotiated. In prescribed participatory spaces questions such as who 
participates, and about what, are determined outside of the space (perhaps by the 
commissioning organisation, perhaps by circumstance) and imposed upon the participants, 
who thus have little scope to determine the conditions of their participation. In negotiated 
participatory spaces participants are able to negotiate who participates, the intended ends 
of their participation, and the rules of interaction between participants. This does not mean 
that they are free from power relations, but in negotiated spaces power relations are 
predominantly horizontal, between those within the space, whereas in prescribed spaces 
there are also vertical power relations, between those inside and outside of the space, to 
take account of.  
Once again, a tension between prescription and negotiation has been at the heart of 
long-standing debates about democracy. A distinguishing feature of debates between 
republicans and liberals, for example, has been the extent to which rights are the 
expression of prevailing political will or a higher moral law (Habermas 1996, chap. 6), 
thus the extent to which negotiated popular sovereignty or prescribed constitutional rights 
has relative primacy. It also characterises contention over the nature of the representative 
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relationship; whether representatives are delegates with a prescribed mandate to 
implement, or trustees with latitude to use their own judgement (Pitkin 1967; Manin, 
Przeworski, and Stokes 1999a). Similarly, whether public organisations should be 
constrained by overt rules, standards or targets imposed from above, or free to manage by 
discretion has been a long-standing point of contention in prescriptions for good public 
management (Baldwin 1997; Hood 1998). New Labour’s use of a centrally-driven targets 
regime in its approach to public administration in England, for example, provoked much 
heated debate (Barber 2007; Bevan 2006; Bevan 2009; Gubb 2009). In addition, the extent 
to which participants can negotiate the conditions of the participatory space, though not 
synonymous with ‘citizen power’, resonates with the dimension that underpins the 
continuum typologies of participation like Arnstein’s ladder, and the recurrent questions 
that surround participatory exercises about who has power to set the agenda, make the final 
decision, and so on.   
Now it has been established that negotiability and sociability are salient features of 
debates about the practice of public participation in policy decisions, as well as long-
standing points of contention in democratic and public administration theory, which are 
both likely to influence the ways in which participation is more broadly constructed, the 
chapter will next consider each of the four modes that constitute the typology. 
 
3.21 Participation as knowledge transfer 
This exploration of the four modes of participatory decision-processes begins with 
forms of participation that are prescribed and solidaristic (i.e. the top right quadrant of 
Figure 3.21): participants have little control over the participatory space but view 
themselves as interdependent fellows of a unified community with common goals and 
interests. This accords with what Hood (1998) terms the 'hierarchist way' of doing public 
management in his grid-group typology of approaches to public administration. 
Hierarchical forms of organisation may seem a strange place to begin an exegesis of public 
participation, given public participation is often posited as an alternative to bureaucratic 
hierarchies (Fung 2004; Le Grand 2008). However, careful examination of the tenets of 
hierarchical organisation demonstrates how it can, and often does, profitably accommodate 
public participation. 
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From Plato’s guardians to Weber’s bureaucracy, there are a number of common 
features to hierarchical approaches to government (Weber 1922; Plato, n.d.). The primary 
feature is of course role stratification – a division between governors and governed – based 
on the justification that it is in the interests of society as a whole for each individual to 
carry out the function for which he or she is most suited. To operate effectively this 
stratification entails a number of conditions: that officials should not use office for the 
pursuit of their own self-interest or their own personal policy preferences; that the basis of 
authority is rationality and specialist expertise; and, therefore, officials should be selected 
by an open and meritocratic process. Though Plato saw democracy as one step from 
tyranny, an orgy of instant gratification at the expense of wisdom and self-discipline, later 
theorists such as Weber acknowledge it has an important role as a check on the totalising 
power of administrative bureaucracy. They thus separate bureaucratic administration from 
political control. However, Weber is pessimistic about the potential for democracy to 
realise popular control. The complexity of modern societies renders direct democracy 
infeasible. This complexity also means that political judgement is itself a form of technical 
expertise that cannot be accessed by the laity and must be honed by specialists. Judgements 
based on public opinion can never be more than demagogic, and political leadership is 
indispensable (Shaw 2008). We emerge with a political-administrative model of policy-
making in which it is the role of political leaders to use expert political judgement to 
ascertain and formulate the general interest of the population and direct the administration 
towards providing for this general interest. The role of the administration is to bring to bear 
the requisite specialist expertise and rational judgement to efficiently provide for this 
general interest. This approximates the ‘Westminster model’ of government (Gamble 
1990), and these ideas pervade quite varied traditions of political thought. They are present 
in both the Fabian socialism of the Webbs (1920) as well as JS Mill’s (1861) epistemic 
justifications for liberal democracy.   
This model of policy-making entails two rationales for public participation in the 
process, both of which are constructed as knowledge transfer opportunities. The first is that 
in order to correctly interpret the common will of the population, political leaders will need 
good information about that population, their needs and values. Accordingly, they may 
invite the public to participate in processes that capture those needs and values, so we see 
participation justified on the basis that, “Understanding peoples’ needs, preferences and 
values by talking with them is a way to enhance the effectiveness of decision-making and 
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service provision” (Involve 2005, 22). The participatory principle is based on pragmatism; 
participation is to improve outcomes, not necessarily because of a right to participate. 
The second rationale is concerned with improving outcomes by ensuring epistemic 
quality. Epistemic theories of democracy suggests democratic policy-making is the best 
method for pooling the disparate knowledge required to ensure effective policy decisions 
(Fuerstein 2008), and participatory governance has often been viewed as a means to 
improve problem-solving capacity through inclusion (K. Bartels 2013). The public is thus 
invited to participate where it is seen to possess expertise that can improve the 
effectiveness of a policy decision, participation “allows government to tap wider sources of 
information, perspectives and potential solutions, and improves the quality of decisions 
reached” (Cabinet Office 2002, 5). This also helps to remedy an inherent weakness of 
stratified political systems in modern societies; the lives of elite decision-makers rarely 
follow the patterns of those of the 'common man', and so the public is particularly valued 
for its experiential knowledge of situations that elites rarely encounter, such as poverty. 
Weber may have based the technical superiority of bureaucracy on the increasing 
complexity of modern societies, but advocates of participation frequently cite the 
increasing heterogeneity of society, and a supposedly more educated and less deferential 
population, as reasons why bureaucratic elites cannot claim a monopoly on expertise 
(Involve 2005; HM Government 2012). Traditionally, the second rationale would pertain 
to the domain of policy and the first rationale to politics based on the facts/interests 
division between the roles of bureaucrats and politicians, though in practice this distinction 
has become rather blurred (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981). 
Unlike the monopoly on specialist expertise, the monopoly on rational judgement 
remains with political and bureaucratic elites. It is important to stress that these processes 
are not commissioned in order that the public can directly instruct policy-makers what to 
do. The public participants are viewed as information units, providing inputs into a process 
of expert interpretation and decision-making, 
Public involvement contributes to evidence based policy-making. But it is 
only one source of evidence. The advice and decisions of policy makers 
will involve balancing evidence from a wide range of sources, including 
existing and new research; economic modelling; regulatory impact 
assessments; evaluation and scientific, technical and expert advice. 
(Cabinet Office 2002, 5) 
The construction of participation as an opportunity for the public to transfer knowledge to 
public-spirited, expert decision-makers is likely to be accompanied by particular 
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institutional practices of participation. Processes are likely to be stratified, with specialist 
roles reserved for expert decision-makers and facilitators which delineate them from 
ordinary participants. Still, those involved in the process will be encouraged to see each 
other as partners, who are all making their own valuable contribution towards a common 
goal, usually an improved policy outcome, thus bargaining or strategic game playing by 
participants will be discouraged. In addition, the participatory space is likely to be an 
invited space in which the public is invited to contribute towards an agenda that is pre-
determined by an organisation's policy priorities. Similarly, who is to participate will be 
decided according to this pre-determined agenda, with the public organisation retaining 
control over both which participant selection method to use, and then who should be 
selected. Nonetheless, given that the efficacy of a participation process within this 
participatory mode is chiefly based on its contribution to improved policy outcomes, the 
focus is not so much on one particular participatory form, but that the form should be 
tailored to best attain the desired outcomes. 
Governmental consultation processes often take this kind of form. Archetypal 
examples of the approach would be the experimentation with deliberative research 
exercises recently conducted by the UK Department for Work and Pensions (Hall and 
Pettigrew 2007; Hall 2009). Members of the public were invited to attend structured 
deliberative workshops to discuss priorities for the benefits system or future departmental 
challenges. Researchers then analysed the deliberations and produced a report that is 
intended to inform departmental decision-making. Participants’ conditions of participation 
were prescribed for them; they did not set the agenda or decide how deliberations would 
proceed. Their relationships with the organisers and officials who are supposed to be 
influenced by the report is also implicitly predicated on the idea that all share a solidaristic 
concern with making the benefit system better, thus deliberative influence – the unforced 
force of a good argument, to paraphrase Habermas – will be sufficient for their concerns to 
have an impact.   
 
3.22 Participation as collective decision-making 
The second mode of participation, located in the bottom-right quadrant of Figure 
3.21, is that primarily associated with the participatory left. It rejects the role 
differentiation, particularly the distinction between governed and governors, that 
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characterised the previous mode in favour of a vision of self-government through 
collective decision-making, “participation refers to (equal) participation in the making of 
decisions and 'political equality' refers to equality of power in determining the outcome of 
decisions” (Pateman 1970, 43). The express notion of participatory democracy advocated 
by Pateman may have originated in the US, out of the social movements of the 1960s and 
1970s, but it has long roots that have found expression in diverse forms throughout history 
– from Ancient Athenian democracy to the anarchism of Bakhunin. Nonetheless, Pateman 
(1970) is a useful starting point as, drawing on Rousseau, JS Mill and GDH Cole, her 
theory of participatory democracy weaves together five of the essential principles that have 
characterised this mode of participation. 
The first principle is the direct participation of all in the taking of decisions, based 
on Rousseau's notion of liberty, that we are free in as far as we are the co-authors of the 
decisions to which we are subject. The second, a general condition of political equality, is a 
corollary of the first – we can only be said to be co-authors of decisions if we have equal 
power to determine them, thus no person should be able to dominate another. Therefore, 
we are presented with a theory of democratic self-government in which a society of 
interdependent equals collectively (usually consensually) take decisions to which they are 
all equally subject. Third is the principle of subsidiarity, that decision-making should take 
place at the lowest appropriate (usually geographically defined) level and cascade up. The 
fourth principle is that participation should not be limited to the political. Participatory 
democracy entails a participatory society in which participation in political, social, civic, 
and economic decision-making is woven into the fabric of a citizen's everyday life. The 
final, fifth principle is that participation is, in the broadest sense, educational. It is essential 
to both the socialisation of citizens and the full realisation of human capacities. 
A brief consideration of the position of deliberative democracy within this typology 
is also necessary, given its influence has arguably superseded participatory democracy, at 
least in the Academy. Deliberative democracy appears to be overtly solidaristic in nature, 
given its rejection of deliberation as strategic bargaining between actors with pre-political 
interests in favour of a conception that emphasises the reflective transformation of 
preferences, consensus and the common good (Dryzek 2000).  It is, however, less clear 
where deliberative democracy stands on the negotiability dimension. Though there seems 
to be a general presumption that participation should be negotiated, deliberative democrats 
may show greater commitment to the quality of opinion formation than to the idea of open 
and direct participation if the two come into conflict (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007). In 
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addition, Habermas’ (1996) influential 'two-track' model of democracy, in which public 
participation takes place in a free-wheeling public sphere that influences but is separate to 
institutionalised processes of official decision-making may arguably be considered closer 
to the knowledge transfer mode outlined above. Other deliberative democrats have also 
been sceptical of handing formal decision-making powers to ordinary citizens (Dryzek 
2010; Parkinson 2006). 
Although the return to fashion of participatory democracy in the 1990s and the 
ascendency of deliberative democracy are often credited with driving the upsurge in 
participatory policy-making initiatives, it is quite rare to see their radical egalitarian forms 
given serious consideration as a practicable component of a theory of public 
administration. One might expect to find some synergy with theories of network 
governance, which incorporates similar principles of interdependence, autonomy, 
negotiation and trust (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). However, those theorists of network 
governance that have considered the role of public participation (Sørensen and Torfing 
2005; Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary 2005) give little attention to the direct forms of 
popular control that sit at the top of Arnstein's ladder and are envisaged by participatory 
democrats like Pateman. Moreover, Dryzek (2010), though optimistic regarding the 
potential of a 'deliberative governance', doubts the possibilities for popular control of 
governance networks given the difficulty of even conceptualising an appropriate public to 
which a network corresponds. Baccaro and Papadakis (2009) are also sceptical of the 
possibilities for a 'participatory-deliberative public administration' and contrast this with 
the Habermasian conception, which they favour.  
This lack of fit with theories of public administration is mirrored in the absence of 
these radical egalitarian modes of public participation in official spheres of policy 
decision-making, at least in the UK. Although the rhetoric of participatory democracy has 
become prevalent, the practice of popular control through consensual decision processes is 
rare even at local level. As noted in Chapter 1, Barnes, Newman and Sullivan (2007) locate 
pressure for inclusive democracy outside the state and in contradistinction to four 'official' 
discourses of participation, and previous work by this author has shown that official 
evaluations of deliberative participation initiatives pay scant regard to principles of 
deliberative democracy (R. Dean 2012). There is as such some basis to participatory 
democrats’ scepticism regarding the radical intent of participatory governance (Bevir 2006; 
Pearce 2010).  
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Outside the UK, participatory democratic prescriptions for decision processes have 
had greater influence within official institutions. The now famous participatory budgeting 
in Porto Alegre, Brazil was inspired by participatory democratic thinking, as were the 
30,000 communal councils of Venezuela, and there is a long history of collective, local 
decision-making through town hall meetings in New England. Within the UK citizen 
control has been restricted to social movements and civil society. The Glasgow Poverty 
Truth Commission creates an egalitarian space where those who experience poverty can 
collaborate on first name terms with public officials, relying on the power of the resultant 
personal relationships to drive wider policy change. Occupy London also appeared to be 
heavily influenced by participatory democracy and examining its operating procedures can 
illuminate the practices typical of this mode of participation.  
Like the knowledge transfer mode of participation these processes are solidaristic – 
interactions between participants are characterised by mutual respect, strategic behaviour 
based on securing personal preferences is discouraged in favour of public reason-giving, 
and the resolution of any conflicts proceeds through discussion oriented towards mutual 
understanding. Unlike the previous mode, the purposes and nature of the initiative are 
negotiated between the participants, rather than prescribed from outside the participatory 
space. The agenda is not pre-set, but collectively set by the participants and anyone can 
contribute a topic for discussion. Participation is open to anyone, rather than participants 
being selected, and restrictions on participation in order to achieve representativeness or 
some other criteria would likely be rejected. The rules of appropriate behaviour and the 
ways in which the business of the participatory space is to be conducted are also 
collectively determined by the participants, and always open to re-negotiation. As Polletta 
(2014) notes, though radical egalitarian organisation is often seen as leaderless, a better 
description is that everyone is seen as a potential leader, and leadership responsibility for 
particular tasks is continually negotiated between participants. Nonetheless, there is no 
special elite group of 'decision-makers', and decisions are prosecuted through collective 
discussion in which each participant can wield an effective veto, thus the aim is to reach 
group consensus. Whether this approach to collective decision-making can survive 
institutionalisation on a national scale remains to be seen. The NHS Citizen process to craft 
a participation architecture for the National Health Service in England, which has some 
basis in deliberative and participatory democratic thinking, will prove instructive, but it is 
presently too early to tell whether this initiative will be successful in realising its aim to be 
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“broad, inclusive and fair” and create an “equal and co-productive relationship between the 
citizen and the NHS” (Tavistock Institute et al. 2014). 
 
3.23 Participation as choice and voice 
The third mode of participation is the first of the agonistic types (located in the 
bottom-left quadrant of Figure 3.21). This mode has an equal disregard for the authority of 
elites, but would reject the radical egalitarian preoccupation with a collective search for the 
common good. It is characterised by a utilitarian methodological individualism that holds 
the general interest is no more or less than the sum total of all the individual interests of 
persons composing the group (see for instance, Bentham 1789). The enduring popularity of 
this utilitarian thinking is demonstrated in the pronouncements by both Nicolas Sarkozy 
and David Cameron (whilst in office) in favour of measuring the effectiveness of 
government according to gross national happiness; viz., by aggregating the individual 
happiness of each citizen into an overall measure. A concomitant doctrine is the idea of 
Homo economicus: individuals have pre-political interests and values which they are 
driven to try to protect or secure; they are, on the whole, the best judge of those interests; 
and, they will respond to incentives. These ideas can be traced back to at least Adam Smith 
and his oft-cited quote from the Wealth of Nations that to secure our dinner we should 
address ourselves to the self-love of the butcher and baker, not their benevolence (1776, 
119). In addition, there is a presumption that the process of each individual pursuing their 
own interests results in a self-regulating system of spontaneous order that produces social 
benefits (even Pareto Optimality). Again, this is often (controversially) attributed to Adam 
Smith and the metaphor of the invisible hand, however; it is explicit in the work of Hayek, 
It is, indeed, part of the liberal attitude to assume that, especially in the 
economic field, the self-regulating forces of the market will somehow 
bring about the required adjustments to new conditions, although no-one 
can foretell how they will do this in a particular instance. (Hayek 1960, 
346) 
These ideas may more commonly be associated with the field of economics, but as Hayek 
notes, they are also a component of political liberalism and cognate doctrines, and in this 
section I will outline how they have been constituted as a theory of democracy, a theory of 
public administration, and how they should be considered as a mode of public participation 
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in policy-making, given the not inconsiderable irony that they are inherently sceptical of 
what is usually thought of as the policy process. 
Schumpeter's influential Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy is often credited 
with precipitating the conception of democracy as competition (Mouffe 2000), but 
Schumpeter's model is overtly elitist in a way that political liberalism would usually reject. 
A more purely individualistic conception is expressed in Downs' Economic Theory of 
Democracy, which sets out a model in which “parties in democratic politics are analogous 
to entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking economy” (Downs 1957, 295). Political actors – 
politicians, parties, governments – are vote-maximisers. They possess their own goals but 
the realisation of these goals is predicated on political support. Accordingly, political 
actors are engaged in a continuous competitive struggle with one another to maximise 
political support, and any decision will be calculated with that end in mind. The voters that 
they compete for are themselves utility-maximisers. They decide on who to vote for by 
calculating the expected utility income from each of their potential political choices and 
selecting the one that provides the greatest return (so long as that alternative has a realistic 
chance of being elected). It is a model of democracy that gives considerable power to 
individual voters since political actors are beholden to their preferences. It has often been 
termed aggregative democracy by its critics (Mouffe 2000; Dryzek 2000) as political 
decisions are calculated by summing the individual preferences of voters.   
Public servants retained their air of public-spirited altruism longer than the 
politicians, but not much longer. From the 1970s the 'knightly' motivations of public 
servants began to be viewed with increasing scepticism (Dunleavy 1991; Le Grand 2003). 
Downs (1967) extended his economic theory of democracy to include bureaucracy, with 
bureaucrats occupying the same place as managers in the theory of the firm, and Niskanen 
(1971) argued that bureaucrats were motivated by the benefits derived from increasing the 
size of the budget they controlled (Dunleavy 1991). More recently, the argument has been 
extended to include public-facing civil servants, such as doctors and teachers, who may 
additionally engage in unwanted acts of paternalism even when motivated by altruism (Le 
Grand 2003). As a result, the market-based approach to public administration is 
increasingly popular. It is a central ingredient of the recipes for entrepreneurial public 
sector reform espoused by Osborne and Gaebler (1993), who attained guru status with the 
Clinton administration (Hood 1998), but the most sophisticated exponent of this general 
approach is arguably Le Grand (2003; 2008), who helped drive New Labour's market-
based reforms of the NHS. The kernel of Le Grand's position is competition between 
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service providers (e.g. hospitals and schools) for the custom of service users (patients and 
parents), who have the power to choose their provider, will result in greater quality, 
efficiency and responsiveness of services and greater equity and autonomy for the users of 
those services, through the other invisible hand of state-facilitated quasi-markets. 
The primary political/social act according to the economic theory of democracy and 
the market approach to public administration is thus for individual citizens to express their 
preferences through choice, whether it is by casting a vote or choosing a service provider. 
Nozick (1974) even applies this logic of choice to political society in its entirety; arguing 
that utopia would be a situation in which there exists a multitude of differently constituted 
communities, where people could choose to live in the community that best suits their 
preferences. It may be objected that this chapter set out to uncover the variety of different 
ways the public participates in policy-level decisions, and choosing one's healthcare 
provider is not participation in a policy-level decision. However, consider the decision 
process involved in closing a failing school or hospital. Within the knowledge transfer 
mode, this decision would be made by expert policy elites with appropriate input from the 
public, perhaps a consultation. Within the collective decision-making mode, the decision 
would be made through collective discussion and unanimity decision amongst all those 
affected. Le Grand (2008), however, proposes that these decisions should be depoliticised, 
enforced by an independent agency that decides by applying specified rules regarding 
market performance. The individual decisions of citizens in the market thus become a de 
facto process of policy-level decision-making, therefore choice should be regarded as a 
form of public participation in policy-making. Moreover, it is absolutely essential to the 
functioning of the market system – if citizens refuse to make choices based on expected 
utility, then the benefits of the market are never realised – as such, public participation as 
choice is a doctrinal component of market-based approaches to social policy.  
There are a range of secondary mechanisms of participation that are also 
commonplace within this mode, for instance; complaints procedures, customer satisfaction 
surveys, and interest group lobbying. It is quite common to find the nomenclature of 
customer outreach applied to participation, for instance the World Bank has equated citizen 
voice with listening to their customers and generating “demand-side pressure” (Kim, 
2013). As Le Grand (2008) notes, if service providers are trying to attract your custom they 
have a strong incentive to listen if you choose to voice your wants and needs (as do 
political parties trying to attract your vote). Therefore, politicians and public service 
organisations are likely to set up processes that allow you to express your preferences to 
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them because your preferences are a direct form of market intelligence. Preferences 
expressed through interest group lobbying should also find a sympathetic ear if meeting 
them can increase the 'market share' of politicians and public service organisations. 
Normative opposition to market logic from most proponents of participation means that 
these forms have rarely received serious consideration as participatory instruments. 
However, Warren (2011) has called for a reappraisal of exit for its potential to widely 
distribute empowerments at low cost, and Goodin and Dryzek (2006) have documented the 
use of mini-publics as a means to shape policy through market testing of ideas. 
The conceptualisation of participation as choice and voice differs from the two 
previous modes of participation outlined in this chapter since it is the first in which 
participation is oriented towards expressing preferences rather than an attempt to reach a 
form of mutual understanding or address the common good. Again this construction entails 
particular forms of participatory practice. Participation mechanisms will tend to facilitate 
interactions between individual citizens and politicians or public organisations rather than 
between citizens. The goal of participation is responsiveness: politicians and public 
organisations should listen to citizens' preferences and do what they say (unless there is a 
larger group of citizens who express opposing preferences), which is quite different from 
the knowledge transfer mode, where public participation is just one of a number of inputs 
that need to be weighed in the decision process. Nonetheless, public voices do not have a 
decision-making role, such as that in the collective decision-making mode. This is 
unnecessary since they can exercise their power through making choices in the 
marketplace. What is similar to the collective decision-making mode is the scope of the 
public to determine their own agenda for participation. Individual citizens and interest 
groups decide what preferences they want to express so set the terms of the debate. 
 
3.24 Participation as arbitration and oversight 
The final mode of participation, located in the top-left of Figure 3.21, is also based 
on an agonistic construction of society in which there is continual conflict between 
individuals and groups to realise their own interests and values. However, this mode is 
sceptical of the proposition that all this competition leads to spontaneous order and social 
benefits. For Hobbes, a society left unregulated by a common power will degenerate into 
civil war as men “make warre upon each other, for their particular interests” (1651, 225). 
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State compulsion is necessary in order that humans can live peaceably together; otherwise 
individuals will renege on agreements with each other when it is in their interests to do so, 
and coordinated action becomes impossible. The notion of the state as a protective check 
on human vice is a recurring theme in political thought, which still persists today. For 
Hobbes it takes the form of absolute monarchy, but for Locke (1690) the community can 
play the role of impartial umpire. Moreover, Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) argue that 
much pluralist thinking adopts a similar notion of the neutral state in which the state acts 
as referee between interest groups, working to uphold customary norms and intervening to 
punish transgressors. 
The idea of the neutral state working for the public interest, like the state's claim to 
a monopoly on expertise, has been attacked by a number of quite different theoretical 
traditions: Marxists have claimed the state in capitalist society is an instrument of 
bourgeois power; the New Right has claimed that state actors follow their own private 
interests (as discussed above); and, even within pluralism, there are competing notions of 
the state, for instance, as simply a mirror of the balance of interests (Dunleavy and 
O’Leary 1987). Ideological critique has also been accompanied by the impact of very real 
failures when public services have caused catastrophic harm to those they are supposed to 
serve, and moreover, subsequently responded badly to their failures. Dunleavy (1977), for 
instance, documented how the local authority closed ranks after the partial collapse of a 
public housing highrise in 1968 killed five residents, privileging their contracts with a 
construction company over the protests of local residents concerned about safe housing. A 
more recent example is the scandal of unacceptably high mortality rates and poor patient 
care at Stafford hospital, where the warnings of patients’ relatives were repeatedly ignored 
as the Board of Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust pushed for foundation trust status (Francis 
2013). Just as the challenge to the state's monopoly on expertise opened a potential sphere 
for public participation, so does the challenge to the state's neutrality and pure public 
service motivation. It provides two potential rationales for public participation, each 
oriented towards producing accountability and legitimacy.  
If the state cannot be trusted to play the role of the impartial referee, perhaps the 
public can. The first rationale is thus to substitute for the state as neutral arbiter. This 
arbiter role can either be systemically institutionalised, or commissioned on an ad hoc 
basis when a public organisation is viewed as too closely aligned to a particular interest 
group or in possession of its own particular interests that diverge from the public interest. 
This mode of participation is rarely given much attention in the literature on public 
102 
 
participation in policy-making, but the most widespread example of citizen participation in 
the business of the state is in a systemically institutionalised arbiter role – as randomly 
selected members of a jury in a legal trial. Legal juries are, of course, not a form of policy 
decision-making, and there is no corresponding systemically institutionalised citizen 
arbitration role in processes of public administration. Nonetheless, they were an inspiration 
for the policy innovation of citizens’ juries that have increasingly been employed as a 
participatory policy-making mechanism in recent years. Moreover, mini-publics such as 
citizens’ juries and citizens’ assemblies have been employed as ad hoc citizen arbitration 
tools, as a means to break through deadlocks in public debates that have become a 
polarised battle between interest groups (e.g. in cases documented by Parkinson 2004; 
Beauvais and Warren 2015). Bingham, Nabatchi and O'Leary (2005) have also 
documented the tendency for the public to take on a quasi-judicial role in new governance 
processes through their participation in forms of mediation, facilitation, mini-trials and 
arbitration. Though it is rarely overtly stated as an aim of participation in the grey 
literature, aspects of the implicit logic of this mode of participation do seem to pervade 
quite widely, in particular the focus on excluding 'vested interests' from decision power in 
order to ensure decision legitimacy is a common theme (see, for instance, the Public 
Administration Select Committee (2013) on Public Engagement in Policy-Making). It is 
often perceived by sceptics as an attempt by public organisations to control the process by 
excluding more informed and articulate participants, but the quest for impartiality may 
provide a legitimate rationale for restricting the role of certain groups. The primary 
objective of participation as arbitration is thus to improve the legitimacy of decisions and 
render them acceptable to all, by demonstrating that decisions have been subject to a fair 
process that has not been dominated by of one set of vested interests. 
The second rationale is that if public organisations and officials cannot be trusted to 
carry out their functions in line with the public good, then the public can play the role of 
impartial critic of state activity and produce accountability through oversight. Public 
organisations are usually subject to oversight by other government or quasi-government 
institutions, such as independent regulatory bodies. Processes of citizen redress also enable 
citizens to directly challenge public institutions through complaints, appeals, tribunals and 
legal cases when they receive unfair or poor treatment. These processes are extensive, with 
UK central government processing close to 1.4 million cases received through redress 
mechanisms each year (Dunleavy et al. 2005). Though redress primarily concerns the 
treatment of a specific individual it can often impact on policy-level decisions, through 
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individual cases becoming precedents that force broader policy changes, and through 
filtering into the work of the relevant oversight bodies such as ombudspersons and public 
service consumer watchdogs14. The original, Scandinavian conception of the 
ombudsperson, for instance, is modelled on the idea of a people’s champion, channelling 
public demands to point out systemic policy and administration failures (H. Dean 2015, 
130). There is thus a case for arguing even these types of oversight through regulatory 
bodies include a significant element of indirect citizen participation, though the citizen is 
restricted to the role of complainant. 
Examples of full participatory oversight, in which citizens replace professionals in 
the role of auditor are uncommon in contemporary public administration in the UK, 
however, they have their historical precedents and advocates. In classical Athens public 
auditors were selected by lot, and Burnheim's demarchy advocates the oversight of 
government bureaucracies by committees of citizens selected by lot (Hood 1998). Hybrid 
forms of oversight whereby citizen auditor roles are created as a subsection within a 
broader process of professional audit have also been introduced into the UK health system 
by Healthwatch and the Care Quality Commission (CQC). Despite the noted potential for 
participation to realise popular oversight of both underperforming street-level bureaucrats 
and policy level decisions (Goodin and Dryzek 2006), as well as the widespread view that 
participation produces accountability, this has mostly been noted as a natural feature of the 
communicative relationships generated through participatory activities, rather than 
theorised as a particular mode of participation in itself. An exception is Boswell’s (2016) 
call for a more deliberative bureaucracy, which has a significant focus on making officials 
more accountable through participatory oversight, proposing ‘scrutiny forums’ where 
officials have to justify their interpretation of policy commitments and ‘contestatory 
reviews’ that can be instigated by civil society when there is a perceived bias amongst 
officials. 
                                                 
14 There is an important distinction between how redress is formulated from an arbitration and oversight 
perspective and the types of consumer voice described in the previous section. In a market or quasi-market 
system the market should ensure that the interests of public institutions and their users are aligned, as 
entrepreneurial public institutions have the extrinsic market motivation to listen to and address their 
customers’ complaints. Accordingly, voice mechanisms can be relatively toothless – you simply complain to 
the organisation that has wronged you and the discipline of the market ensures they will put it right. From an 
arbitration and oversight perspective the relationship is more adversarial. When wronged you must complain 
to another institution (e.g. the ombudsperson), or institute a formal process of appeal in which the two parties 
engage as adversaries presenting their cases, precisely because the institution that treated you unfairly is not 
motivated to remedy the problem and must be compelled to do so.    
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The importance of neutrality for this mode of participation points to some key 
features of likely participatory practices. Selection of participants will be tightly controlled. 
Who participates is of crucial importance to the legitimacy of the process and the 
acceptability of any decisions it reaches, so there will be clear criteria for demonstrating 
that the selection of participants has not prejudiced the final outcome. Therefore, 
participants will be selected at random or selected for their impartiality, namely; their lack 
of any links to the interest groups with a stake in the outcome of the process. If the 
mechanism is an ongoing process there are also likely to be limited terms for participants, 
since this reduces incentives for interest groups to try to co-opt participants to their cause. 
A specific agenda that participants are entrusted with prosecuting will also be determined 
in advance – this is a necessary pre-requisite for selecting impartial participants and also 
prevents participants adapting the process to pursue their own interests. Participation is 
likely to be adversarial. Those with an interest in the decision present their case to the 
impartial adjudicators, who are expected to interrogate their arguments and come to a 
balanced decision. Finally, the output of the process will carry considerable weight – it  
may be a decision that all parties are expected to abide by, or a report to which a public 
organisation is compelled to respond. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a typology of participation that goes beyond the 
radicalism and resignation of the most common approach to classifying participation 
mechanisms, which situates radical democracy as the apogee of participatory practice and 
any deviation from its principles as illegitimate.  It has shown participatory democracy has 
no monopoly on claims to public participation, and attempted to outline the most common 
alternative understandings of participation. Public participation is not necessarily in 
opposition to hierarchy and institutional power. It has a legitimate complementary role in 
such systems, and this is often how it is constructed by public organisations. Rather than 
presuming participation should always be solidaristic, the typology includes agonistic 
modes of participation, which have tended to be neglected in the literature despite rising 
interest in agonistic conceptions of democracy following Mouffe (2000). This is not to say 
we should refrain from arguments about what the right forms of participation are, only that 
these arguments should be directed towards contesting the actual assumptions of 
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Figure 3.31: Summary of the four modes of participation 
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alternative modes, rather than simply presuming others are bastardising the ideas of 
participatory democracy. 
The typology presents four modes of participation – as knowledge transfer, 
collective decision-making, choice and voice, arbitration and oversight – in which clear 
rationales for participation are linked to historical notions of the functions of the state, and 
combined with characteristic participatory practices and conceptions of the citizen. It is 
intended to be a parsimonious heuristic providing useful analytical frames that can 
illuminate our thinking about participation. It can help us understand conflicts between 
actors in existing participation initiatives, for instance; why the attempts of public 
organisations to reduce interest group manipulation of processes are commonly construed 
as attempts to control the process by those who do not share an agonistic worldview. In 
addition, it may assist predictions of why some participation initiatives succeed whilst 
others fail: introducing agonistic procedures into solidaristic institutional cultures may 
result in alienation, whereas introducing solidaristic processes into agonistic institutional 
cultures may result in interest group domination and processes being viewed as 
illegitimate. 
The typology is not intended to be a schema for classifying traditions of political 
thought. After all, it is possible to identify elements of all four quadrants in just the 
writings of JS Mill. Neither should it be used to rigidly assign different types of 
participatory mechanisms – e.g. citizens juries – to different participation modes. It can, 
however, increase our sensitivity to the nuance with which the same or similar mechanisms 
are used for different ends – citizens’ juries, for example, can and have been used for 
arbitration and for knowledge transfer. Moreover, the four modes are presented as 
archetypes and cannot capture all the myriad variations in participatory practice. The real 
world is messier than the neat conceptual distinctions outlined above. The modes should 
not be viewed as static, self-sufficient, alternative models of participatory governance. 
They are sets of practices responding to particular problems of governance that are most 
commonly associated with particular modes of governing. Still, there are affinities as well 
as differences between the four modes, thus one mode of governing may borrow practices 
and problem definitions from another. Participatory processes are therefore likely to 
contain subtle variations on these modes, and even combine elements of different modes 
into hybrid forms. Take, for instance, the Citizens’ Initiative Review that has been 
appended to referenda in Oregon. It is part soft arbitration in that a group of 20 randomly 
selected people are asked to hear the arguments from the relevant interested groups for and 
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against a proposal, then come to a judgement, but the main focus is a variation on 
knowledge transfer. The judgement statement this group produces is intended to raise the 
epistemic quality of the final vote by providing high quality, unbiased information to 
decision-makers, only here the decision-makers are voters as opposed to policy-makers. 
Recent moves towards thinking about state structures in terms of multi-level 
governance, along with the difference democrat critique that there are multiple overlapping 
publics, not one homogeneous public, create the potential for different modes of 
participation to interact in a variety of ways to serve multiple functions within complex 
policy systems. In such instances, the typology can be a useful tool for deconstructing 
these complex processes to highlight which components are performing which 
participatory labour and to what end. Chapter 6 addresses this theme in detail. Before this, 
the next two chapters reflect on the empirical investigation into the procedural preferences 
of those involved with participatory initiatives. Chapter 4 draws on both the quantitative 
and qualitative findings to ask whether participation preferences mirror the four modes of 
participation outlined in this chapter. 
  
108 
 
Chapter 4  
Understanding Procedural Preferences for Participatory Policy-Making 
 
Each man…carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a 
“philosopher”, an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception 
of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to 
sustain a conception of the world or modify it. 
 
Antonio Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks 
 
 
The fact that participation is an essentially contested concept forces the actors 
involved with participatory policymaking initiatives to become everyday philosophers. 
They must make sense of the diversity in conceptions of participation and what it means 
for their practice. Which particular conception of participation should they sustain, for 
instance? Does it need modifying? This chapter is focused on understanding these 
procedural preferences for participatory policy-making. The idea that citizens have policy 
preferences – for instance, on the appropriate level of redistribution through taxation, or 
the right level of immigration – is a familiar one. Procedural preferences concerning the 
process by which policy decisions are made have been subject to less attention on the basis 
that citizens are more interested in the outcomes of decisions than how they are arrived at 
(Font, Wojcieszak, and Navarro 2015). There is, nevertheless, a small but recently 
burgeoning literature demonstrating that, across a variety countries, citizens’ preferences 
for democratic decision-making are diverse (Bengtsson 2012; Bengtsson and Christensen 
2016; Dryzek and Berejikian 1993; Font, Wojcieszak, and Navarro 2015; Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse 2001; P. Webb 2013). In UK social policy, analyses of stakeholders’ views 
have shown a mixture of consumerist, democratic and technocratic rationales underpinning 
tenant participation in social housing and participation in what were primary care groups in 
the NHS (Cairncross, Clapham, and Goodlad 1997; Hickman 2006; R. Rowe and Shepherd 
2002). The chapter therefore asks whether there is a similar diversity in participation 
preferences. If so, does this diversity mirror the typology of four modes of participation? 
Moreover, are there distinct differences between different types of actors, for instance; 
disagreements between civil servants and activists on the right way to do participation? 
                                                 
 [and woman…] 
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Understanding participation preferences is valuable for a number of reasons. It is 
important for the very reason that the claim of policy initiatives to be participatory is tied 
to their ability to attract broad-based public support and involvement. Recent research has 
found that procedural preferences matter for political behaviours and appraisals of political 
institutions. Whether citizens express a preference for participatory-, representative-, or 
expert-led decision processes is predictive of their propensity to take up opportunities to 
participate, as well as the means by which they participate (Bengtsson and Christensen 
2016; P. Webb 2013; Neblo 2015). The gap between a person’s procedural preferences and 
their perception of existing procedures is associated with greater dissatisfaction with 
government and greater inclination to disobey laws (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001). An 
appreciation of citizen’s participation preferences is thus likely to be essential in attracting 
broad participation, as well as beneficial for the legitimacy of political institutions that 
open up to participation and the legitimacy of the policies that are arrived at through 
participatory policy-making. 
Understanding participation preferences is also important for comprehending which 
participatory institutions are adopted, the way they are adapted, and whether they are likely 
to be successful. Gramsci is not the only philosopher to note that our intellectual activities 
contribute to sustaining social structures; John Dewey also maintained, “Change men’s 
estimate of the value of existing political agencies and forms, and the latter change more or 
less” (1926, 6). The notion that political phenomena do not exist distinct from political 
ideas, the former both shape and are shaped by the latter, has more recently been adopted 
by the fourth wave of new institutionalism. ‘Discursive Institutionalism’ has emphasised 
how agents’ background ideational and foreground discursive abilities are central in 
shaping institutions, how they change and why they persist (Schmidt 2008). Knowledge of 
participation preferences is thus a prerequisite for a proper analysis of the shape and 
working of participation in policy organisations.   
Discursive Institutionalism outlines three levels at which ideas and discourses 
influence political phenomena: policy, programmatic and philosophical (Schmidt 2008). 
Existing surveys of citizens’ procedural preferences tend to use a small number of survey 
items to tap preferences at the philosophical level, focusing on whether citizens believe 
that in the political system as a whole decisions should be made by the public, by 
representatives or by experts. This approach in presenting three discreet options at the level 
of the political system, only one of which is participatory, implies that those who favour 
participatory decision-making all understand participation in the same way, something that 
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Chapter 3 gives reasons to doubt. The analyses of stakeholder views are, in contrast, 
focused more at the policy level, exploring participants’ preferences for the use of 
participation in one specific policy arena. There has been little empirical work focused on 
procedural preferences at the programmatic level; investigating the broad frames of 
reference that enable those involved in participatory processes to construct a vision of 
participation and use it to guide their action.  
It is these programmatic level preferences that are the target of this chapter. They 
are explored through an analysis of the results of the Q-method survey with 34 key 
informants involved with participatory activities in health, housing, poverty and social 
exclusion, and social security policy. This in-depth survey method is itself a condensed 
process of everyday philosophy, presenting participants with difficult choices amongst the 
competing facets of different conceptions of participation. An individual participant’s Q-
sort provides a detailed model of their preference for participation in social policy 
decisions: what they believe are the objectives of participation, the appropriate roles for 
participants and officials and the relationships between them, their preferred participation 
practices, and how they think participation should be evaluated. The principal components 
analysis (PCA) then facilitates a comparison between these individual preferences and 
maps any common shared preferences among the group. These results are further 
illuminated by material from the post-sort interviews. The core of this chapter outlines 
three shared preferences that were identified through the PCA. It first presents them in 
isolation, then comparatively, highlighting the major similarities and differences between 
them. The results reveal significant differences between preferences regarding the purposes 
of participation, how much power should be afforded to the public, and what motivates 
participation. The three participation preferences are then situated in relation to the four 
modes of participation from the previous chapter. However, this process is more than a 
deductive hypothesis test of whether the preferences reflect the four modes of 
participation. The richness of the data means that the thoughts of the participants are 
instructive in refining understanding of these modes. 
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4.1 Research and Analysis Process 
4.11 Data collection process 
This section briefly recapitulates some of the key aspects of the method in order to 
aid the reader’s interpretation of the following results.  For the Q-sort, each participant was 
given 48 cards containing normative statements relating to: a) the objectives of 
participation, b) the roles of participants and officials and the relationships between them, 
c) participatory practices, and d) evaluation criteria. In order to test the use of the typology 
these statements were structured according to the four modes of participation (see Table 
4.11), but this does not mean that principal components must reflect the modes of 
participation since participants can arrange the statements in whatever way they wish, 
including ways that would be contrary to the four modes. The participant then sorted each 
of these cards into one of the cells in a pre-determined sorting grid (see Figure 4.11), based 
upon how much they agreed or disagreed with each statement. This sorting process was 
then directly followed by an interview that probed the participant’s thinking and gave them 
a chance to elaborate further. 
Figure 4.11: The Q-sorting grid 
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Table 4.11: Breakdown of Q-set statements15 
 Component of Participation 
Mode of Participation Objectives Participants’ 
Roles 
Institutional 
Practices 
Evaluation 
criteria 
Knowledge Transfer 2 2 2 2 
Collective Decision-Making 2 2 2 2 
Choice and Voice 2 2 2 2 
Arbitration and Oversight 2 2 2 2 
Wildcard 7 3 4 2 
 
 
4.12 Data analysis process 
Once a participant has completed their Q-sort, each statement is then awarded a 
score based on its position in the grid, from +4 if it is placed in the most agree column, 
down to -4 for the most disagree column (as per Figure 4.11 above). The relative 
difference in scores engendered by the different sorting behaviour of the participants is 
used to create a correlation matrix that shows how similar each participant’s Q-sort is to 
every other participant’s. PCA was then employed to identify the common variance 
amongst participants’ Q-sorts, thus whether the Q-sorts are grouped in ways that would 
indicate the existence of a few shared preferences. Three principal components (PCs) were 
retained and varimax rotated to produce the solution detailed in Table 4.1216. Varimax 
rotating the solution maximizes each participants’ PC loading on one PC and minimizes it 
on the other two.  
 
Table 4.12: Details of varimax rotated three PC solution 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 
Variance explained  19% 19% 7% 
No. of Loading Q-sorts (sig at 
1% level) 
16 17 7 
Standard Error of z-scores .14 .13 .24 
 
The loadings of each participant’s Q-sort onto each PC is shown in Table 4.13. The 
magnitude of these loadings demonstrates the association between an individual 
participant’s Q-sort and the shared preference captured by the PC. They run from a 
                                                 
15 This is a summary of Table 2.31 in Chapter 2, which takes the same form but includes the full text of the 
statements, rather than just the number of statements. 
16 Full details of how this solution was arrived at can be found in the methods chapter, Section 2.33. 
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maximum of 1.0, which would demonstrate complete equivalence between the 
participant’s preference as expressed in their Q-sort and the shared preference captured by 
the PC, to a minimum of -1.0, which would demonstrate an inverse association between an 
individual’s Q-sort and the PC. A loading of 0.0 demonstrates no association. 
 
Table 4.13: Participants and their Q-sort loadings 
Ref 
No. 
Pseudo-
nym17 
Primary 
Role18 
Policy Area(s) PC1 PC2 PC3 
P01 Mark Civil Servant Health, Local 
Government 
0.15 0.70* -0.04 
P02 Rebecca Activist Housing 0.21 0.32~ 0.10 
P03 Richard Civil Servant Poverty & Social 
Exclusion 
-0.12 0.58* 0.28~ 
P04 Flora Activist Health, Other 0.51* 0.38* 0.40* 
P05 Gary Civil Servant Social Security 0.29~ 0.50* 0.01 
P06 Steven Civil Society Health, Local 
Government, Other 
0.15 0.79* 0.03 
P07 Celia Activist Social Security 0.23 0.64* -0.08 
P08 Jason Civil Servant Social Security -0.25 0.27 0.65* 
P09 Maureen Civil Servant Poverty & Social 
Exclusion 
0.28~ 0.51* 0.27 
P10 Lucy Civil Society Housing, Local 
Government, Poverty & 
Social Exclusion, Other 
0.11 0.13 -0.57* 
P11 Jim Civil Society Health, Housing, Local 
Government, Poverty & 
Social Exclusion 
0.64* 0.31~ -0.24 
P12 Neil Civil Servant Health 0.53* 0.25 0.30~ 
P13 Lauren Civil Servant Social Security 0.13 0.69* 0.16 
P14 Kate Civil Society Health, Housing, Poverty 
& Social Exclusion 
0.73* 0.12 0.02 
P15 Jeremy Activist Housing -0.02 0.29~ 0.05 
P16 Lewis Civil Society Health, Housing, Local 
Government, Poverty & 
Social Exclusion, Other 
0.10 0.17 0.43* 
P17 Annette Civil Servant Social Security, Other 0.22 0.55* -0.40* 
P18 Nabil Civil Servant Health, Local 
Government, Poverty & 
Social Exclusion, Other 
0.63* 0.17 -0.07 
P19 Orla Civil Servant Health, Poverty & Social 
Exclusion 
0.75* 0.35~ -0.11 
                                                 
17 Names and demographic details have been changed to protect participants anonymity 
18 Many participants in this study were involved in participation activities in multiple guises. I have broadly 
categorized them according to their primary role into civil servants, civil society (people employed in non-
government policy organisations) and activists (people who participated voluntarily as individual citizens or 
in organised campaign groups). 
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P20 Salma Civil Servant Health, Housing, Poverty 
& Social Exclusion 
0.61* 0.46* 0.02 
P21 Stella Activist Social Security 0.11 0.31~ -0.04 
P22 Alexandra Activist Health, Other 0.14 0.60* -0.28~ 
P23 Anna Activist Health, Poverty & Social 
Exclusion 
0.63* 0.37* -0.08 
P24 Michael Civil Society Poverty & Social 
Exclusion, Other 
0.55* -0.31~ 0.13 
P25 Felicity Civil Society Health, Local 
Government, Other 
0.73* 0.34~ -0.25 
P26 Carly Activist Health, Poverty & Social 
Exclusion, Other 
0.47* -0.13 0.52* 
P27 Gabriella Activist Housing, Poverty & 
Social Exclusion 
0.43* -0.03 0.25 
P28 Sarah Activist Health, Local 
Government, Other 
0.73* 0.19 -0.09 
P29 Janeane Civil Servant Health 0.20 0.44* 0.18 
P30 Salim Civil Society Social Security, Other -0.04 0.56* 0.42* 
P31 Robin Activist Health, Social Security 0.63* 0.11 -0.05 
P32 Terry Civil Society Housing, Social Security 0.50* 0.58* -0.06 
P33 Peter Civil Society Local Government, Other 0.34~ 0.52* -0.29~ 
P34 Elizabeth Civil Society Health, Housing, Local 
Government, Poverty & 
Social Exclusion, Other 
0.39* 0.55* 0.10 
Note: * = statistically significant at the 1% level, ~ = statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
The next step is to interpret the substantive meaning of the three PCs. In order to do 
this a ‘PC array’ was calculated for each of the three PCs. The arrays are a composite Q-
sort calculated from a weighted average of ‘flagged’ Q-sorts, which are those Q-sorts with 
their highest statistically significant loading (1% level) on the respective PC. This process 
computes a z-score for each statement based upon the score of flagged Q-sorts weighted by 
the factor loading of that sort. The z-scores are then rank ordered in the form of the original 
Q-sorting grid to create a synthetic, composite Q-sort, providing a representation of the 
shared preference of the participants that can be interpreted by the researcher. Every 
statement thus has a Z-score and Q-score for each of the three factor arrays. By interpreting 
an array we can illustrate what the participants loading on this PC hold in common. 
Comparing the different arrays illustrates how the shared understandings represented by 
each PC differ from the others.  
Q-methodologists interpretations of these arrays often focus on: ‘characterising 
statements’ – those at the extremes of the PC array; ‘distinguishing statements’ – those that 
have statistically significant unique placings for a PC; and ‘consensus statements’ – those 
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where there is no statistically significant difference between PCs. In order to illustrate the 
three PCs identified by this research, a full representation of the PC array in the form it 
would appear as a Q-sort is provided for each. Each cell of the sorting grid contains: the 
statement number, which I use to refer to the statements throughout; the theme the 
statement pertains to, for example, the objectives of participation; and a short summary of 
the content of the statement19. This is accompanied by a short narrative interpretation of 
the PC by the researcher, focusing on the characterising statements for the PCs. The 
analysis then progresses to highlighting the differences and similarities between the PCs, 
making use of the consensus and distinguishing statements. 
 
 
4.2 Introducing the Three Shared Participation Preferences 
4.21 Preference 1 (PC1) 
The shared participation preference represented by the array for PC1 is one in 
which public-spirited and well-informed citizens engage in open processes of collective 
decision-making and self-government (Statements: S42, S09, S32, S37). It is a solidaristic 
process oriented towards finding the common good, in which diverse publics should be 
brought together in a participatory space that promotes mutual respect (S11, S22 S17). 
Power is an important theme. Participation should be a way for the marginalised to 
challenge their exclusion (S12). Moreover, policy-makers should not be able to control the 
agenda setting, decisions, and evaluation process (S4, S43, S35, S8); participation should 
transfer decision power from bureaucrats to citizens (S20). However, this is not so that 
citizens can pressurise and battle with self-interested authorities but in order that the two 
can work together as equal partners (S3, S6, S45). Participation is valued as a means to 
improve policy outcomes, but it is more important that participation creates a fair decision 
process that realises people’s right to participate in decisions that affect them (S40, S7, 
S34). The key criterion for measuring its success is whether people feel they have any 
influence over these decisions (S46), and the extent of control that participants wield in the 
process (S14). The individualistic approach to participation is rejected. Participation is not 
simply about promoting and defending one’s own interests and values (S15, S33), nor  
                                                 
19 A list of the full statements, along with their z-scores and q-sort scores, is provided at the end of this 
chapter for reference (see Table 4.51). 
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Figure 4.21: PC1 array 
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resolving conflicts between competing interests (S33, S41). Similarly, collective processes 
of decision-making are preferred to avenues for individuals to voice preferences to 
decision-makers (S5) or choose between policy options (S47, S27). 
 
4.22 Preference 2 (PC2) 
The participation preference rendered through PC2, also rejects the individualistic 
approach to participation (S05, S27, S15) in favour of a vision in which public-spirited 
citizens engage in an effort to find the common good (S11, S42), characterised by mutual 
respect and greater mutual understanding (S17, S48). Similarly, participation is viewed not 
as a battle or negotiation between the state and citizens (S16, S06, S03), but as a 
collaborative partnership (S31, S45). However, the notion of participation as collective 
decision-making and self-government is firmly rejected (S37). Participation is primarily a 
process in which citizens use their experiential expertise (S09) to help policy-makers 
access wider sources of information and improve policy decisions (S13), and the key 
criterion for assessing whether it has been successful is to ask whether the resultant 
policies are more responsive to public needs and values (S19). Participation is also 
important in demonstrating that decision processes are fair and perceived to be legitimate 
(S34, S07), and the public should feel they can influence the policies that matter to them 
(S46, S43). Nonetheless, influence is not analogous to decision power; policy-makers 
should listen to the public, but also need to exercise judgement in deciding what should be 
taken account of in any final decision (S43). When designing participatory initiatives it is 
important have a clear question and make participants aware of the scope of the initiative 
and its limits with regard to policy impact (S04), but there is no right way to do 
participation and it is best to tailor any process to what is most appropriate to the policy 
issue under consideration (S11). 
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Figure 4.22: PC2 array 
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4.23 Preference 3 (PC3) 
The third and final shared participation preference rejects the idea that people are 
motivated to participate because of bonds with others and shared social goals (S42). They 
are motivated to participate because they believe they have something to lose or gain, so 
participation should enable them to defend their interests and values (S15). There is no one 
general interest. Participation is about bringing together a range of different publics all 
with their own interests and values (S22). The purpose of this is not to have an open and 
honest exchange of ideas that results in greater mutual understanding (S48), nor to use the 
participation itself to resolve the competing interests (S41). It is about giving all relevant 
interests a voice that can influence the policy-makers that take decisions (S43). There is 
qualified support for individualised mechanisms of participation such as choice to 
empower individuals (S27, S47, S05). In evaluating participation then, it is more important 
that that all interests have been genuinely represented (S44) than that participants have had 
control over the process (S14), though it is important to be flexible regarding evaluation 
criteria, which should be tailored to the purpose of the process (S38). Participation 
processes should be open to all, with extra resources focused on encouraging 
disadvantaged groups to participate (S32), and it is important that government and public 
service organisations work closely with existing community organisations rather than 
setting up or imposing new participatory structures (S39). Nonetheless, there needs to be 
clear definition of the scope of the agenda and what is expected of participants (S38). 
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Figure 4.23: PC3 array 
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4.3 Comparing the Three Preferences 
In presenting the three participation preferences above each was taken in isolation. 
This section compares the three preferences with one another to further illuminate their 
interpretation. It begins by comparing Preference 1 with Preference 2, then compares 
Preference 3 with the other two simultaneously. 
 
4.31 Comparing Preference 1 and Preference 2  
Preference 1 and Preference 2 both present a direct challenge to the view of 
participation encapsulated by the other. Table 4.31 provides a descending list of statements 
with the greatest difference between z-scores for the arrays for PC1 and PC2. Statements at 
the top of the table are more favoured by Preference 1 than Preference 2, and vice versa at 
the bottom of the table. It is apparent that S37, at the top of the table, and S13, at the 
bottom of the table, both capture a key idea for one of the preferences that is rejected by 
the other preference. The notion that participation is about realising collective self-
government through collective discussion and decision-making, which animates Preference 
1, is rejected by Preference 2. Likewise, the idea that participation is about public officials 
accessing wider sources of information in order to improve their policy decisions, a key 
objective for Preference 2, is rejected by Preference 1. These statistical results appear to 
capture genuine differences in opinion that were also manifest in the qualitative interviews: 
I don't necessarily think that public participation in the sense of getting 
people to form self-governing communities is very realistic, I think it 
sounds quite utopian... But talking about going out and consulting people 
on, you know, very definite things that matter to them now, I think that's 
really valuable. So I think that would be the sort of public participation I 
quite like. (P05: Gary, Civil Servant) 
 
It's not giving about giving a voice to influence decisions. It's bigger than 
that. And it's not about them [policy-makers] then using it to make their 
decisions. It has to be about taking the control off of the decisions. (P28: 
Sarah, Activist) 
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Table 4.31: Comparison of selected Q-sort statement scores, PC1 and PC2 
No. Statement PC1 
 
 
PC2 
 
 
zPC1 
- 
zPC2 
37 The aim of participation is to enable citizens to take the 
decisions that affect their lives through collective discussion 
and decision-making. It should be about collective self-
government. 
4 -2 2.53 
14 Participation should be evaluated based on how much control 
the participants have over the process, for instance; have the 
participants set the agenda, and how much control do they 
have over the final decision? 
2 -1 1.55 
45 Public participation in the policy process should create a new 
relationship between public institutions and citizens in which 
both are equal partners co-creating policy. 
4 1 1.14 
32 Participation initiatives should be open to all those who wish 
to participate. Participants should not be specially selected, 
though extra resources may need to be focused on 
encouraging disadvantaged groups to participate. 
3 0 0.99 
20 The aim of participation should be to transfer decision power 
from elites in bureaucracies and public service organisations 
to the public, so the public can exercise some control over 
these institutions. 
3 0 0.87 
19 To judge the success of public participation we need to look 
at the resultant policies and services and ask are they more 
responsive to public needs and public values. 
0 4 -1.33 
43 The aim of participation should be to give the public a voice 
that can influence decisions. Policy-makers need to listen, 
but must then exercise judgement in deciding what should be 
incorporated into the final decision. 
-2 3 -1.62 
4 Public participation initiatives should have a clear question 
that is being asked of participants. Participants need to be 
informed of what is in and out of the scope of the discussion, 
what is expected of them as participants, and what the limits 
of the process are with regard to its impacts on policy. 
-2 3 -2.01 
13 The objective of public participation is to improve policy 
decisions by ensuring that decision-makers can access wider 
sources of information, perspectives and potential solutions. 
-1 4 -2.02 
Note: All differences are statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
It is apparent from Table 4.31 that many of the most prominent differences between 
the two preferences relate to the control and power that participants should wield over the 
process, particularly the decision-making aspect. Whilst Preference 1 views participation 
as a means to transfer power (S14, S20), Preference 2 is in favour of public officials 
retaining decision power (S43). Preference 2 is in favour of a tightly defined process with a 
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specified agenda (S04), whereas Preference 1 opts for open processes in which there is 
participant control over the agenda (S14, S32). In contrast, both preferences are united in 
their support for solidaristic statements. Statements about mutual understanding (S48), 
mutual respect (S17), social motivations (S42) and the common good (S11) are all ranked 
highly within the PC arrays for both preferences. They also show a similar level of 
agreement in disavowing statements that express individualistic (S15, S05) or agonistic 
(S33, S03, S06) sentiment, which receive strong negative rankings for both preferences20. 
Through analysis of the qualitative interview data it became apparent that some of 
the statements on which there was, from the researcher’s perspective, surprising consensus 
between the two preferences were interpreted in different ways by participants loading on 
the different preferences, thus further emphasised the differences between Preference 1 and 
Preference 2. It was surprising to find for instance that S48 on open and honest exchange 
and mutual understanding was the second highest ranked evaluation criteria for Preference 
2. This statement was drafted to express a deliberative democratic idea and was envisaged 
by the researcher as being oriented towards mutual understanding between different groups 
among the public. However, the participants associated with Preference 2 often interpreted 
this in light of public distrust of policy-makers. They judged that it was important for 
participation to facilitate an open and honest exchange between policy-makers and the 
public, thus emphasising the dominance of the public-policy-maker relationship for this 
participation preference. 
The idea that the public should be valued for the expertise it can bring to policy 
decisions (S09) was ranked in the most agree column for both preferences. It is hardly 
surprising for Preference 2, which views participation as a process whereby decision-
makers access wider sources of information from the public, that the notion that the public 
has some useful expertise to contribute is important. It is more unexpected that this 
statement was so important to Preference 1. Nonetheless, a number of the participants 
loading on Preference 1 put an additional empowerment twist on the idea of the public as 
experts. Recognising that someone has something important to contribute to a decision was 
viewed as an important component in empowering them, especially with regard to the 
socially excluded, who have been conceived of, historically, as passive recipients of policy 
with little to contribute to its formulation: 
                                                 
20 The reader wishing to cross-reference similarities in statement scores can do so using Table 4.51 at the end 
of the chapter 
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In terms of that person, who then may have responsibility for tackling in-
work poverty within his organisation or is being invited as an expert to 
talk about that, saying, 'Actually, the real expert is this person 
[experiencing poverty]. I want you to hear his story first and foremost.' 
There is a transfer of power going on. It's not an individualistic transfer of 
power, but I think it is a transfer of power. (P24: Michael, Civil Society) 
Once again, therefore, an apparent similarity on closer inspection reinforces the difference 
in Preference 1’s preoccupation with rebalancing power relationships compared to 
Preference 2’s focus on improving outcomes by obtaining relevant lay expertise. 
 
4.32 Comparing Preference 3 
Participants’ PC3 loadings appear to show that Preference 3 is complex and draws 
together two views with a common element. Furthermore, both of these two views look to 
be associated with the other PCs, which also complicates the interpretation. The factor 
loadings demonstrate that those with a strong positive loading on PC3 mostly have quite a 
strong positive loading on one of the other PCs (see Table 4.13), yet for some participants 
(Flora and Carly) it is PC1 and for others (Jason and Salim) it is PC2. These relationships 
with the other PCs are reinforced by the qualitative interviews, and help to demonstrate the 
two viewpoints combined within PC3. Flora and Carly might be described as disillusioned 
idealists. They believe in a more equal and participatory society, but are sceptical of the 
motivations of policy-makers and the public, along with the possibility of participation to 
overturn entrenched power relationships. 
So you can make patient participation in the NHS as good as you want, 
but everybody is still fighting for scarce resources, and every time you win 
a bit more money for young people's mental health, or actually wheelchair 
services which is a sort of orphan, a poor area, you're taking away from 
somebody else. Well that, nobody wants to do that. But that's the status 
quo and how do you get round that, because actually the people who make 
the decisions about that are very very powerful with huge economic 
interests, Can make sure their friends don’t  go to jail, for phone tapping, 
I mean, you know, you've just got such a huge, actually it's not huge, it's a 
small class of people, but with huge resources, huge finances, huge stakes 
in how it is, you know, and you can't pin the tiger. (P04: Flora, Activist) 
The view was particularly characterised by a strong distrust of policy-makers: 
If there was, “Right, go in this room and talk to politicians about this.” 
You wouldn't trust them… people just won't go in. Because they'll think, 
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“Well why should we go in and say this, because they're not going to listen 
to us or take us seriously anyway”. (P26: Carly, Activist) 
Jason and Salim do not share this distrust of public officials and politicians. 
Summing up his position towards the end of the interview, Jason mused, 
I guess there is a kind of, there's a degree to which I've emphasized 
wanting participation to be about getting sources of information from 
people who are most affected by services, into the heads of decision-
makers, but leave the decision-makers to make the decision, not looking 
to the citizens to do it. (P08: Jason, Civil Servant). 
This is a clear statement of the kind of reasoning embodied in Preference 2. However, 
there is also an element of pluralist thought underlying Jason and Salim’s preference for 
public officials to make decisions. The state is viewed as neutral arbiter between 
conflicting interests: 
That is the function that one wants the experts in local authorities and 
central government to fulfil, is to compare the interests. (P08: Jason, Civil 
Servant) 
 
I guess what I'm saying is, there will always be people who are shouting 
for their own interests… I mean, I think I've been relatively consistent in 
saying basically, everyone should have a voice. But the problem is that 
you need to be able to easily discount those voices in public participation. 
(P30: Salim, Civil Society) 
The salience of pluralist thinking to Preference 3 is also reinforced by the strong negative 
loading of Lucy, who expressed explicitly anti-pluralist views, rejecting one statement as 
“pluralist nonsense” and later commenting “I just think that pluralist model is slightly 
broken” (P10: Lucy, Civil Society). 
Given this complexity, comparing the differences between Preference 3 and the 
other two preferences is particularly valuable in highlighting the common element that 
underpins it. Table 4.32 shows the biggest differences between the preferences. Again it 
descends in order from statements at the top which are favoured by Preference 3 but not 
the other two, down to statements that are favoured by Preference 1 and Preference 2, but 
rejected by Preference 3. They demonstrate that Preference 3 is much more sceptical about 
the solidaristic nature of participation. It inverts the ratings of the other two preferences 
regarding people’s motivation to participate. People are motivated to participate because 
they feel they have something to lose or gain (S15), not because of shared social goals and 
bonds with others (S42). That participation should aim to achieve greater mutual 
understanding (S48) is rejected, and ideas of equality and mutual respect are of little 
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importance (S17). Individualised avenues of participation for citizens and groups to 
represent their interests and values to policy-makers are more acceptable than for the other 
two preferences (S05, S15), and whilst there is not strong support, there is less antipathy 
towards ideas of choice and competition (S27, S10). 
 
Table 4.32: Comparison of selected Q-sort statements scores, PC3 with PC1 and PC2 
No Statement PC
1 
PC
2 
PC
3 
zPC1 
- 
zPC3 
zPC2 
- 
zPC3 
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The best people to involve in any particular 
participatory policy-making exercise are 
those who can contribute most to improving 
the particular policy that is under 
consideration. 
-2 -2 4 -2.61 -2.73 
27 The objective of participation is to empower 
the public and the best way to do that is to 
give individuals a choice over which provider 
of services they can use. 
-4 -4 2 -2.1 -1.98 
39 If government or public service organisations 
want to talk to the public, they should do so 
by engaging with existing community 
organisations, rather than setting up and 
imposing new participatory structures. 
-1 -2 3 -2.03 -2.51 
15 People are not motivated to participate in 
policy-making for the health of democracy, 
but because they believe they have something 
to lose or gain, therefore; participation should 
enable individuals and groups to promote and 
defend their interests and values. 
-3 -2 3 -1.91 -1.55 
44 Public participation is of little value if those 
that participate are not representative of those 
that will be affected by the decision, 
therefore; representativeness is a key 
criterion for evaluation. 
0 0 4 -1.68 -1.83 
10 Public services have to compete for 
customers, and politicians for their 
constituents. Therefore, the aim of 
participation should be to find out what 
people want and need, then deliver that. 
-4 -3 0 -1.54 -1.15 
5 It is more important that participation should 
give individual citizens a means to voice their 
preferences and have them heard by decision-
makers than facilitate discussions between 
citizens. 
-3 -4 1 -1.26 -1.77 
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17 It is important that participation initiatives 
cultivate an environment in which everyone 
has an equal opportunity to give their views. 
One particular way of communicating should 
not be privileged over others, and differences 
should be recognised and respected.  
3 4 0 0.84 1.21 
48 Has there been an open and honest exchange 
of ideas and perspectives from all those 
involved? Has this resulted in greater mutual 
understanding? These are key criteria when 
assessing whether public participation has 
been a success. 
1 2 -4 1.5 2.16 
46 A key measure for the success of 
participation is whether people feel they have 
any influence: Do they think they can affect 
decisions on policies that matter to them?  
3 3 -2 2.15 2.38 
42 It is primarily bonds with others and shared 
social goals that motivate people to 
participate, so participation works best when 
it is woven into the fabric of people's 
everyday lives, for instance; situated in local 
communities. 
3 1 -4 2.61 1.98 
Note: All differences are statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
The qualitative data again reinforced these distinctions even for some of the more 
unexpected differences on single statements. It was not clear for instance why greater 
scepticism of the solidaristic basis for participation would result in a more positive rating 
for S39, which suggests speaking to existing community groups is preferable to setting up 
new government-led participation exercises. However, it was evident from the interviews 
how this could be favourably interpreted according to both pluralism and distrust of 
officials. For Salim it is important for policy-makers to talk to community groups since 
these groups play a useful role in aggregating and moderating the interests of the 
communities they represent. Whereas for Carly it is important to participate through 
community groups because they are more trustworthy than officials, and the weight of 
numbers gives you more power to influence disinterested officials than participating as 
individual. The differences between Preference 3 and the other two preferences thus 
reinforce the interpretation of the PC array, namely; that Preference 3 is more oriented to a 
conception of participation as a process of interest representation.  
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4.4 Three Preferences, Four Modes of Participation 
4.41 Preference 1, participation as collective-decision-making 
The above description of Preference 1, with its focus on collective self-government 
and a more equal distribution of power, closely reflects the collective decision-making 
mode of participation in policy-making that the previous chapter related to the principles of 
participatory and deliberative democracy. The qualitative data that was gleaned from 
participants’ reactions to the Q-sort statements and the interview that followed the Q-sort 
indicates there was an undercurrent of participatory democratic thinking that informed the 
views of the participants who hold Preference 1:  
This is about participatory governance… the best case scenario is when 
you have established a proper kind of process of dialogue, where that, 
those decisions can be collective decisions, right. (P25: Felicity, Civil 
Society) 
Even participation initiatives which may not fully realise participatory democratic ideals 
could be viewed as a useful staging post on the route towards a more participatory society, 
“So there's maybe in those situations, you're going down a much more service user 
involvement road on our way to participatory democracy” (P25: Felicity, Civil Society).  
These participants, however, did not simply reflect back the researcher’s 
preconceptions and there were some interesting ways that participants challenged or 
expanded the understanding of the collective decision-making mode of participation as 
theorized in Chapter 3. A community development approach was just as prevalent as 
participatory democratic thinking in underpinning these participants preference for 
participation as collective decision-making. . Sarah described her approach to participation 
as “classic community development”: 
What I would describe it as is, basically lighting fires all over the place… 
You just ignite people, and you find the people in the community who 
want to do something, and just get the bellows out and encourage them to 
do it, and get them together to do it… Classic community development. 
That's all it is. At its base. Community development. (P28: Sarah, Activist) 
Participants also referred to approaches such as ‘Asset-Based Community Development’ 
(ABCD) and ‘Appreciative Inquiry’ that focus on citizen-led interventions that generate 
improvement through focusing on community assets or what is working well for service 
users and building upon it. 
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The prevalence of community development ideas helps to explain the placement of 
some statements which may raise an eyebrow if Preference 1 were to be interpreted solely 
in terms of participatory democracy. Consensus decision-making is ordinarily considered a 
cornerstone of participatory democratic thinking yet is not a prominent feature of this 
preference, even with the significant caveat that it may not always be possible (S23). 
Though these participants did place an emphasis on the discussion and negotiation of 
decisions, there was some concern that consensus can be too demanding and that it can 
also be a power-play, “Consensus, unless there is a [private] vote, is the ability to silence 
the dissenter” (P11: Jim, Civil Society). A number of the participants were content with 
discussions followed by voting to determine decisions, particularly if the number of votes 
were used to balance power relations, for instance; an equal number of votes distributed to 
policy officials and the public. The community development approach was conceived as 
more of an ongoing process of negotiating and re-negotiating small scale agreements 
whereby certain people agree to undertake certain actions, as opposed to arriving at a 
group consensus concerning what everyone will do. A common refrain against radical 
participatory modes of organisation is that consensus decision-making is too demanding. It 
is therefore instructive that those who subscribe to the collective decision-making mode of 
participation are open to multiple decision processes; whilst wedded to the idea of 
approximately equal power and non-domination, they do not feel that this can only be 
realised through consensus decisions. 
Despite the participants concern with discussion and negotiation of decisions, there 
is reason to doubt that deliberative democratic ideas were a strong influence. As with 
consensus decision-making, statement 18, Publicly debating social issues is the primary 
political act, so reasoning between people should be the guiding procedure for policy 
decision-making, which is one of the most deliberative democratic statements in the Q-set, 
was a little surprisingly not prominently placed for Preference 1. This could again be due 
to the prevalence of community development ideas amongst the participants, which we’ve 
seen are more akin to anarchist self-organisation than a New England town meeting. A 
number of participants were flummoxed by this statement and found the meaning vague, 
which could be due to poor drafting by the researcher. However, a very small minority of 
participants gave a nuanced response. Three participants, for instance, rejected the 
statement on the basis that the word ‘reasoning’ privileged one mode of communication 
and excluded other legitimate modes, 
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It's about hearts and it's about, as well as minds, and it's about people have 
got all kinds of things they want to get across. 'Reason' sounds like there's 
some kind of things you should say and things you shouldn't say, and ways 
of behaving that you should do, and things you shouldn't do. (P28: Sarah, 
Activist) 
They believed ‘reasoning’ should be changed to ‘discussion’. This has been a criticism of 
deliberative democracy by feminist theorists, and one participant referred explicitly to 
feminist theory when making this argument. This suggests that those who have been 
exposed to deliberative democratic debates could interpret the statement, but that this 
exposure was not common among the participants in this study. It perhaps indicates that 
the influence of deliberative democracy on democratic theorists in the Academy is not yet 
replicated amongst policy-makers and citizens. There was little to suggest that deliberative 
democratic ideas were an important factor in this understanding of participation as 
collective decision-making. 
In summary, Preference 1 captures an understanding of participation as a 
solidaristic process, in which equal partners collaborate to arrive at decisions and take 
actions that benefit the common good. This preference broadly appears to be based on a 
combination of ideas from participatory democracy and community development. As such, 
it is a close reflection of the collective decision-making mode of participation outlined in 
the previous chapter.  
 
4.42 Preference 2, participation as knowledge transfer 
Preference 2, like Preference 1, appears to closely mirror one of the four modes of 
participation. The focus on capturing lay expertise in order to inform better policy 
decisions by officials is redolent of the knowledge transfer mode. Analysis of the 
interviews of the participants that hold this preference again help to illuminate the reasons 
that participants are attracted to participation in this form, as well as some of the nuance to 
this position. There were a number of reasons that participants gave for why the public was 
not tasked with making decisions, but invited to contribute their expertise and opinions to 
help policy-makers make better decisions. Public officials were seen as more capable of 
taking decisions, given that they are trained to reflect on their own biases, integrate 
multiple sources of potentially conflicting information and take a view on the bigger 
picture: 
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I think that that's why we have public officials or publicly elected kind of 
posts, is to sort of step back and look at the bigger picture and hopefully 
have access to all the information necessary to make a decision which the 
people in the participation thing might not have access to all the 
information, necessarily. (P07: Celia, Activist) 
This enables policy-makers to take tough decisions that the public do want to make 
themselves. In addition, they were viewed as connected into the broader policy system so 
more capable of knowing which decisions would result in tractable interventions, “we [the 
local authority] are policy experts, we know more than they do about the actual policy 
levers at our disposal to actually make change” (P01: Mark, Civil Servant). 
Reluctance to transfer decision power away from public officials and politicians 
was also related to support for the primacy of electoral democracy and a concern about 
what happens to accountability if decision power is given to members of the public: 
Perhaps this is the civil servant in me talking, but ministers design policy, 
and I think that's, there's something very valuable in that. They obviously 
take public opinion into account as they do that, but you know, that's kind 
of why we have democracy and why it works that way. (P05: Gary, Civil 
Servant) 
 
If actually real power is being given to these people, then who are they, 
why are they being given this power and you know, do they, do they 
represent the, do they really represent the constituencies that they are 
claiming to, and so on? (P03: Richard, Civil Servant) 
The primacy of electoral politics was also a factor in the need to clearly specify the 
agenda and parameters of participatory processes. For some participants elected officials 
set the broad agenda and the public have their input at the ballot box, so participation 
initiatives have to take their cue from this:  
I think your election, your democratic mandate, is almost where you're 
going to target and what you're going to focus on. Actually how you're 
going to do it, that's where you have participation. (P01: Mark, Civil 
Servant) 
 
When as a public servant you ask a question, you ask a question, you go 
out to consultation, some questions you know the answer to. They’re not 
really open for debate, because ministers have decided, and in my view  
it's better to be honest about that and say these are the questions which are 
relevant, so let's talk about them. Even though you want to talk about these, 
these other issues, there's no point, because they have been decided. And 
so if you let people set the agenda, then you might just have a totally 
pointless discussion, which leaves everyone kind of feeling a bit frustrated. 
(P03: Richard, Civil Servant) 
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There was however some variation among the participants regarding the extent of 
flexibility that could be incorporated into the agenda to take account of new issues that the 
public might raise. Richard’s comments also point to a further reason that clearly specified 
parameters are important: honesty about the limits of participation is important for its own 
sake, but it is also necessary to maintain trust and avoid frustration. 
It became apparent from participants’ comments and interviews that participation 
was not just about accessing wider sources of information for this preference. It was 
already alluded to above how opening up decision making to greater transparency and 
rebuilding a dysfunctional relationship between the public and public institutions is an 
important component of Preference 2. It explains the unexpectedly strong agreement with 
S48 on open and honest exchange and mutual understanding, along with S34, Participation 
is about improving the legitimacy of decisions by bringing decision-making out into the 
open from behind closed doors. By involving everyone with a stake in the issue, the public 
can see a decision is fair and does not favour vested interests, which was originally 
conceived as a more agonistic statement. The participants loading on this preference 
favoured openness in order to allay what they perceived as unfounded public suspicions 
that policy-makers were not working in the public interest, more than as a mechanism to 
ensure self-interested policy-makers are forced to act in accordance with the public good. 
Therefore, being very clear and open about the scope of participation, and how the 
information the public provides is incorporated into the final decision are viewed as key 
elements of its legitimacy, as well as the legitimacy of public institutions more broadly. 
The primary objective of participation for Preference 2 remains to improve policy 
outcomes. This is a key criterion in assessing whether participation had been successful, 
but improving outcomes is not everything. This was apparent from reactions to S36, The 
aim of participation should be to improve policy and to improve services. If public 
participation does not result in noticeable improvements in policy and/or services then it 
has failed, which only received moderate support. The focus on failure is a much stronger 
drafting than for the other evaluation criteria statements, which simply ask whether 
something is an important criterion. Though improved outcomes were thought to be an 
important criterion, there was less support for the idea that participation had conclusively 
failed if improvements were not achieved, for instance Mark commented on this statement,  
I don't necessarily agree with that, because, I mean, I think that is the 
primary aim of it from my point of view, anyway, but I actually think 
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sometimes just going through the process itself, if done in a good way, can 
be enough. (P01: Mark, Civil Servant) 
Preference 2, therefore, captures a technocratic understanding of participation as 
knowledge transfer to improve policy decisions, underpinned by common ideas from 
classical public administration theory such as the primacy of electoral democracy and the 
decision-making expertise of public officials. However, within this understanding there is a 
recognition that participation can have other benefits too, particularly in regard to fostering 
public trust in officials and institutions. 
 
4.43 Preference 3, participation as agonism 
The interpretation of Preference 3 is not as clear-cut as that for Preference 1 and 
Preference 2, and it certainly does not appear that Preference 3 straightforwardly mirrors 
one of the remaining two modes of participation, choice and voice or arbitration and 
oversight. The relations between the three preferences do seem to reflect the dimensions 
that underlie the typology of participation though. If Preference 1 and Preference 2 account 
for the two solidaristic modes of participation, Preference 3 is a more agonistic 
counterpoint. The above comparison of Preference 3 to the other two preferences 
demonstrated that the main differences were along the sociability dimension, with 
Preference 3 rejecting the social motivations of participating citizens in favour of the idea 
of their getting involved to defend their own interests and values. The more agonistic bent 
of Preference 3 was to a large extent underpinned by a pluralist understanding of interest 
representation, though for some participants it was more related to a distrust of officials. 
 Chapter 3 detailed the importance of pluralist ideas to conceptions of participation 
as choice and voice and arbitration and oversight, so it is interesting to find that this more 
agonistic preference is not strongly reflective of either mode of participation. As was noted 
above, Preference 3 is distinguished from the other the two preferences by its relative 
support for choice. Still, the preference is not fervently for choice. Taken together the four 
most unambiguously choice and voice oriented statements (S05, S10, S27, S47) have mean 
Q-sort scores of +1 on the array for PC3. The difference is rooted in the fact that these 
statements were strongly negatively salient for the other two preferences. The same four 
statements have mean Q-sort scores of -3.5 on PC1 and -3 on PC2. Many of the 
participants in the study had a strong positive bias in their Q-sorts; they felt there were 
more statements that they agreed with than those they disagreed with. Yet choice 
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statements were almost universally quickly rejected by participants holding Preference 1 
and Preference 2. Choice was described as “nonsense” by Anna and “trivial consumerism” 
by Sarah. It was not seen as a form of participation by several participants because it has 
no collective or dialogical aspect. Some participants supported choice in theory but 
doubted that it is practicable. They questioned whether real choice exists unless the public 
is involved in determining the options available as well as choosing between them, and the 
range of choices has been opened up to include community and other solutions. Despite the 
qualified support, the relative favour of choice does thus appear to be a significantly 
different position. 
The polysemy of the concept of ‘voice’ means that it was often difficult to 
disentangle exactly how it was being used; whether it was giving power to the voiceless, 
voicing lay expertise to assist policy-makers, or voicing consumer wants. Nonetheless, a 
consumerist understanding of voice was an implicit element of Jason’s view. He spoke 
extensively about how he would use focus groups to test policy concepts with those who 
would be affected by them: 
And then you listen to what they tell you. And what they tell you, what 
you're not necessarily doing, is a quantitative study into how many people 
like and how many people dislike your policy idea. What you're trying to 
do is get a handle on whether your policy concept is solving the real 
problem or the real issue that they experience. (P08: Jason, Civil Servant) 
Here participation is viewed as analogous to market research, where civil servants design 
policy products then test out that they meet the needs of the consumers of those products. 
This implicit consumerist stance was not, however, solely restricted to participants loading 
on to Preference 3. It was a diffuse element of a number of the civil servants in this study’s 
viewpoint, for instance; Annette (whose Q-sort loads onto Preference 2) frequently referred 
to customers, and spoke about running customer forums and customer surveys. 
The arbitration and oversight mode also has a curious relation to Preference 3. The 
idea of arbitration was not very salient across the board, but the three statements that most 
unambiguously refer to arbitration or adjudication (S24, S29, S41) are actually more 
negatively ranked in the array for PC3 than for PC1 and PC2. This is perhaps because, as is 
evident in the quotations from Jason and Salim above, policy elites were viewed as 
removed from the fray of pluralist competition, so policy elites could perform the 
arbitration role. The views of participants such as Flora and Carly, with their distrust of 
officials, implicitly challenge this confidence in policy-makers as neutral arbitrators 
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though. Despite the distrust of officials that characterized some of the participants loading 
on Preference 3, there was no greater support for participation as oversight. In fact, all the 
participants who referred to the value of actual examples of participatory oversight hold 
one of the other two preferences. Robin pointed to public participation in Healthwatch, 
Orla to regulatory and scrutiny committees and Janeane to lay participation in Care Quality 
Commission (CQC) inspections, but there was no such discussion from participants 
holding Preference 3. 
In summary Preference 3 appears to underline the usefulness of the sociability 
dimension of the typology of participation in that it represents an agonistic counterpoint to 
the solidarism of participation as collective decision-making and participation as 
knowledge transfer, represented by Preference 1 and Preference 2 respectively. Yet, at the 
same time, it presents a challenge to the typology given that this agonistic viewpoint does 
not translate into a view of participation as arbitration and oversight, and shows only 
moderate support for participation as choice and voice. 
 
 
4.5 Discussion 
This chapter has analysed the Q-method survey and interview responses of 34 key 
informants involved with participatory social policy, using them to model three distinct 
preferences for participation in governance. A large majority of the these key informants 
held one of two of the preferences, which show clear affinities with the collective decision-
making mode and knowledge transfer mode of participation that were described in Chapter 
3 (see Figure 4.51 below). This suggests that the approach of a large number of prominent 
actors in participatory social policy will be influenced by these particular broad frames of 
reference. A third, less prominent, preference was also identified that was held by a 
minority of participants, often in conjunction with one of the other two preferences. 
Preference 3 should be interpreted with more care than the other two, since the array is 
comprised of substantially fewer Q-sorts (see Figure 4.51), making it more susceptible to 
the vagaries of individual variations among the constituent Q-sorts and measurement 
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error21. Nonetheless, this preference also appears to capture a theoretically meaningful 
distinction in orientation to participation 
As Figure 4.51 illustrates, the three preferences demonstrate support for the 
typology of four modes of participation. As well as identifying two modes of participation 
that reflect the knowledge transfer and collective decision-making modes of participation, 
the dimensions that underpin the typology proved predictive of the differences between 
preferences. Preference 1 and Preference 2 should be expected to be united on the 
sociability dimension but divided on the negotiability dimension. This is exactly what was 
found in the PC arrays, with both preferring participation as a collaborative process 
oriented towards the common good, but diverging on the amount of control participants 
should have over the agenda and decision-making. The sociability dimension also predicts 
the difference between Preference 3, which is more agonistic in orientation, and the other 
two preferences. 
  
Figure 4.51: Mapping the three preferences on to the participation typology 
 
 
                                                 
21 This can be observed in the greater standard error of statement z-scores for PC3 compared with PC1 and 
PC2 (see table 4.12 above). See Chapter 2 for greater discussion of the strength of inferences. 
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Despite the identification of agonistic sentiment in Preference 3, as well as more 
diffusely in the interviews, these elements did not coalesce into a coherent and distinct 
mode of agonistic participation, presenting a challenge to the arbitration and oversight and 
choice and voice modes. Participants frequently asked for clarification or confessed to 
having difficulty understanding ideas of arbitration. On S29, which states the public should 
take on oversight or adjudication roles, for instance, Alexandra commented: 
Yeah, I think that was why I struggled with it a bit. I mean. I think there 
are public organisations that seem to be just another group. Sometimes 
almost quite bland or almost have created themselves to focus on one 
issue, probably. And so therefore, it is important that people in the public, 
the public, people who are in the public sector, can provide... But I don't 
know if they have to provide adjudication. 'On controversial issues.' I think 
that's why it’s sitting there. I can't quite work that one out. I thought that 
one was a particularly difficult one. (P22: Alexandra, Activist)  
It is perhaps not surprising that this was a new idea to some of the participants. It was 
documented in the previous chapter that these ideas are not common in either the academic 
or grey literature on participation, thus much less prominent in the rhetoric of participation. 
In the discussions that followed the researcher’s clarifications of these ideas, none of the 
participants particularly embraced them. This may have been a result of ‘the shock of the 
new’, or genuine disagreement.  
Even participants that approvingly discussed actual examples of participatory 
oversight, did not translate this into a more abstract preference for this approach. Take, for 
example, Janeane’s comments on public involvement in CQC inspections: 
Experts by Experience, it's called. It's bringing a very different angle, a 
different perspective, it's someone who actually has received a similar 
service themselves, so can look in through those eyes, to see whether there 
is somewhere where they feel that they would have been happy to receive 
treatment that they had when they were in that position. So in a way, it's 
kind of like a lay bringing in lay people…Rather than just paid officials 
who've got their own tick-tick list, bringing in a human factor into it. (P29: 
Janeane, Civil Servant) 
Janeane’s comments appear to refract the idea of oversight through her preference for the 
knowledge transfer mode of participation. For Janeane, the public’s role in inspection is 
described as complementing officials by bringing in additional, experiential expertise, her 
Q-sort shows she rejects the more agonistic idea of exerting pressure on policy-makers and 
holding them to account.  
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The empirical findings therefore raise a question of whether the distinction between 
two agonistic modes of participation should be jettisoned, given the lack of support for the 
choice and voice and arbitration and oversight modes of participation. However, this would 
be a hasty move. Their lack of reflection in the empirical results might be plausibly 
attributed to the issues of sampling this particular group of key informants (as discussed in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.32). Both could be considered a more right-wing approach to 
participatory policy-making and it was discussed how few of the study participants claimed 
to vote for right-wing political parties. In addition, both modes have a strong theoretical 
grounding. Chapter 3 argued that though neither the advocates nor critics of choice have 
viewed it as a theory of participation, there is a compelling theoretical rationale for 
challenging this opinion. The remainder of this thesis will therefore retain a distinction 
between two agonistic modes of participation. This chapter has noted that, despite the lack 
of a dominant preference for either choice and voice or arbitration and oversight, their 
logic does implicitly inform some of the opinions expressed by the participants. Moreover, 
Preference 3 does not appear to constitute a single coherent agonistic approach to 
participation that could simply replace the existing modes. Retaining the distinction 
between two agonistic modes is useful in broadening understanding of how participation 
can be done, for instance; making explicit some of the assumptions behind approaches 
such as participatory oversight, which the above discussion demonstrated go seemingly 
unrecognised. It also provides alternatives to restricting decision-making to officials in 
circumstances of pluralist competition between interests, which the next chapter reveals 
can often be problematic. 
This chapter has focused on elaborating the three preferences in detail, delineating 
them from one another by drawing clear boundaries around them. It may be tempting to 
draw a clear dichotomy between the two primary preferences. Preference 1, participation 
as collective decision-making, is the radical, democratic view taken by activists and civil 
society. Preference 2, participation as knowledge transfer, is the conservative, technocratic 
view taken by public officials. Nevertheless it is apparent that the picture is more 
complicated. As Barnes, Newman and Sullivan (2007) have previously discovered there is 
a permeable boundary between official discourses of participation generated within the 
state and focused on improving the quality and legitimacy of decisions, and pressures for 
more inclusive democracy generated within civil society. Though there were a 
preponderance of civil society and activist participants with their highest loading on 
Preference 1 and civil servant participants with their highest loading on Preference 2, more 
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than a third of participants break this mould (see Table 4.13 above). In fact, the highest 
loading of any participant on Preference 1 is a civil servant (P19: Orla), and on Preference 
2 it is a civil society actor (P06: Steven). Accordingly, it would not necessarily be helpful 
to locate all tensions in the practice of participation as a simple battle between an official 
and a radical view. The reasoning behind the preferences also demonstrated that it would 
be an oversimplification to classify the difference between these two preferences as purely 
one between technocracy and democracy. Though the technocratic impulse undoubtedly 
influences Preference 2, it was also apparent that reservations about devolving decision 
power and agenda-setting were related to the representative relationship. As such the 
difference between Preference 1 and Preference 2 is also related to preferences for 
different types of democracy: representative versus participatory. 
It is also clear that there is not a simple one-to-one relationship between individual 
participants and preferences. Despite using a method that forces choices, seven participants 
have significant positive loadings (1% level) on more than one principal component, and 
thus endorse seemingly competing preferences for participation (see Table 4.13). Even 
where participants did not have multiple significant loadings there was still evidence that 
they borrowed ideas associated with other preferences. This was discussed above for Jason, 
whose interview clearly referenced ideas linked to knowledge transfer despite not having a 
significant loading on Preference 2. It was also just demonstrated how Janeane took an 
alien approach and refracted it through her knowledge transfer preference. The 
relationships between individual participants and the three participation preferences are 
thus complex. This is not a unique finding. Font, Wojcieszak and Navarro’s (2015) survey 
of Spanish citizens' procedural preferences also found that many simultaneously approved 
of apparently contradictory notions of participatory-, representative- and expert-led 
governance. The next chapter takes up the important points of contention between 
preferences identified in this chapter, particularly the preference for who should have 
decision power, and the distinction between social and self-interested motivations for 
participation. It uses a selection of key interview extracts to examine these issues in-depth, 
analysing the complexities and ambivalences in individuals’ preferences in order to 
explore the nature of procedural preferences for participation.  
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Table 4.51: Full principal component arrays 
  
PC1 PC2 PC3 
No. Statement Q-
score 
Z-
score 
Q-
score 
Z-
score 
Q-
score 
Z-
score 
1 The point of participation is to improve participants’ skills; to give 
them a greater sense of confidence and of their own power to act and 
influence the decisions that affect them. 
-2 -0.65 -1 -0.74 0 -0.24 
2 Any participatory process needs to be actively managed (e.g. through 
participant selection and facilitation) in order to prevent an 
unrepresentative group from dominating the process and hijacking the 
decision.  
0 -0.12 1 0.28 -1 -0.46 
3 Citizens and the state only work together when their interests coincide. 
Most of the time they don't, so participation has to enable the public to 
battle public institutions to get what it wants. 
-3 -1.04 -3 -1.25 -3 -1.08 
4 Public participation initiatives should have a clear question that is 
being asked of participants. Participants need to be informed of what is 
in and out of the scope of the discussion, what is expected of them as 
participants, and what the limits of the process are with regard to its 
impacts on policy. 
-2 -0.76 3 1.25 4 1.49 
5 It is more important that participation should give individual citizens a 
means to voice their preferences and have them heard by decision-
makers than facilitate discussions between citizens. 
-3 -0.83 -4 -1.34 1 0.43 
6 The aim of participation is not to make decisions with policy-makers, 
but to hold them to account and exert pressure on them to make the 
right decisions. 
-3 -0.82 -3 -1.14 -2 -0.74 
7 The objective of public participation is to create a fairer process for 
making policy decisions and in turn a fairer democracy, one that is 
perceived to be legitimate by the public. 
2 0.91 2 0.94 -4 -1.18 
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8 The success of public participation should be judged by those who 
commissioned the process and whether they feel their decision has 
been enhanced by the involvement of the public. 
-4 -2.08 -3 -1.09 -3 -1.06 
9 Local people are the best source of information about their own 
neighbourhoods, poor people are the experts in poverty, and service-
users best know where the problems with services are. The public 
should be valued for the expertise it can bring to policy decisions. 
4 1.79 4 1.53 2 0.74 
10 Public services have to compete for customers, and politicians for their 
constituents. Therefore, the aim of participation should be to find out 
what people want and need, then deliver that. 
-4 -1.57 -3 -1.18 0 -0.03 
11 Public participation is not about who can shout the loudest for their 
own private interests. It should be directed towards finding the 
common good, rather than bargaining about who gets what. 
2 0.8 3 1.31 1 0.34 
12 Participation should be a means through which the marginalised in 
society can challenge their political and social exclusion. 
4 1.83 2 0.86 0 0.26 
13 The objective of public participation is to improve policy decisions by 
ensuring that decision-makers can access wider sources of information, 
perspectives and potential solutions. 
-1 -0.34 4 1.68 1 0.56 
14 Participation should be evaluated based on how much control the 
participants have over the process, for instance; have the participants 
set the agenda, and how much control do they have over the final 
decision? 
2 0.81 -1 -0.74 -4 -1.87 
15 People are not motivated to participate in policy-making for the health 
of democracy, but because they believe they have something to lose or 
gain, therefore; participation should enable individuals and groups to 
promote and defend their interests and values. 
-3 -1.12 -2 -0.76 3 0.79 
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16 If it is to have any power, public participation should be independent 
from state institutions. It should be a space in which the public can 
articulate their own agenda and demands, before negotiating these with 
government and public organisations. 
1 0.09 -4 -1.45 2 0.72 
17 It is important that participation initiatives cultivate an environment in 
which everyone has an equal opportunity to give their views. One 
particular way of communicating should not be privileged over others, 
and differences should be recognised and respected.  
3 1.13 4 1.5 0 0.29 
18 Publicly debating social issues is the primary political act, so reasoning 
between people should be the guiding procedure for policy decision-
making. 
-1 -0.47 -4 -1.31 1 0.42 
19 To judge the success of public participation we need to look at the 
resultant policies and services and ask are they more responsive to 
public needs and public values. 
0 0.09 4 1.42 -3 -1.15 
20 The aim of participation should be to transfer decision power from 
elites in bureaucracies and public service organisations to the public, so 
the public can exercise some control over these institutions. 
3 0.95 0 0.08 -2 -0.79 
21 The success of public participation should be assessed by asking the 
participants whether they are satisfied. 
-1 -0.6 -4 -1.37 -1 -0.57 
22 There is no one 'public' with a general interest. Participation initiatives 
must bring together lots of overlapping little 'publics', all with their 
own interests and values. 
4 1.45 2 0.7 4 2.07 
23 Though it may not always be possible, participation should always aim 
to make collective decisions based on group consensus. 
-1 -0.5 -1 -0.48 -1 -0.46 
24 Participation should take a form that allows all those with a stake in the 
decision to present their claims, then there needs to be a clear and 
impartial mechanism for adjudicating between those claims. 
1 0.12 -1 -0.21 -1 -0.6 
143 
 
25 We should judge the success of a participatory decision process on the 
extent to which it results in a decision that is accepted by everyone as 
fair and legitimate. 
1 0.23 0 -0.09 -4 -1.32 
26 The point of public participation is to create cohesive communities, in 
which responsible citizens can work together to solve their own 
problems without relying on the state. 
0 0.09 -2 -0.97 -1 -0.68 
27 The objective of participation is to empower the public and the best 
way to do that is to give individuals a choice over which provider of 
services they can use. 
-4 -1.4 -4 -1.28 2 0.7 
28 There is no right way to do participation. The particular form of 
participation should be determined by what is most appropriate to the 
particular issue under consideration. 
2 0.86 4 1.57 0 0.31 
29 Public organisations frequently act like just another interest group, so it 
is important to create roles in which the public can provide impartial 
oversight or adjudication on controversial issues. 
0 0.03 1 0.34 -3 -1.11 
30 The best people to involve in any particular participatory policy-
making exercise are those who can contribute most to improving the 
particular policy that is under consideration. 
-2 -0.73 -2 -0.85 4 1.88 
31 Public organisations and public officials should not try to lead 
participation exercises, but play an enabling role. They should help the 
public achieve their own agenda by providing the skills and resources 
the public lack. 
1 0.1 1 0.61 2 0.73 
32 Participation initiatives should be open to all those who wish to 
participate. Participants should not be specially selected, though extra 
resources may need to be focused on encouraging disadvantaged 
groups to participate. 
3 1.06 0 0.07 3 0.83 
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33 The success of a participatory decision process should be assessed on 
how far it contributes towards resolving any conflict between 
competing interests or competing perspectives with regard to the 
decision being taken.  
-4 -1.4 -3 -1.12 -2 -0.98 
34 Participation is about improving the legitimacy of decisions by 
bringing decision-making out into the open from behind closed doors. 
By involving everyone with a stake in the issue, the public can see a 
decision is fair and does not favour vested interests. 
2 0.87 3 1.34 2 0.74 
35 To ensure accountability, it is important that elected representatives 
and public officials retain ultimate authority over any final decision. 
-4 -1.58 0 -0.04 0 -0.12 
36 The aim of participation should be to improve policy and to improve 
services. If public participation does not result in noticeable 
improvements in policy and/or services then it has failed. 
0 -0.28 1 0.5 -2 -0.97 
37 The aim of participation is to enable citizens to take the decisions that 
affect their lives through collective discussion and decision-making. It 
should be about collective self-government. 
4 1.58 -2 -0.95 -1 -0.59 
38 We cannot say there are a number of evaluation criteria that apply to 
all, or even most, public participation exercises. The assessment of 
success or failure must be based on the purpose(s) of the specific 
exercise being evaluated. 
-1 -0.45 2 0.68 3 1.13 
39 If government or public service organisations want to talk to the public, 
they should do so by engaging with existing community organisations, 
rather than setting up and imposing new participatory structures. 
-1 -0.58 -2 -1.06 3 1.45 
40 Participation may be a means to achieve better outcomes, but its 
principal objective is to realise people's right to participate in decisions 
about the society in which they live 
1 0.8 0 -0.02 3 0.75 
41 Society will always contain conflict about what the right values are, as 
well as competing claims for resources. The aim of public participation 
should be to resolve these conflicts between competing interests. 
-2 -0.7 -1 -0.69 -3 -1.01 
145 
 
42 It is primarily bonds with others and shared social goals that motivate 
people to participate, so participation works best when it is woven into 
the fabric of people's everyday lives, for instance; situated in local 
communities. 
3 1.22 1 0.59 -4 -1.39 
43 The aim of participation should be to give the public a voice that can 
influence decisions. Policy-makers need to listen, but must then 
exercise judgement in deciding what should be incorporated into the 
final decision. 
-2 -0.66 3 0.96 4 1.57 
44 Public participation is of little value if those that participate are not 
representative of those that will be affected by the decision, therefore; 
representativeness is a key criterion for evaluation. 
0 0.03 0 -0.12 4 1.71 
45 Public participation in the policy process should create a new 
relationship between public institutions and citizens in which both are 
equal partners co-creating policy. 
4 1.74 1 0.6 1 0.35 
46 A key measure for the success of participation is whether people feel 
they have any influence: Do they think they can affect decisions on 
policies that matter to them?  
3 1.14 3 1.37 -2 -1.01 
47 People don't want to attend endless meetings and discussions. The best 
way to enable the public to influence policies and public services is to 
give individuals options from which they can choose, whether that's a 
choice of service provider or a choice of different spending priorities 
for their neighbourhood. 
-3 -1.2 -1 -0.73 1 0.51 
48 Has there been an open and honest exchange of ideas and perspectives 
from all those involved? Has this resulted in greater mutual 
understanding? These are key criteria when assessing whether public 
participation has been a success. 
1 0.15 2 0.81 -4 -1.35 
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Chapter 5  
Tool or Trap? Cognition or Discourse?  
What is the nature of a procedural preference? 
 
That cumbersome computer [the brain] could hold so many contradictory opinions 
on so many different subjects all at once, and switch from one opinion or subject to 
another one so quickly, that a discussion between husband and wife under stress 
could end up like a fight between blindfolded people wearing roller skates. 
 
Kurt Vonnegut, Galápagos  
 
 
What is the nature of our procedural preferences? Do we store one of Chapter 4’s 
three participation preferences like code in our cumbersome computers, then apply it to 
consistently process the data of our external world? Or are these preferences more 
ephemeral repertoires that people deploy in their discursive interactions with one another, 
flexibly shifting from one opinion to another as the context demands? Are they productive 
like tools, used to effectively guide action? Or are they traps that result in myopia and 
frustration? The majority of the procedural preference literature is based on secondary data 
analysis of survey data, thus can say little about these questions. This chapter instead draws 
primarily on qualitative data to illuminate the nature of participation preferences by 
examining in detail the ways that people talk about these preferences. 
The main body of the chapter is devoted to a discursive analysis of the post-Q-sort 
interviews. It attempts to remove the blindfold and the roller skates from two central 
debates about participatory governance: the distribution of decision power and the role of 
conflict and self-interest. For each of these topics the analysis begins by focusing on a key 
extended extract from one interview, then builds outwards to encompass other research 
participants.  A natural consequence of this process is a further elaboration of the content 
of the participation preferences and modes, since who holds decision power and the role of 
conflict and self-interest relate to the two dimensions that structure the typology of 
participation modes, as well as the main cleavages between the three participation 
preferences. 
Before beginning this empirical analysis the chapter briefly introduces the 
theoretical debates surrounding the nature of political opinions, and how they relate to 
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research on procedural preferences. The final section then draws out the lessons of the 
analysis for the nature of procedural preferences and situates these insights in the 
theoretical literature. It demonstrates that preferences are context-sensitive. It argues that 
preferences are ambivalent to the core but that this does not preclude consistent patterns in 
aggregate responses. In addition, it shows that preferences are simultaneously tools and 
traps.  
 
 
5.1 Debates on the Nature of Preferences 
The literature on procedural preferences is still in its infancy. It has been mainly 
oriented towards demonstrating that procedural preferences matter at all, against the 
contention that people are interested only in policy outcomes, not the procedures by which 
they are arrived at.  Accordingly, it has primarily focused on demonstrating the plurality of 
preferences, the content of these different preferences – for instance, whether they are for 
experts, representatives or citizens to make decisions – and whether the preferences are 
predictive of behaviours (Bengtsson 2012; Bengtsson and Christensen 2016; Font, 
Wojcieszak, and Navarro 2015; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Neblo 2015; P. Webb 
2013). Mostly, it has said little about the nature of these preferences. All of these studies 
have employed quantitative survey methods that, broadly speaking, ask their respondents, 
do you prefer decisions to be made by experts or representatives or citizens? Currently, 
there is little research that looks beyond the survey responses about which type of decision 
procedures people prefer in order to describe what it is they find compelling about them 
and why, as well as why they dislike alternative approaches (Font, Wojcieszak, and 
Navarro 2015). Accordingly, it has only been possible to speculate on the reasons behind 
the apparently incongruous result that people subscribe simultaneously to contradictory 
preferences, which characterise the findings detailed in the previous chapter, as well as 
those of Bengtsson (2012), Font, Wojcieszak, and Navarro (2015), and Neblo (2015). 
Survey questions on procedural preferences are focused at a general level, thus 
decontextualized. It is commonly inferred that the intended decision-level is the nation 
state, but this is not always specified. It is thus difficult to know how someone with 
ambivalent preferences - who prefers decisions to be taken by representatives at the 
national level, but to take decisions themselves at the local level, to leave decisions on 
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healthcare provision to doctors, but want elected representatives to take decisions on 
policing – would approach such questions. This is hardly an outlandish hypothetical 
individual, but it is impossible to know which context would be salient for such a person at 
the moment of survey completion. These studies appear to be implicitly informed by the 
orthodox approach to attitudinal research. As Allport’s classic definition has it: 
An  attitude  is  “a  mental  or  neural  state  of  readiness,  organised  
through experience,  exerting  a  directive  or  dynamic  influence  upon  
the  individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it is 
related” (Allport, 1935 cited in Howarth 2006). 
Procedural preferences, in this view, are to some degree context-independent, inner, mental 
entities that individuals carry around with them, that can be measured by surveys, and (as 
the explanatory variable) can explain individual behaviours (response variable). Font, 
Wojcieszak, and Navarro (2015), for example, describe their survey as capturing attitudes 
and Bengtsson (2012), who does give consideration to these issues, argues that surveys are 
an adequate way of measuring preferences.  
Critics of this approach to political opinions have labelled it ‘cognitivist’ given its 
focus on individualised cognitions. It has come under sustained attack from within 
psychology and sociology. Rhetorical analysis (Billig 1991) and discourse analysis (Potter 
1996; Potter and Wetherell 1987) propose alternative epistemological underpinnings 
whereby opinions are context-specific, action-oriented, and structured through social 
processes. Social Representation Theory has also criticised the idea that attitudes are 
individualised cognitions in response to an external object in favour of social 
representations that are formed through interaction and evident in social practices. (Gaskell 
2001; Howarth 2006). These approaches have also challenged the idea that attitudes are 
consistent, as opposed to ambivalent and ‘dilemmatic’ (Billig 1991). Studies have shown 
that people’s preferences are deeply ambivalent on a range of issues from distributive 
justice (Hochschild 1981) to intergenerational informal caring relationships (Hillcoat-
Nallétamby and Phillips 2011). Robert Merton (1976) enumerated six types of sociological 
ambivalence as distinct phenomena from, but part of the explanation of, psychological 
ambivalence. Two of these types seem particularly pertinent to the understanding of 
participation preferences: a) the notion that a single role or social status often incorporates 
multiple incompatible normative expectations, for instance; “ambivalence in the role of the 
bureaucrat when individualised and personal attention is wanted by the client while the 
bureaucracy requires generalised and impersonal treatment” (Merton 1976, 7); and b) the 
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existence of contradictory cultural values concerning how society should be organised and 
the right way to live. As has already been documented, participation is associated with a 
range of different cultural values with attendant variety for the roles of those involved and 
the relationships between them. 
Mary Douglas’ Grid-Group Cultural Theory, which provided the inspiration for the 
typology of four modes of participation described in Chapter 3, has also provided an 
influential approach for thinking about both procedural and policy preferences (Gastil et al. 
2011; Hood 1998). Its tenets suggest such preferences are cultural in orientation. An 
individual’s preferences are predictable as they are oriented by one of a finite number of 
cultural biases. For Wildavsky (1987) political preferences are cultural in that they are 
endogenous and rooted in social life. Culture is constructed in the process of supporting, 
modifying or opposing existing social relations. This process is, however, limited by the 
fact that there are only four22 viable ways of life. Each way of life is characterised by a 
distinct set of shared values, and defined in opposition to the other three. Therefore, the 
conflict between the different cultures is an essential component of their identity and 
viability.  
This description aligns cultures with the anti-cognitivist approaches to political 
preferences, however; similar arguments have been rehearsed in debates amongst cultural 
theorists regarding both the nature of culture and the extent to which cultural orientations 
apply at the level of the individual. As Mamadouh (1999) notes, Mary Douglas has argued 
that individuals’ possess robust cultural orientations that pervade the different domains of 
their life, whereas Thompson and Wildavsky have proposed that, contrariwise, individuals’ 
cultural orientations may shift depending on context, for instance, between the home and 
the workplace. More recently, an article co-authored by a number of the most prominent 
Grid-Group Cultural Theorists, including Douglas and Thompson, suggested that cultural 
theory was not a good instrument for capturing “the totality of an individual’s behaviour 
and thought” and is instead “most applicable to social domains in which people meet, 
argue, communicate and justify themselves in regular, face-to-face interaction” (Verweij et 
al. 2006b, 838), suggesting cultural orientations may be discursive in nature. Nonetheless, 
some recent survey research suggests the applicability of “cultural cognitions” in 
                                                 
22 There is some debate in the cultural theory literature regarding whether there are four or five, see 
Mamadouh (1999) for a useful summary. 
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predicting individuals’ policy preferences across a wide range of topics (Gastil et al. 2011; 
Ripberger et al. 2012).  
Understanding the nature of people’s procedural preferences is important in 
understanding the design of participatory governance initiatives and how they can be 
improved, as well as how people will behave with regard to these initiatives. The 
procedural preference literature has been concerned with understanding the influence of 
support for participatory decision-making on people’s propensity to take up participatory 
opportunities, and Merton has theorised the influence of sociological ambivalence on 
behaviours. Ambivalent preferences, for instance, may be a strength in terms of openness 
to many alternative participatory practices, but could result in failures if participation is 
used to simultaneously pursue contradictory goals or oscillate between them. Strong 
cultural orientations, on the contrary, may be productive in providing a tool for 
consistently reasoning through the many difficult tensions that arise throughout the process 
of participation. However, they may also become traps, blinding people to the merits of 
alternative approaches, and creating resistance against necessary alterations as the context 
changes.  
The combination of Q-method and interviews employed within this particular 
research context is well-suited to exploring whether individuals’ preferences for 
participation are culturally coherent or ambivalent, and whether they are rhetorical, 
cognitive, or discursive in nature. The combined quantitative and qualitative data on the 
same person’s viewpoint provides a richer source of information than having just one type 
of data. The rendering of subjective viewpoints in an objective data structure provides a 
detailed model of an individual’s preferences that transparently specifies the regularities in 
similarities and differences between people. It also guards against criticisms of “bird-
spotting” illustrative examples that have, for instance, been levelled at other qualitative 
studies of cultural orientations (Mamadouh 1999). The proceeding interview then enables 
further in-depth exploration of those preferences: what it is that’s compelling about them, 
and how contestable preferences are justified. The methods can be flexible with regard to 
epistemology (Ramlo 2011).23 Most Q-methodologists would reject the idea that it captures 
inner cognitions in favour of the more behaviourally-oriented notion that it captures the 
process of expressing one’s subjectivity operantly (Brown 1980; Watts and Stenner 2012). 
                                                 
23 Although more positivistic uses of Q are often dismissed by Q-methodologists as Q ‘technique’, i.e. not 
proper Q ‘methodology’ 
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Yet, in many ways the approach may have benefits over more traditional survey methods 
for capturing cognitions. Participants are given statements that represent the range of 
debate about participation, which they sort through iterated comparisons. They are able to 
return to statements and alter their score in light of the other statements. This could help to 
mitigate some of the problematic framing effects – for instance, those caused by question 
order and wording - that Zaller and Feldman (1992) note are troubling for survey 
researchers. The participants are also able to challenge the wording of statements and 
clarify their responses in the interview, reducing problems of interpretation for the 
researcher.  
The study, in one sense, also constitutes an ideal test case for sociological 
ambivalence versus cognitive consistency. As detailed above, there are reasons to believe 
that the subject should produce sociological ambivalence due to the competing values and 
role expectations associated with participation. In addition, the participants in this study are 
of a particular type. They are all heavily involved in participation activities; many of them 
are paid to think about this issue on a daily basis. Zaller and Feldman (1992) note that 
people exhibit more stability in their responses to survey questions on items that are salient 
for them and they have thought about. Accordingly, if anyone is likely to have stable and 
consistent preferences concerning participation, then it is the participants in this study. The 
next two sections of the chapter take-up the qualitative analysis in order to illuminate these 
theoretical debates, which until now have only seen light engagement from the literature on 
procedural preferences. 
 
 
5.2 Who Decides? 
The empirical analysis begins with the question of how decision power should be 
distributed within participatory governance. The issue of ‘who decides?’ was identified by 
the principal components analysis (PCA) as the key point of contention between 
Preference 1 and Preference 2 in the previous chapter, and is also a defining feature of the 
negotiability dimension of the typology of four modes of participation outlined in Chapter 
3.  First, the analysis will examine the reasons civil servants give for why it’s important 
they retain decision power, then consider other participants’ justifications for why decision 
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power should be distributed more equally. Each discussion commences by examining in 
detail an extended passage from one participant before broadening out the analysis. 
 
5.21 The technocrat’s dilemma 
The following text is an extract from the interview with Jason. One reason for the 
selection of this particular extract is because it packs into a relatively concise passage a 
number of the recurring justificatory strategies for civil servants to retain the decision-
making role. Jason, as was detailed in the previous chapter, is a civil servant whose 
viewpoint appeared to be primarily characterised by a combination of pluralist and 
classical public administration elements. To set the context, this discussion takes place near 
the beginning of the interview. Jason is still sorting through the Q-sort statements and is 
responding to Q-sort statement S29, Public organisations frequently act like just another 
interest group, so it is important to create roles in which the public can provide impartial 
oversight or adjudication on controversial issues. Immediately preceding the extract 
reproduced here, Jason says he is struggling with the statement, breaks it into two pieces, 
and argues in regard to the first part that public organisations do not just act like another 
interest group, they are another interest group. The ensuing discussion is reproduced as 
Extract 5.21 below. 
 
Extract 5.21: The technocrat’s dilemma24 
Which means for the second part of the statement, then, 'so it’s important 
to create roles that the public can provide with impartial oversight'. So by 
'the public', do you mean the public through Parliament, or do you mean 
literally, like we'll just drag people in off the street and they can-- 
 
Yeah, I was thinking more extra-parliamentary initiatives. So for instance, 
you see things like citizens' juries, et cetera, where sometimes they're 
brought in when there's a controversial issue, and there's seen as like an 
impasse and there's no way forward, and then they get a sort of citizens' 
jury together to sort of come up with a set of recommendations. 
 
Right, I get you.  
 
So they're seen as a sort of impartial-- 
                                                 
24 Voice of the interviewee is in normal text, voice of the interviewer is italicised. 
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The experts can't work it out, let's get them to explain it to some members 
of the public, and see what, see which way their view goes. 
 
Yeah. 
 
 
Oh god. So I don't think, in that case, I really change my view about that. 
I don't think that's okay. I think that the experts should be able to work it 
out, and if they can't, you kind of, a politician has to make a decision. 
 
Right. 
 
But I am thinking about the kind of policy work I do, I am not thinking 
about things that look particularly like prison sentences, like you know, 
making a prison decision, or whatever. So for example, [structuring social 
security benefits]25 is bloody technical. And I think it would be a real 
shame to take something that is as technical and consequential as 
[structuring social security benefits], and try, and be put in a position 
where you would have to get someone in who doesn't really understand it, 
and then try and explain it to them, just because you haven't got your own 
house in order, and haven't been able to figure out what you think the right 
thing to do is. Does that make sense?  
 
Yeah.  
 
So I'm putting this down there, not because I undervalue the role of sort of 
public scrutiny, but more because I think experts should be able to do their 
jobs--should be made to do their jobs properly. The public are paying us 
to do this, and it seems a bit of cheat to say we can't work it out, you come 
in and sort it out for us. Does that make sense? 
 
[A brief discussion follows in which Jason enquires whether these type of 
citizens juries are what the researcher is referring to by a participation 
initiative, and it is explained that it is for the participant not the researcher 
to determine what participation means to them. This type of participation 
is just one example, and there is a little elaboration of the example to place 
it in a specific context, that of a local authority organising a citizens jury 
when there is a public uproar around a decision to close a local hospital. 
Jason then concludes his discussion of statement S29 by saying:] 
 
It's really hard, isn't it? So that's really, really hard, because, you know. 
That's what the local authority should have been doing, right. That is the 
function that one wants the experts in local authorities and central 
government to fulfil, is to compare the interests. It's this first part of the 
statement that then becomes difficult for me. 'Public organisations 
                                                 
25 As the interviewee is speaking about his own work, the exact details have been amended to protect the 
interviewee’s anonymity. 
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frequently act like just another interest group.' Which I agree with, I just 
don't give a shit. I might come back to that, is that all right? 
 
The primary topic of this extract is Jason’s struggle to decide whether he agrees or 
disagrees with statement S29, a task he finds so difficult that even after lengthy discussion 
he postpones until later. What is it that is so challenging about statement S29 for Jason? 
Jason is a civil servant arguing for a bureaucratic hierarchy in an era when more than 30 
years of attack from both the right and the left has delegitimised the idea of bureaucratic 
hierarchy as elitist. Moreover, Jason has been explicitly presented with these arguments on 
the other statements and has himself just assented to one of them, that public organisations 
are just another interest group. Jason is thus troubled by the dissonance of trying to 
reconcile two contradictory views, that public organisations are interest groups and that 
they are neutral experts who can weigh up interests. Though Jason understandably fails to 
reconcile the two, he presents a persuasive case for the authority of experts to make 
decisions and it is illustrative to see how he achieves this. 
The idea of public oversight and arbitration appears to be a new one for Jason. He 
asks for clarification but in doing so makes an argument that public oversight is through 
parliament and attempts to dismiss the idea of non-parliamentary means of oversight 
through making it seem strange and ill-thought out, “dragging people off the streets”. 
Nonetheless, the researcher’s clarification has the effect of shutting down this easy 
dismissal, forcing Jason to make a proper case. It is notable that the collective noun is then 
immediately transformed from ‘public organisations’ to ‘experts’, which is the first time 
that civil servants are referred to as experts in this interview. It is not surprising that the 
term experts is employed here; it is loaded with considerable rhetorical power and, as 
described in Chapter 3, claims to expertise are commonly used to justify authority. The 
term experts is potentially an inclusive category, it could include anyone, yet here it is 
being employed to make a category distinction: the public and politicians are not 
encompassed within the term experts26. This is reinforced by the comments that 
immediately proceed this extract, when Jason states that he disagrees with statement S09 
because the public are not experts, they are experienced and these are different things. The 
substitution of experts for public organisation also functions to distance the decision-
                                                 
26 It is perhaps noteworthy that this distinction between expert civil servants and non-expert politicians is one 
that reappears in a number of different interviews, and this is not only confined to interviews of civil 
servants. 
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makers from the people who were previously described as an interest group, helping to 
minimise the dissonance between the two ideas. A secondary category distinction quickly 
follows; Jason is “thinking about the kind of policy work I do”, which is “bloody 
technical”. The implication is that in less technical policy areas it may not be necessary for 
experts to make the decisions. This distinction performs two functions. It establishes 
Jason’s legitimacy for taking decisions about his own work; when Jason speaks about 
experts he is speaking about himself. It also establishes that he is not ideologically 
hierarchical, he only supports hierarchy when it is absolutely necessary. 
There are two further justificatory strategies that Jason employs, which reappear in 
other interviews where civil servants make arguments for their authority to make decisions. 
The first appears contradictory but works to protect the speaker against the retort that he is 
authoritarian or anti-democratic. Though Jason rejects the idea that the public should 
provide scrutiny through non-parliamentary means, he first asserts the value of public 
scrutiny. Similarly, later in the interview, he reiterates his democratic credentials,  
Even though I'm a democrat and I believe that people should have a voice, 
I still, the thing that's guiding the way I've set this out is this belief that 
having a voice is also about identifying experts to do the decision-making 
for you so that you don't have to. 
The second strategy is to emphasise the need for experts to make decisions as a 
responsibility to the public. Civil servants are not power-hungry and their privileged role as 
decision-makers is not a power play; it is a burden that they bear on behalf of the public. It 
presents a positive picture of the civil servant as a servant of the public, not as, say, a 
maximiser of professional prestige (as in Public Choice Theory) or a stooge of bourgeois 
class interests (as in Marxism). This burden motif also recurs in other interviews, for 
instance; a number of participants state that the public want to influence decisions rather 
than take decisions, which is persuasive because, as the procedural preference literature 
shows, for at least some of the public this is true. This burden motif was particularly stark 
in the comments of Mark, another civil servant, (note there is again a protective link to the 
democratic): 
I think it is that sort of democratic mandate, that we are the, people want 
to be able to hate us, in a way, they want us to make the decisions that they 
don't want to make, and they understandably don't want us to make, but 
it's our sort of duty to do so.  
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For Jason being a decision-maker is connected to a notion of professionalism. In 
just the short passage above he refers five times to the idea that if the experts cannot make 
a decision and have to devolve it to the public then they are failing to do their job properly. 
As aforementioned, Jason is not speaking abstractly in this passage, he is speaking about 
himself. The description is therefore partly about establishing a positive professional self-
identity. Jason is not simply justifying an abstract principle of organisation, he is justifying 
his everyday practice. If he does not decide then he is a failure. The professional identity of 
the civil servant is an important factor behind a number of participants’ justifications for 
expert decision-makers, at times clashing with participants more radical personal identities. 
Another two civil servants, Annette and Gary, for instance, both primarily paint a picture 
of participation as a means of government consultation, which belies their more radical 
personal views. Annette says from a personal perspective she is in favour of collective self-
government, but from a professional point of view it is a long way off. At the end of the 
interview in which he played the role of a very cautious civil servant, Gary unexpectedly 
said that the things he had spoken about were very much influenced by the fact he had just 
come from work, and if the interview were to take place on a Saturday he might give 
responses that were more suspicious of institutions and more in favour of building a new 
way of doing democracy. It is also illustrative that the civil servants who reject the idea of 
specialised decision-makers define themselves against the traditional civil service culture. 
Nabil claims his team has a voluntary sector ethos, and Orla says that she is employed to 
improve outcomes and her bosses do not realise that her work is actually about realising 
people’s right to participate.   
‘The experts’ are the heroes of Jason’s story. They are employing their 
considerable technical expertise to solve complex challenges that have important 
consequences for society. In addition, they are weighing up the interests of different groups 
to ensure that one interest group does not dominate a decision. This construction of the 
civil servant as neutral technocrat provides a positive professional identity, and also 
indemnifies against critique. Those who criticize can be construed as the interest groups 
who didn’t get their own way, or those who do not want to face up to the difficult 
decisions. This way of thinking is undoubtedly productive for individual civil servants. It 
affords them a positive framework for interpreting and guiding their quotidian practice that 
is consonant with the traditional culture of their workplace, thus it is integrative, reducing 
friction in professional relationships. Orla and Nabil question this construction and present 
themselves more as insurgents fighting to bring about necessary culture change in a 
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resistant system. Unlike the other civil servants, they report frequent conflicts and 
frustration with their colleagues in other departments who do not understand how their 
teams work. The construction also provides clear guidance for dealing with the many 
interest group claims that civil servants are likely to be faced with in their work. To present 
as impartial enables one to engage with a number of conflicting groups whilst still 
retaining one’s legitimacy with each group. In both the cases of technical decisions and 
arbitrating between interest groups the construction of public participation as ‘voices’ that 
need to be ‘listened to’ enables the civil servants to see themselves as acting 
democratically and to counter claims that they are hierarchical, without having to abandon 
their professional identity as expert decision-makers. 
Though it has its productive features, a strong connection between the construction 
of the civil servant as a neutral, expert decision-maker and a positive sense of professional 
identity is also problematic in relation to participatory governance. If one’s professional 
identity is tied to the idea of being a decision-maker, if I’m only doing my job properly if 
I’m making decisions, then calls to share decision power are going to be viewed at best as 
a criticism of performance and at worst as an existential threat. To concede that a collective 
decision process could do as good or better job is to admit failure, or worse, redundancy. 
Accordingly, such calls are likely to be resisted. This is, however, a trap in which the role 
of the civil servant is constructed too narrowly. Even though a number of participants in 
this study rejected the authority of bureaucrats to occupy the role expert decision-makers, 
they still saw the value of bureaucracy, and professed that there should be a more equal, 
collaborative relationship between the public and policy-makers. For these participants 
civil servants would still play an important role, but it should be in enabling and facilitating 
collective processes. As was observed with Jason and his claims that public organisations 
are interest groups, the idea of the civil servant as neutral expert is troubling even to civil 
servants who advocate it. Lauren also had significant difficulties with this idea as is 
apparent in the next extract. 
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Extract 5.22: The technocrat’s dilemma (part 2) 
So a load of conflicting things I've just said in that statement. 
 
No, I don't necessarily think so. [both laugh] What do you think was 
conflicting about it, I guess? 
 
I guess the kind of, my views on, yeah we can't be impartial but actually, 
I think the centre can be more impartial, but you know. I think it's so hard, 
I think it's an impossible job to kind of get that balance right between 
ensuring that people are engaged, participating, and have their, not just 
have a voice for the sake of sharing their voice, but actually that that voice 
is being acted upon. I think getting that right, but then making sure that 
each voice is equally listened to, I just think it's such a difficult tension to 
balance. But I think that's somewhere where, actually, the public couldn't 
necessarily, would you, I suppose the question is, can you get that if you 
devolve it entirely to the public? And I don't know. 
 
Yeah. I mean, I guess that's a common justification for government, I 
guess. 
 
Yes. And they've got your best interests at heart [sarcastically]. No, but 
you know, there is a sense as well that they are good at convening the 
expertise as well. 
 
This passage follows one in which Lauren was asked why she is sceptical of 
transferring decision power away from civil servants, and in which she similarly tried and 
failed to fully convince herself of the role of civil servants as impartial decision-makers. In 
this extract we see the Janus-face of this idea for Lauren. The sarcasm of “they’ve got your 
best interests at heart” enables her to assert something she holds as true, whilst 
simultaneously disavowing it, to prevent her seeming naïve. She rather tentatively invokes 
the ‘tyranny of the majority’ argument to justify the decision-making power of the 
bureaucracy, but then undercuts it with her sarcasm, and settles on the ability to convene 
expertise. In the preceding passage, the same tyranny of the majority argument elides into 
an argument that the accountability of civil servants means more joined-up delivery. In 
attempting to justify the decision-making role, Lauren appears to be grappling with the 
problem of what’s the role of civil servants vis-à-vis the public if they are not impartial 
decision-makers. The idea that they are conveners of expertise, though here it has more of 
a stakeholder focus, is not too dissimilar to the facilitative or enabling role that those who 
favour participation as collective decision-making want to see.  
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5.22 The radical’s dilemma 
Now that we have seen how hierarchy within participatory policy-making is 
justified, it is illustrative to compare the counter-position: how radicals justify more 
egalitarian decision procedures. As mentioned in Chapter 4, a number of different decision 
procedures were advocated that challenged the idea of politicians and public officials as a 
special class of decision-makers. The following passage from the interview with Kate 
doesn’t propose a particular approach to decision-making, but contains a number of the 
recurring justificatory strategies for challenging hierarchy that are employed by 
participants in the study who propose the various egalitarian approaches to decision-
making. For context, Kate is an employee of a civil society organisation but is also 
personally involved in political campaigns as an activist. Like the extract from Jason, this 
passage is selected from near the beginning of the interview. Kate has just finished her Q-
sort and has been asked to reflect on the process and whether there is anything she would 
like to challenge about the statements she was asked to rank. 
 
Extract 5.23: The radical’s dilemma 
[…] also there needs to be more kind of focus on, proper kind of true 
participation that also involves making sure that there isn't this, “there is 
the general public who have no skills and then there are experts who have 
all the skills”, I think there is something there about participation also 
involves making sure that the people who are the general public, who have 
the experience, are, decision makers. I think you know we're kind of 
building an arbitrary divide here, between between the people who can 
participate and the decision-makers who make the decisions, and so I, 
that's why I quite liked the ones about, yeah, like the public participation 
and the policy process should create a new relationship between public 
institutions and citizens in which both are equal partners in co-creating 
policy [...] 
 
I mean I guess the reason why there’s quite a few statements that sort of 
make that, that dichotomy between the public, as people who kind of 
inform policy and then policymakers as the people who then take decisions 
is because that's often what policy makers say about public participation, 
so they’re kind of representing that view, so I wonder what you think is 
wrong with that model, if you don't like it. 
 
Well I think that people who are decision-makers in one arena may well 
be participants in another arena, so you may well, you know, I don't know, 
you might be a government minister and make education policy, but that 
doesn't necessarily mean that you don't participate in a way much closer 
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to a normal individual about an issue around the environment on your local 
high street. I think you can be a policymaker in some situations and a 
participant in other situations and, and kind of someone with experience 
in other situations, as someone who you know is being impacted on that, 
by that, so I kind of I just sort of think and then the dividing line in between 
the people who can make the decisions and have all the knowledge and 
the people who participate in these kind of processes is a bit more fluid 
than it is when you set up a dichotomy between the people who know and 
do and the people who participate in what everyone else sets up for them.  
 
I think probably there's also something around participation being a kind 
of iterative process in that once you participate once in something you 
become a different kind of participant to the first time. So there is a kind 
of there's disengaged people participating in public policy, then there are 
more engaged people and then there are your kind of sort of your expert 
citizens as it were, kind of serial participators, and then there are people 
who have been, stopped being you know policy officers etc., then there 
are decision-makers, and I think you can move through those without 
going straight from being completely uninformed to being a decision-
maker, but you can also be any one of those in a different bit of your life 
at the same time. 
 
In the first sentence of this extract Kate, rather hesitatingly, engages in a bold 
rhetorical move: she defines what is and is not “true participation”. True participation is 
when the public are decision-makers and there is no arbitrary divide between participants 
and decision-makers. The word “arbitrary” reinforces this rhetorical strategy given its 
etymological connection to notions of capricious randomness along with its conventional 
use in a political context to refer to anti-democratic or despotic decision-making. As was 
observed with the discussion of Arnstein’s Ladder in Chapter 3, the labelling of forms of 
participation that do not meet one’s own normative standards as outside of the bounds of 
real participation is a familiar strategy amongst those who feel collective decision-making 
is the only legitimate form of participation. To set up one's own normative preferences as 
the truth suggests a considerable confidence in the rightness of those preferences. This is 
quite a stark contrast with the type of justifications of hierarchy employed by civil 
servants, which we saw were much more tentative, usually including a protective clause, 
and primarily founded on pragmatic grounds. Participants who made arguments for more 
equal decision power appeared much more comfortable to simply assert these principles 
without lengthy justifications. Sarah, for instance, simply asserted, “It’s not about elected 
representatives having ultimate authority. Absolutely not.” The extract from Kate’s 
interview is therefore somewhat atypical in that it provides a detailed argument for why 
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decision power should be shared, whereas for many participants this appeared to be beyond 
need of justification. 
Given her bold opening gambit it is interesting how Kate proceeds with the 
majority of her argument. Kate is primarily trying to establish the arbitrariness of the status 
distinctions that set up a special class of decision-makers. It is notable that in the first 
paragraph the general public’s legitimacy as decision-makers is predicated on the notion it 
is they, not the experts, who have experiences. This accepts the premises but reverses the 
conclusion of Jason’s argument that the public were only experienced and not expert, thus 
should not be decision-makers. Kate continues her argument in a similar vein, meeting her 
opponents on their own terrain. She makes three claims for why members of the public 
should not be excluded from decision-making. The first is that they may bring technical or 
decision-making expertise from other areas of their life that are not immediately apparent 
from their status as a normal individual. The second claim is that they may bring additional 
experiential expertise to the decision as someone who is impacted by it. Finally, the third 
claim is that people may bring decision-making experience from previous participatory 
activities. All three claims are in effect arguing that if you exclude the public from the 
decision you exclude some valuable experience or expertise that would make the decision 
better. They are pragmatic claims, unlike the normative “true participation” claim. Of 
course, Kate could have argued differently. She could have continued in a normative vein 
and challenged the notion that expertise and experience are the correct criteria for 
determining who should be a decision-maker, for instance, making the participatory 
democratic argument outlined in Chapter 4, that it is integral to someone’s autonomy that 
they have equal power to determine the decisions that impact them. The result of Kate 
basing her argument in expertise is that she reinforces that this is the legitimate criterion 
for deciding who should be a decision-maker, so much so that by the end of this process 
she appears to be advocating the very distinctions she set out to undermine. The final 
sentence reads as if the uninformed must undertake a participatory apprenticeship before 
they are eventually rewarded with decision-making responsibility. 
The question remains of why Kate, who appears to be normatively committed to 
equal power in decision-making, bases her argument on pragmatic grounds resulting in 
some semantic difficulties. There are a number of possibilities. First, perhaps it was simply 
the most salient argument in this context. Kate is responding against the idea that 
politicians and public officials should be specialised decision-makers, thus it is not 
surprising that she alights upon the primary reason that is given to justify this and 
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improvises a counter-argument within the terms of that debate. An alternative question – 
for instance, ‘should there be equal power to determine a decision?’ – may have elicited 
different justifications. Second, the idea that it is qualified people who should make 
decisions may be to some extent convincing for Kate, despite her conflicting preference for 
equal decision power. Third, the deployment of pragmatic arguments may have the same 
protective effect as when civil servants assert their democratic credentials. Radicals are 
rarely criticised for being too pragmatic or too hierarchical but are often criticised for being 
too idealistic. They are thus likely to be sensitive to dismissal as too idealistic and, 
accordingly, there is a symbolic potency to making pragmatic arguments.  
This may also partly explain the ambivalent attitude to consensus decision-making 
that was documented in the previous chapter. Egalitarians have good cause to think that a 
commitment to consensus decision-making will mark them out as an idealist. It is 
frequently criticised as unrealistic, for instance; Lauren, the civil servant, refers to it as a 
“pie-in-the-sky dream”. A number of participants are sceptical or even disavow consensus 
while also positively describing consensus-like decisions. Jim, for instance, who we saw in 
the last chapter stated that consensus without a private vote is just the ability to silence the 
dissenter, later praises Occupy’s consensus decision procedure, though with the caveat that 
“You wouldn't be able to make every decision in life through that”. It is particularly 
evident how the criticism of consensus functions in the comments of activist, Rebecca: 
Yeah, I don't know if we can ever reach consensus, not a real consensus. I 
mean, on a, in the big picture, because humans aren't ever all going to think 
the same. You just need some degree of consensus, I suppose, but consent 
is very manufactured, isn't it, like you see it being manufactured all the 
time, what is reasonable and what is the middle ground. It's actually, that's 
actually very carefully constructed, it's not a natural position. So yeah, I 
think the sort of Occupy lot are just naive, really.  
 
About the consensus process? 
 
Yeah, about consensus. It's not all just, you don't just sort of do that wavey 
hand thing, the jazz hand thing, until you all agree.  
Here Rebecca criticises consensus from both ends. She asserts her pragmatism and 
distinguishes herself from the naïve “Occupy lot”, who are made to appear slightly 
ridiculous, which is the kind of argument that Lauren would approve of. However, she also 
asserts her radical credentials in arguing, like Jim, that consensus is a power-play as the 
middle ground is manufactured; a little later in the interview it transpires that this 
manufacture is “by powerful interests, corporations, and the media, and politicians who 
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help them”. Just as some of the civil servants are sensitive to the criticisms that they are too 
hierarchical, and take measures to address this argument that cause them significant 
cognitive dissonance, some of the activists and civil society actors have the same 
experience with regard to the critique that they are too idealistic and their proposals are 
unrealistic. Rebecca ends her discussion of consensus exasperatedly, “I don't know, I'm not 
answering these very well, am I? I just don't know [both laugh]. I just don't know. I mean, 
they're like, they're big questions that I'm always mulling over and changing my mind on”.  
The participants who are attempting to realise more egalitarian decision processes 
are most commonly battling against the status quo, in which decision power is not widely 
shared. Just like for any band of insurgents with the odds stacked against them, to be on the 
side of the righteous (as the standard-bearers of true participation) is likely an important 
motivation in sustaining this campaign. Still, in order to be successful they need to 
persuade those within the spaces where decision power is currently held that it should be 
shared. It is therefore no surprise to find these participants are responsive to the logic of the 
civil service in their arguments for more equal decision power. In this context it is a wise 
move to position themselves as expert and pragmatic. When addressed directly to civil 
servants, the argument that they say the experts should make decisions but in restricting the 
number of decision-makers they are excluding a wealth of expertise and experience is in 
one sense very rhetorically effective. The civil servant either has to agree or appear 
paternalistic; to make a case that the public does not possess any expertise, or make Jason’s 
claim that the public has a kind of expertise but it is not the right kind to enable them to 
take decisions. It is one thing to make such a case in a private interview with a researcher 
(another technocrat), but quite another to do it publicly to the people who will be excluded.  
The other way that the idea of the citizen expert functions productively is in 
boosting the confidence of ordinary citizens to participate. For people like Kate, who is a 
confident and skilled political operator in paid employment in a political role, this is not an 
issue. But some of the volunteer participants remarked that they and others can be afraid of 
participating with policy-makers, for instance Carly said, “I think normal people would be 
scared to engage with politicians. It's like me when I started like, you're wary of them, you 
think they're higher up. You always have that”. In addition, Gabriella, when discussing her 
role as co-chair of a local authority poverty initiative, said, 
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That's why we've got him [Council Leader] sitting there, co-chairing with 
me, who is just somebody--well I'm not 'just somebody.' I am an important 
person as well [laughs]. But coming from an area that has got a lot of 
deprivation and sitting along with him. 
Constructing the citizen as possessing their own expertise, different from that of the policy-
makers, is a way for people who are unsure of their status to feel that they are not ‘just 
somebody’, that they have an important contribution to make. Both Carly and Gabriella 
take pleasure in recounting experiences where they imparted everyday insight that was new 
knowledge to policy-makers. 
There are also dangers to a single-minded focus on the institutionalisation of more 
egalitarian power relationships between the public and officials within a professionalised 
and hierarchical bureaucracy. In the discussion of her involvement as co-chair, it is 
apparent that Gabriella experiences cultural barriers to participating in decisions. She 
describes officials as “suits” with “a business-like attitude”, who have their own agenda 
and go off and do their own thing. She also experiences her role as co-chair as only the 
veneer of power. Asked if she feels the initiative is having an impact on policies, she 
responds: 
I don't know if... Because they come along to the meetings, and you know, 
we've got the leader of the council chairing it with me. Do they almost feel 
compelled to come because it's the leader of the council? You know, do 
they really want to be there, or are they just doing what the boss was 
saying? I've noticed that even if I'm going through the agenda item, there 
isn't eye contact with me. It's the leader who's being addressed. 
 
Right.  
 
It's him that they look at. And I can see the, you know, the body language 
and the kind of little nervousness in their faces. It's the leader, you know. 
Can't disagree with him or annoy him, you know? And it's just like, what, 
I'm supposed, I'm sitting here right next to him, I'm supposed to be the co-
chair, but I'm not getting noticed. This is what I mean by, although they’re 
coming along to the table, we're supposed to be sitting side by side, does 
that really, genuinely happen?  
The formal sharing of power may simply obscure the ways that power relations play out, as 
power is exerted through more amorphous, less accountable means; the real decisions are 
taken outside of the public decision space, or through implicit professional pressures. What 
happens to accountability when there are more egalitarian relationships between public and 
officials was a live debate for participants. For Anna and Michael creating personal bonds 
between citizens and officials would increase accountability by increasing the 
165 
 
responsibility officials would feel for those they have come to know. Contrariwise, 
Elizabeth worried that participation could reduce an individual’s scope to challenge if they 
feel complicit in the decision, and Flora worried that her growing closeness to decision-
makers made it more difficult to criticise them:  
It is very difficult to keep clear oppositional positions against people you 
drink beer or wine with, you know? It is. Because you start to understand 
their difficulties, and actually you kind of need not to.  
It is apparent then that even those who show support for collective decision-making worry 
about its dangers, such as a tendency to co-opt by reducing the ability to challenge 
decisions, as well as to conceal existing inequalities in power. 
This section has foregrounded some of the arguments that underpin disagreements 
on the distribution of decision power within participatory policy-making. Civil servants’ 
professional identity as impartial decision-makers clashes with the egalitarian value that 
true participation involves equal decision-making power. It became apparent, however, 
that the participants are not ideologues. They have nuanced positions and express 
significant doubts about their preferred mode of participation. Those who feel decisions 
should be the domain of neutral officials doubt the ability of neutrals to act impartially. 
Those who want to see more equal distribution of formal decision power are aware that 
this comes with risks that power is exerted in other ways.  
The presentation of the ways that people reason through their preferences has 
begun to provide an insight into the nature of these preferences. It was made apparent how 
the preferences are rhetorically constructed. In justifying how they rank certain statements, 
participants implicitly take account of common attacks against their position. Civil servants 
wanting to retain decision power emphasised their democratic credentials, inuring them 
against the critique of being overly hierarchical. Egalitarians emphasise their pragmatism, 
distancing themselves from accusations of naivety. There is also evidence that preferences 
are productive tools.  The idea of the public's expertise can boost the confidence of 
participants to engage with elites. There is value to the civil servant’s self-identity as 
neutral technocrat. It provides a unifying organisational culture, as well as helping to 
manage varied interest group claims. Still, it can also be a trap that makes opportunities to 
collaborate look like threats. 
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5.3 Conflict and Self-Interest 
In Chapter 3 it was argued that a defining feature of alternative approaches to the 
design of social and political institutions throughout history has been the extent to which 
citizens are regarded as predominantly self-interested or other-oriented and thus whether 
social relations are predominantly agonistic or solidaristic. This division between agonistic 
and solidaristic approaches to participation was predicted to be a prominent cleavage 
between participants in the study. It did separate Preference 3 from Preference 1 and 
Preference 2. Nevertheless, Chapter 4 detailed how the overwhelming majority of 
participants favoured solidaristic approaches to participation and eschewed agonistic ideas. 
As such, this issue provides a counterpoint to the overt contestation around who decides. 
Rather than being a highly visible point of contestation, it is for the most part an absence. 
Given the importance of conflict and self-interest in a number influential political theories, 
from Hobbes to the public choice school, it is interesting to see how the participants 
address these issues. Have they identified a means for radical egalitarian organisation to 
deal with the problem of strategic self-interest, or does this remain somewhat of a blind-
spot? 
One way to deal with the problem of self-interest is to deny that citizens are self-
interested at all. Jim gives the most forthright statement of such a view: 
She [Margaret Thatcher] basically said, people are selfish and if we accept 
their selfishness and then create a market for them to be selfish within, 
everyone will benefit. Well, I don't believe that. I believe the opposite. 
That everybody is actually altruistic and if we create a place where 
people's needs are listened to, they can then act in a more adult and 
altruistic manner. Then everyone benefits.  
The other participants do not state their view in such absolute terms. They concede that 
citizens are mostly a complex mix of self-interest and public-spiritedness. Even so, their 
presentation and practices emphasise the latter over the former. Michael, for instance, 
points to the neglect of one side of Adam Smith’s writings, claiming that greed and fellow-
feeling hold together, then summarises the practice of his organisation as “trying to bring 
out the best in people, rather than always believing the worst in people.” A further 
common strategy for minimising the problem of self-interest can be seen in the following 
extract from the interview with Elizabeth. 
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Extract 5.31: Self-interest as personal passions 
And as I say, I think self-interest, there's something just about the self-
interest which is where self-interest is defined as kind of purely very self-
seeking, and there's--if you were to talk about self-interest in terms of 
personal passions, they're still the things that interest you yourself, but 
maybe it's a less conventional. I suppose it's a less ego, I don't know. It's a 
less self-seeking and self-serving definition of self-interest, where you 
recognise that actually, you know, you do need to tap into what people feel 
is really important to them, and what they're interested in. Because 
otherwise, they won't engage so much, isn't it. […] 
 
Yeah. I guess it's just, if you did think that people were sort of only--were 
more, in a sense, likely to be self-interested than, and not be able to kind 
of transcend that just individual interest about, 'I want to get from this 
process what I want to get from it, and I don't care what other people’s 
needs are.' 
 
Oh, I think people definitely transcend. You know, I think part of the 
process of participation--and again this goes back to the listening and the 
relationships horizontally as well as vertically, you know. It, you know, I 
think that is one of the, that is one of the pluses. I do think that good 
participation can produce a greater sense of, yeah, where the differences 
are, but also where people have things in common and a sense of--yeah, I 
think there is a common good element to it, for sure, that takes people out 
of themselves. But I don’t think that it's, I don't think it's therefore a bad 
thing to recognise that people bring into that things that really motivate 
them. You know, I think that's a very, it's a very human part of it, isn't it? 
 
In this passage Elizabeth sanitises the idea of self-interest, transforming it from 
self-serving ego into motivating, personal passions. This positive re-framing of self-interest 
from a potential threat to the common good to an essential motivation for people to get 
involved in political participation is widespread amongst the participants. In order for 
people to engage you have to meet with their interests and their problems, then through 
participation they begin to think outside of themselves; they become a part of a public and 
begin to think structurally.  
Another, more subtle, challenge to the idea that Jim and Michael rejected of 
strategic, self-interested Homo economicus is elaborated in the second part of the passage 
from Elizabeth. Through the process of participation people transcend their personal 
interests and move towards the common good. Their preferences are malleable and 
endogenous to the process, not fixed and exogenous. Given this, egalitarian processes of 
collective decision-making, when well organised and well facilitated, can be a means for 
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surmounting conflicts. Orla, for instance, describes a participatory budgeting initiative in 
an ethnically divided community, where previous top-down local authority spending 
decisions had exacerbated tensions. The process began with “nobody talking to anyone and 
an atmosphere you could cut with a knife”, but over the two-day duration of the initiative 
tensions were broken down and the different groups started collaborating with each other. 
By the end of the process, Orla explains, it was “feel the love territory”. To suggest that 
those who favour a collective decision-making approach to participation are blind to the 
role of self-interest and conflict in participatory initiatives would be an over-simplification. 
They see the importance of personal interest in motivating an individual to participate. The 
importance of facilitation and other process design techniques in minimising interest group 
domination and ensuring everyone has a voice recur throughout the interviews. Moreover, 
the promise of overcoming interest group conflicts and doing politics differently is a 
primary attraction of this mode of participation. 
There is evidence that, despite alertness to these issues, the prevalence and 
persistence of self-interest and conflict are minimised, suggesting they may be 
underestimated. Participation as collective decision-making can undoubtedly overcome 
some conflicts, but even its advocates admit it would be unrealistic to expect it to work in 
all situations. After describing the successful participatory budgeting initiative, Orla says, 
“I’m not saying that’s going to work for everything”. Elizabeth recognises that there will 
be times when groups will try to secure their own needs, especially when there is 
competition for resources. Sarah, who perhaps has the strongest collective decision-making 
orientation of the participants, demarcates the boundaries of where her views apply on 
more than one occasion in her interview:  
Whether you could do, you know, areas where there's a lot more 
competition, say around wind farms or all that kind of stuff and all the 
NIMBY stuff, then that's a different matter. But in certain areas, this works 
fine.  
Though they state that their preferred mode of participation does not work in all 
contexts, the participants are vague about where and when it works and where and when it 
doesn’t. There was also little consideration from these participants of how a collective 
decision-making initiative that fails to result in an acceptably negotiated decision should be 
concluded. When Sarah is pressed about how decisions are made when there is conflict she 
begins to speak about how she would stop participating if she strongly disagreed with the 
group on an important point of principle. This echoes a frequent criticism of radical 
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participatory democracy that, since all forms of coercion are forbidden, there is no means 
for resolving conflicts apart from expulsion, splintering or dissolution of the group, which 
hardly seems like a satisfactory outcome on matters of collective public concern. As was 
noted in Chapter 3, the collective decision-making mode of participation is far from 
widespread in policy institutions in the UK. Those who wish to see more of it are faced 
with institutional scepticism and have to be strong advocates for why it works. As such, it 
is perhaps no surprise that they are better at making arguments about why it will work than 
defining the boundaries of its limitations 
Self-interest and conflict were more readily accepted as an everyday part of 
participatory initiatives by those who favoured the knowledge transfer mode of 
participation. This is particularly true amongst the civil servants, some of whom we have 
already seen incorporated a pluralist element into their understanding of participation. As 
foreshadowed earlier in this chapter in the discussion of Extract 5.21 from the interview 
with Jason, it is a relatively simple move to extend the role of the civil servant from an 
expert weighing up all the evidence and making a decision to an impartial arbiter weighing 
up competing interests. Nonetheless, it was noted how some civil servants found their 
supposed neutrality or impartiality troubling. One of the keys to this conception of policy-
making is to locate conflicts among stakeholders – for instance, between benefit recipients 
and taxpayers, employers and members of pension schemes, tenants and landlords – with 
the policy-maker remaining aloof from such conflicts in order to govern impartially. We 
saw that for Jason much of his difficulty with statement S29 was due to him previously 
stating that public organisations were just another interest group, thus not removed from 
the conflict.  
The perception that public institutions are enmeshed in, rather than detached from, 
social conflicts was prevalent among the activist participants. They were much more likely 
to present conflicts as situated between public institutions and the public than between 
different stakeholders. This cannot simply be attributed to radical political viewpoints. 
Celia and Stella, for instance, both favour the knowledge transfer mode of participation. 
They stress the role of elected officials and public servants in assessing the big picture and 
taking decisions based on a wide range of evidence. Their own activism is motivated by 
what they see as the failure of current government to adequately fulfil this role, Celia says 
she has given up participating in government-led participation opportunities on welfare: 
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Because anything that they would enable or set up is going to be a load of 
crap and they're not going to listen to it anyway, so you've got to, you 
know if you want to--with a government like this, if you want to have a 
voice, or have power, you've got to be an activist and a campaigner and 
you've got to take a fight to them, basically, in whatever way you can. But 
that's not necessarily the case, probably, for all areas of decision-making 
or policy. This is just my experience of the DWP. 
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) is particularly singled out for criticism by 
a number of participants, who claim that it has its own agenda and is not interested in what 
they have to say. In describing how the poverty initiative she is involved with has tried to 
engage the DWP, but were told that it would be too political for the DWP to get involved, 
Carly says, “So they wouldn't want to be seen to be fighting poverty and challenging 
stigma, because it's against their--you understand what I mean? Their, it's them that's the 
cause, so you know.” Carly interprets the DWP’s attempt to assert its neutrality as further 
confirmation that it has its own specific agenda, one that is not committed to reducing 
poverty. The comment points to the problem with public organisations’ attempts to assert 
their impartiality when they are perceived to be the direct cause of the problem by one side 
in a politically polarised debate. It is extremely unlikely in such a situation that any claims 
to impartially assess all the evidence and make a neutral judgement will have sufficient 
credibility with all sides to garner legitimacy for a decision. 
This discussion of the perceptions of self-interest and conflict in participation has 
further elaborated understanding of the knowledge transfer and collective decision-making 
modes and preferences. The individuals who hold these preferences are not wholly blind to 
self-interested or agonistic practices. This section has demonstrated that the participants do 
find means for addressing such practices, most commonly means that mesh, more or less, 
with their orientation to participation. In each case, however, the solidaristic predisposition 
of participants does appear to result in a partial blindness to certain forms of conflict. 
Those who favour the collective decision-making mode underestimate the prevalence and 
persistence of self-interested conflicts among the public. Those who favour the knowledge 
transfer mode over-estimate the extent to which public officials are detached from conflicts 
and can claim impartiality. This analysis has again helped to illuminate some aspects of the 
nature of the preferences people hold. It was apparent from Elizabeth’s sanitisation of self-
interest into ‘personal passions’ how participants can reinterpret the unfamiliar so that it 
fits with an existing set of meanings – a process social representations theorists have called 
anchoring. There were also examples of the ways that people draw context-specific 
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boundaries around their preferences, for instance; Sarah’s view that her approach might not 
work for policy topics on which there is a lot of NIMBYism.  
 
 
5.4 So, What is a Procedural Preference? 
Section 5.1 of this chapter set up a dichotomy between a cognitivist approach to 
researching political attitudes and a more discursive approach. The former mainly employs 
large-scale survey analysis and has dominated the procedural preference literature. The 
latter is usually characterised by the use of qualitative techniques and has so far been 
absent from debates on procedural preferences. If preferences are more like cognitions then 
we should expect them to be consistent and context-independent. If they are more like 
discourses we should expect them to be ambivalent and context-sensitive. It was argued 
that this study provides something of an ideal test case, since the subject area is one where 
we might expect to find sociological ambivalence, yet the participants’ knowledge of the 
subject means they should be expected to have relatively stable preferences. This 
concluding section of the chapter draws together the lessons of Sections 5.2 and 5.3 and 
discusses their implications for the nature of procedural preferences, situating them in the 
theoretical literature discussed in Section 5.1. It first addresses the question of whether 
preferences are context-independent or context-sensitive. Then it examines the evidence 
for ambivalence versus consistency. Finally, there is an assessment of the effects of the 
preferences, whether they are tools or traps.  
 
5.41 Are participation preferences context-independent or context-sensitive? 
There are a number of ways that participation preferences appeared to be 
constituted in relation to specific contexts. In the above analysis this was most obvious in 
the ways that preferences were bounded by policy issue context. Jason connected his 
preference for experts to make decisions to the technical complexity of certain policy 
issues, and stated it may not apply to other less technical areas like prison sentences. 
Sarah’s preference for solidaristic processes was related to the particular issue on which 
she works, but she said it may not be appropriate for other, more competitive issues like 
placement of wind farms. There were a number of other ways that the importance of 
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context manifested itself. Just as with a survey questionnaire, in the Q-sorting process 
participants were faced with a range of decontextualized statements to respond to. The lack 
of ‘object context’ caused them significant difficulties in deciding whether they agreed or 
disagreed with a statement. Problems in sorting statements were attributed to: a) 
geographical context, different types of participation were felt to be more appropriate at 
different geographical levels; b) political context, different types of participation may be 
necessary depending on levels of trust between citizens and public organisations; and c) 
participation type, some participants wanted the type of participation pre-defined (e.g. 
consultation or co-production), which was particularly problematic given the objective of 
the process was to allow participants to define participation for themselves.  
The discussion in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 also hinted at three aspects of the discursive 
context that were constitutive of participants’ preferences. Gary and Annette both said that 
they were speaking through their professional identities as civil servants and that in Gary’s 
words, “talk to me on a Saturday, I’d be very different”. This is an archetypal example of 
Merton’s second type of sociological ambivalence, “in which the interests and values 
incorporated in different statuses occupied by the same person result in mixed feelings and 
compromise behaviour” (1976, 9). Furthermore, it was discussed how the setting, a private 
research interview with someone who could also be considered an expert technocrat, 
presented a particular scenario in which it was acceptable for Jason to suggest that the 
public do not have the right kind of expertise to make a decision. It is questionable whether 
this argument would occur to him if he were speaking publicly to a group demanding 
inclusion. In addition, we saw how Kate’s switch from normative to pragmatic 
justifications for equal decision power proceeded out of the specificities of the kind of 
question she was responding to. Each case suggests that it was features of the discursive 
context in which the conversation took place that were at least partly constitutive of the 
views that were espoused. Object context and discursive context are thus potential sources 
of a substantial amount of variability in a single participants’ preferences; variability that 
would not be captured by rating, on a scale of 0-10, whether allowing experts to decide is 
the best or worst kind of way to make political decisions (as in: Bengtsson 2012; Font, 
Wojcieszak, and Navarro 2015). 
 
173 
 
5.42 Are participation preferences ambivalent or consistent? 
In performing the Q-sort and through discussion in the interview participants did 
not appear to be simply responding to objects according to a pre-existing, fully-formed 
participation preference. Instead they appear to be arguing (with themselves) for certain 
practices and against others, often trying to find a path through difficult issues. This is 
particularly apparent in Rebecca’s comment that she was always mulling over and 
changing her mind on these big questions. This conforms to Billig’s (1991) thesis that 
thinking is itself arguing and our private thoughts reproduce public debates. Accordingly, 
we saw above that preferences are expressed in ways that were rhetorically oriented, both 
offensively and defensively. Kate’s pragmatic argument that citizens should be involved in 
decision-making because of their expertise, for instance, functions both to protect her from 
criticism as a naïve idealist and to undermine a key argument for why public officials 
should retain decision power. Kate’s characterisation of ‘true participation’, defined 
against an arbitrary distinction between decision-makers and participants, is also evidence 
to suggest that procedural preferences have a cultural element in that they are defined in 
opposition to alternative ways of organising. Moreover, throughout a number of the 
passages reproduced above, there is evidence that even strong preferences are dilemmatic 
(Billig 1991) – that is, contain ambivalent themes. Even those participants such as Lauren, 
Kate and Sarah with statistically very clear preferences (see Table 4.13, Chapter 4) 
demonstrate significant ambivalence or contingency on the issue of the distribution of 
decision power, which sits at the core of their expressed preference. Participants were 
frequently self-reflexive about their ambivalence throughout their interview, chastising 
themselves for being hypocritical or contradictory, as can be observed in the first line of 
Extract 5.22 from Lauren’s interview. 
The rhetorical orientation of the expressed preferences, coupled with their 
sensitivity to context challenges the cognitivist notion that individuals have persisting 
participation preferences that can be unproblematically captured by survey questions. The 
observed variability and ambivalence is consistent, however, with the discourse approach 
espoused by Potter and Wetherall (1987). Following this approach, the four modes of 
participation outlined in Chapter 3 could be seen as furnishing individuals with a range of 
‘interpretive repertoires’ – lexicons of recurrently used terms and metaphors – that 
participants in this study drew on to perform different tasks as the particular discursive 
context demanded. Nonetheless, there is something unsatisfying about the discourse 
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approach, which is that the relation between preference and individual disappears 
altogether. If preferences are the application of discursive repertoires to appropriate 
discursive contexts, then the individual preference is simply a series of fleeting discursive 
acts. It suggests that any individual can and is likely to draw on any interpretive repertoire. 
Though it explains inconsistency and ambivalence in preferences, it does not help to 
explain the consistent regularities.  
Participants expressed a great deal of consistency in their preferences. They 
engaged in a number of behaviours that were suggestive of personal predispositions. 
Though there was ambivalence, there was also certainty, for example; it was noted above 
that Sarah dismissed the idea that officials should have ultimate authority with just two 
words “Absolutely not.” Participants were also observed engaging in processes of 
anchoring: Elizabeth transformed self-interest into ‘personal passions’ to fit with her more 
solidaristic orientation, and Chapter 4 described how Janeane interpreted participation’s 
potential oversight function so that it fit with the notion that the public should work 
alongside officials by bringing complementary experiential expertise. Jason and Kate both 
employed the same interpretive repertoire – that expertise substantiates claims to wield 
decision power – to argue for contradictory ends. Kate claimed it justified citizen power, 
while Jason claimed it justified official power, thus the same repertoire was employed 
differently by each participant, but in ways that were consistent with the greater part of the 
other arguments each espoused. In addition, the Q-sort presented participants with a variety 
of statements encompassing multiple discursive repertoires that they ranked in highly 
patterned ways that were theoretically predictable and similar to what has been empirically 
observed in other studies (Bengtsson 2012; Font, Wojcieszak, and Navarro 2015).  
Gaskell’s (2001) notion that social cognitions and social representations’ possess a 
stable core and flexible periphery provides one way to explain this simultaneous 
consistency and ambivalence. Nevertheless, this approach is also unsatisfying. As 
discussed at length above, there is substantial ambivalence even on the question of the 
distribution of decision power, which the principal component analysis in Chapter 4 
identified as a core principle for each of the two primary modes of participation. An 
alternative approach is to think of individuals as having a probabilistic orientation (Zaller 
and Feldman 1992). When an individual constructs their preference regarding participation 
they will do so in light of multiple conflicting considerations, which could potentially take 
them in different directions. There are no core aspects of an individual’s preference that are 
immune from conflict and questioning; they are at heart dilemmatic. An individual 
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possesses a preference when in the majority of circumstances she resolves such conflicts in 
a certain direction. Kate and Jason are both conflicted on issues at the centre of their 
participation preference. Still, Kate keeps returning to the idea that decision power should 
be more equally distributed, whilst Jason keeps returning to the idea that officials should 
be the ones to make decisions.  
In summary, the participants in this study act rhetorically. They argue with 
themselves, often contradicting themselves. They are sensitive to the discursive and object 
context. However, their discursive acts are not randomly determined by discursive context. 
Different participants have differently patterned responses when such acts are viewed in 
aggregate. To say that an individual has a strong preference is to say that this aggregate 
pattern shows consistency. Principal component analysis and factor analysis on survey 
data, with its additional stage of aggregation, is useful in capturing the contours of the 
debates on an issue. However, we should be careful about using such methods to pack 
individuals in neat procedural preferences boxes. It is debatable whether it is possible to 
classify any individual as possessing a generalised preference for, say, citizen-led decision-
making that applies in all contexts in the way that current research on procedural 
preferences implies. It may be possible to use statistical analyses to argue that, all things 
being equal, an individual has a predisposition to favour citizen-led decision-making, but 
in many cases all things are not equal. Even in this study, with its greater specificity of 
context, the views of participants with statistically unambiguous preferences are 
characterised by understandable ambivalence, confusion, and context-specific variations. 
Individuals may have a predisposition towards favouring participation as knowledge 
transfer or collective decision-making. Still, their ability to move flexibly between 
preferences should not be underestimated, particularly when the object or discursive 
context changes. A mixed methods approach that collects both quantitative and qualitative 
data on a person’s preference is thus instrumental in understanding their multi-faceted 
nature. 
 
5.43 Are participation preferences tools or traps? 
A number of ways that participation preferences were constituted so as to be 
productive for the preference holder have been documented throughout this chapter. It was 
argued that self-identifying as a neutral decision-maker was useful for the civil servant in 
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accommodating themselves to the dominant organisational culture, as well as negotiating 
with a variety of interests groups. For those who favour collective-decision-making, to be 
on the side of the righteous in advocating for true participation, and to be vague about the 
limitations of this approach, are important in sustaining the motivations of those trying to 
see their vision realised against the odds. Still, just as participants’ preferences are 
characterised by ambivalence and consistency, they can be both tools and traps. At times, it 
was observed how the very thing that makes a preference productive for negotiating a 
complex social environment can also prevent individuals from seeing the value of 
alternatives or adapting to changed contexts.  
An identity as a neutral, expert decision-maker meant that Jason saw any 
devolution of decision power as a threat to his role rather than an opportunity for 
collaboration. It also caused problems for the DWP when they made claims to impartiality 
in a situation where they were seen by others as implicated in politicised debates. This is 
not to say it is never legitimate for public institutions to play the role of neutral arbiter or 
broker, only that their ability to do so with credibility is circumstance dependent. 
Paradoxically, it may be most tempting for a public institution to assert its neutrality 
exactly when its credibility is challenged. Nevertheless, adopting an alternative approach, 
for instance, instituting a participation initiative as an arbitration or oversight mechanism 
may prove much more effective in producing a decision that commands legitimacy in such 
circumstances.  
The vagueness over how to do collective decision-making when self-interest and 
conflict are prevalent is also problematic for its advocates. If collective decision-making 
does not work in all contexts, then this is exactly the kind of knowledge that is necessary to 
make it successful. Does this mode of participation simply exacerbate conflict? 
Participatory decision-making has been observed to obscure differences and conflicts, 
rather than open them up to greater examination and resolution (Mansbridge 1980). For 
this type of participation to function effectively in areas where there are deep-seated 
political conflicts – as there currently are, for instance, around social security benefits – 
there needs to be a good understanding of how collective decision-making can be realised 
in such circumstances, or whether other modes of participation would prove more 
effective. 
One way to address the problem of preferences becoming traps is to provide 
individuals with multiple frames for thinking about participation and their role in it; a task 
that the typology of four modes of participation can assist with. Some of the participants 
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demonstrated they were already skilled in this regard, for instance; take Flora’s comment 
on how she approaches her participation as a healthcare activist: 
I mean it's it's not the right sort of scenario but I mean I still consider 
myself a revolutionary socialist, but this isn't about that kind of political 
scenario. We’re not trying to change the context of the system of 
healthcare, we're trying to fix it, we are trying to save it, we are trying to 
make it as good as we can. 
In her participatory activities Flora brackets her revolutionary socialism and desire to 
radically overturn power relationships as inappropriate to the political scenario in which 
she is participating. Instead she applies an alternate frame to her participation and 
orientates herself to the practical concern of how she can make healthcare services better. 
Similarly, Orla can switch between different conceptions of her role as a civil servant. In 
general she doubts the neutrality of policy-makers and works towards more participatory 
decision-making, but also gives specific reasons why in one particular circumstance it may 
be more efficient for her team to act as the neutral decision-makers rather than organising a 
participatory process. Of course this project to provide actors with a range of different 
frames would generate ambivalence by design, with its attendant risks as well as 
opportunities. 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that the heterogeneity between 
participants’ preferences for participation provides an imperative for creating diverse sets 
of participation opportunities. If participatory governance is to truly attract broad-based 
participation it needs to take account of the different ways that people wish to participate. 
The heterogeneity within participants’ preferences for participation outlined in this chapter 
– that most participants are able to recognise the inherent logics of different ways of doing 
participation and some can even flexibly switch between them – suggests that a system of 
diverse participatory opportunities may also be able to command widespread legitimacy. 
The next chapter will explore in detail what such a systemic approach to participatory 
policy-making might look like. Drawing on the deliberative systems approach for 
inspiration it will investigate which functions a policy system has to fulfil, and which 
modes of participation might best realise those functions. 
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Chapter 6  
A Systemic Approach to Participation in Public Administration 
 
Arbitrary reduction of multiple and conflicting principles to one solitary survivor, 
guillotining all the other evaluative criteria is not, in fact, a prerequisite for getting 
useful and robust conclusions on what should be done. 
 
Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice 
 
 
The existence of multiple and conflicting principles of participation, as well as 
multiple and conflicting preferences for participation, presents the problem of what to do 
with all of this diversity. The variety of demands on political institutions created by 
diversity of preferences for political decision-making is considered by some as an 
insurmountable barrier to engineering an institutional solution that commands widespread 
support (Bengtsson and Christensen 2016). So, how should we approach the design of 
participatory policy institutions in light of these competing demands? One solution is to 
select a preferred mode of participation, argue for its superiority, and design all institutions 
in its image, discarding the other modes of participation. Given previous chapters’ critique 
of Arnstein and her followers for taking this type of approach, it may come as little 
surprise that such ‘guillotining’ is not advocated in this chapter. There is however a more 
inclusive solution to this problem of value pluralism. The pessimism over the possibility of 
designing legitimate institutions when faced with heterogeneous preferences is based on an 
assumption that institutional solutions cannot themselves be heterogeneous. This chapter 
argues for a more ‘ecumenical’ approach to institutional design (G. Smith 2009) that 
recognises the importance of a diversity of different types of opportunities to participate in 
governance. It adopts a systemic approach to describe how complex policy systems can be 
founded on what Amartya Sen (2010) has called a ‘plural grounding’. 
There are now a number of disparate approaches that challenge the idea that 
institutional arrangements must be founded on a single, coherent set of values or 
principles. In criticising the ‘transcendental institutionalism’ of social contract theorists 
such as Hobbes, Rousseau and Rawls, Sen (2010) has made the case for a capacious theory 
of justice that recognises the inescapable plurality of competing principles, rather than 
identifies a single set of transcendental principles of justice with a resulting institution 
179 
 
arrangement. Similarly, Grid-Group Cultural Theorists’ recent turn towards ‘clumsy 
solutions’ (Verweij and Thompson 2006) is an attempt to deal with the persisting diversity 
of plausible worldviews. Many of the leading proponents of this field now argue that, 
given this diversity, any ‘elegant’ solution to solving a policy problem that attempts to 
optimise around the problem definition and solutions of one cultural orientation is 
guaranteed to fail to achieve widespread and longstanding legitimacy. They call for clumsy 
solutions that constructively harness the contestation between different cultural 
orientations (Verweij et al. 2006a). Sen has argued that a broad theory that encompasses 
non-congruent considerations does not by any means become incoherent, unmanageable, 
or useless; “definite conclusions can emerge despite the plurality” (2010, 397). There are 
now a number of examples of the clumsy solutions approach providing new insights on 
seemingly intractable policy problems such as climate change (see: Verweij and Thompson 
2006) by including voices from across what Gastil et al. (2016) call cultural cognitive 
divides. Nonetheless, they have only hinted at the realisation of the clumsy institutional 
forms that would take account of diversity in procedural preferences (Verweij et al. 
2006a). 
A systems approach provides a framework for how to conceive of and construct 
such institutions. Systems thinking offers a means for breaking free of the models-based 
approach to democracy and public administration, whereby institutions are theorised from 
within a single normative model, in order to consider the functions a political system must 
realise and the mechanisms best suited to serving them (Warren 2012). A key insight of the 
increasingly influential deliberative systems approach is that no single deliberative arena is 
sufficient to fully perform all the functions necessary to authorise political decisions 
(Dryzek 2010; Mansbridge et al. 2012; Parkinson 2006). It is systemic in that it considers 
deliberative arenas as:  
A set of distinguishable, differentiated but in some ways interdependent 
parts, often with distributed functions and a division of labour, connected 
in such a way as to form a complex whole. (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 4) 
The notion that there can be a division of labour between deliberative arenas with each 
performing different functions shifts the way we should analyse particular instances of 
deliberation. It is this that alters expectations of them, so that a single site of deliberation is 
not expected to carry the entire burden of legitimacy for authorising a political decision. In 
addition, though it is still important to judge sites of deliberation independently, they 
should also be judged in relation to other parts of the system and in terms of their systemic 
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effects. A specific weakness of one deliberative arena may not prove to be very important 
if this is remedied by another component of the deliberative system. Contrariwise an 
exemplary case of deliberation may turn out to be problematic if it displaces other 
important components of the system (Mansbridge et al. 2012). 
Many of the benefits attributed to the deliberative systems approach are similarly 
beneficial for reconceptualising the ways we think about participation. Just as with 
deliberative innovations, there is a tendency to think of new participatory initiatives (which 
are in some cases the same thing) as individual projects without considering their relations 
to the broader political system and other means for participation. Once we accept that no 
participation exercise can realise all the myriad benefits attributed to participation, but 
different participatory activities can contribute to realising different functions, it opens up 
possibilities for increased participatory diversity. We may be more forgiving of particular 
instances of participation that fail to engage a certain group of people if part of the reason 
for that failure is this group already has another means to make their voices heard. We may 
be more accepting of types of participation that do not meet our own particular normative 
conception of participation too. Those who favour the collective decision-making approach 
to participation, for example, may accept knowledge transfer type activities that aim to 
collect experiential expertise to inform decisions, perhaps even view these as useful, if they 
take place in a system where there are other opportunities to realise citizen control. 
Moreover, thinking systemically helps bring to light the broader context and systemic 
problems that condition specific instances of participation, for instance; if a large number 
of participatory activities are failing to engage a certain group in the population, then rather 
than seeing this as an individual failing of specific initiatives we may instead be drawn to 
thinking about systemic remedies. 
This chapter applies a systemic approach to public participation in processes of 
public administration. It first argues for why it would be inappropriate to simply apply the 
influential deliberative systems approach to thinking about participation in policy systems, 
identifying three forms of synecdoche when the deliberative system is applied to 
participatory public policy. It then outlines an alternative approach that harnesses the 
insights from value pluralism and systems thinking to propose three functions that policy 
systems have to realise: effectiveness, autonomy and accountability. It shows how these 
functions are best served by different modes of participation, using examples of actual 
participation in the English National Health Service (NHS) to illustrate. The concluding 
section then considers some of the ways that different modes and functions can be 
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structured within a system, as well as the ways to assess how well a system is operating 
and how the approach can illuminate existing issues in participatory practice.  
 
 
6.1 Beyond the Deliberative System 
The deliberative system has capacious boundaries. All of the most prominent 
statements of the deliberative systems approach intend for it to include public 
administration (see: Dryzek, 2010; Mansbridge et al., 2012; Parkinson, 2006). It 
encompasses “all governmental and non-governmental institutions, including governance 
networks and the informal friendship networks that link individuals and groups 
discursively on matters of common concern” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 8). The term 
‘deliberative system’ conceals the extent to which these scholars are similarly agreed that 
the approach is intended to be a theory of participation just as much as it is a theory of 
deliberation. The term was coined by Mansbridge in an attempt to expand deliberative 
democracy to take account of everyday political talk, in an essay where: “The analysis 
calls throughout for a democratic theory that puts the citizen at the center” (1999, 212). If 
the deliberative system already encompasses participation in public administration, then a 
new approach would be unnecessary. However, there are question marks over how well a 
theory originally intended to explain the political/legislative process translates to the 
policy/administration process. How does deliberative governance conceive of public 
administration, and what forms of participation does it prioritise? This section argues that 
in both cases the deliberative systems approach inscribes a synecdochic conception: it 
reduces public administration to governance networks and public participation to talk and 
deliberative influence. 
The deliberative system may include ‘all governmental institutions, including 
governance networks’, yet the position of governance networks, public bureaucracies and 
the roles of public administrators within the deliberative system are left unspecified by 
Mansbridge et al. (2012). Most of the empirical examples of deliberative innovations 
analysed by Parkinson (2006) are from the NHS, so we may expect a more detailed 
account of deliberative public administration therein. Nonetheless, whilst Parkinson’s 
specification of the deliberative system expends a great deal of effort on reconceptualising 
the representative relationship, there is no such treatment of the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats 
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are neutral functionaries who manage, monitor and implement but play no role in decision-
making (2006, 169).  Given the context of the empirical work in the NHS, this is a 
surprising omission considering the number of appointed officials taking binding decisions 
on matters of common concern in this domain is likely much greater than the number of 
elected officials with a representative relationship to the public. It is guilty of common 
tendency amongst deliberative democrats to slip into a stylized distinction between 
democratic politics as the locus of will-formation and public administration as a process of 
neutral translation of democratic will into output (Boswell 2016). It is no surprise that 
deliberative democrats have viewed politics through the lens of will-formation, given that 
this is the function that deliberation best serves (Warren 2012). Still, the focus on inputs 
characterised by reflective will-formation and the neglect of how this will is translated into 
outputs is problematic for applying the deliberative systems approach to public 
administration, which is exactly the realm of this translation. It is especially problematic 
given deliberative democrats increasing propensity to view the process of will-formation as 
one of reaching ‘incompletely theorised agreements’, since it neglects the ways that such 
agreements are contested and interpreted in translation, including the ways that those with 
power and access can manipulate this translation process to their advantage (Boswell 
2016).  
 The idea of the public administrator as neutral functionary is of course compatible 
with the classical public administration conception of bureaucracy, but, as has been noted 
throughout this thesis, this conception has been subject to extensive critique from diverse 
traditions of public administration scholarship, which have attempted to establish new 
perspectives on public encounters between citizens and bureaucrats (K. Bartels 2013). New 
Public Management (NPM) has emphasised the importance of such interactions to enhance 
the power of consumers over an inefficient, over-regulated and unresponsive bureaucracy. 
Critical Theorists have argued that administrators should not be seen as inhumane cogs in 
the political machine and stress the necessity of re-founding the moral agency of public 
officials in their interactions with citizens. In addition, participatory governance has called 
for public encounters of shared decision-making in order to reverse the alienation of 
citizens from officials and find more effective policy solutions (K. Bartels 2013). Is there a 
distinct deliberative conception of the bureaucrat? Boswell’s (2016) suggestion the that the 
process of policy implementation should be characterised by a number of mechanisms that 
force those who have exercised discretionary power to account for their actions implies 
that there is, and it is one in which the bureaucrat is both a decision-maker and a 
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participant in deliberations about what is to be done and what has been done. This is a 
marked shift away from the ‘Whitehall public service bargain’ of classical public 
administration, whereby bureaucrats give-up their public profile and partisanship in favour 
of loyalty to their political masters, and in exchange for permanence in office (Hood and 
Lodge 2006). It is difficult to see how bureaucrats could regularly engage in public 
justifications surrounding the politics of administration without embroiling themselves in 
the kind of political arguments that have traditionally been viewed as the domain of 
politicians. 
The few proponents of the deliberative systems approach that have elaborated the 
role of public administration in more detail (Boswell 2016; Dryzek 2010) have equated 
public administration with governance networks. This is again perhaps not surprising given 
that network governance is arguably the most compatible mode of public administration 
with the deliberative systems approach. It too is based around relationships of horizontality 
rather than hierarchy, and persuasion rather than coercion (Rhodes 2007; Sørensen and 
Torfing 2005). Nonetheless, there are a number of doubters of the supposed hollowing out 
of the state and public administration’s inexorable march towards governance through 
decentred networks (Goldfinch and Wallis 2010; Lodge and Gill 2011; Marinetto 2003). 
Indeed, it has been argued that the advent of digital technologies has created pressures to 
reverse the trend of fragmentation and agencification in favour of re-integration and re-
governmentalisation (Dunleavy et al. 2006; Margetts and Dunleavy 2013). Even Rhodes 
(2007), one of the originators of the shift towards thinking about administration in terms of 
governance networks, admits that public administration is not equivalent to governance 
networks. They are only one component and administration is pursued through a mix of 
bureaucracies, markets and networks. Similarly, Torfing and Triantifillou (2013) have 
argued that their ‘New Public Governance’ (network-oriented) co-exists alongside New 
Public Management (market-oriented) and Classical Public Administration (bureaucracy-
oriented), and that this co-existence will continue into the future. The non-equivalence of 
public administration and governance networks poses some difficult questions that 
deliberative theorists are yet to answer. Does the deliberative system encompass the 
entirety of public administration, or just networks? If the former, then there is a need to 
elucidate the implications of the deliberative system for markets and bureaucracies, 
particularly since deliberative principles do not mesh as neatly with the logics of markets 
and bureaucracies, as is apparent from the dissonance between the deliberative bureaucrat 
and the Whitehall public service bargain noted above. If deliberative governance only 
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encompasses networks, is this due to the limitations of deliberative theory, or because 
networks are normatively superior from the deliberative perspective, thus public 
administration should replace bureaucracies and markets with networks?  
The ways that public administration is conceptualised within the deliberative 
system filters into the conceptualisation of public participation too. Dryzek’s (2010) focus 
on networks, which he claims are easy to exit and have an ill-defined demos, leads him to 
reformulate the usual preoccupations of participatory governance: popular control and 
political equality. Popular control becomes “participation in deliberation about a decision 
on the part of all those affected by it” and political equality becomes inclusion in 
deliberation in proportion to affectedness (Dryzek 2010, 126). These reformulations are 
unlikely to impress participatory democrats for whom participation in governance has 
always been about sharing in decision-making through the assumption of formal powers. 
Whereas for Arnstein “citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power” 
(Arnstein 1969, 216), for Dryzek citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen 
deliberation. Parkinson (2006) is also sceptical of placing decision-making powers in the 
hands of citizens, reserving them for elected representatives. In his deliberative system 
bureaucrats act on behalf of citizens to provide a check on strategic action in the political 
process. This is a direct inversion of the Weberian and Habermasian conception of the 
political-administrative relationship, in which politics provides a necessary check on the 
totalising power of administration. It is unclear why bureaucrats over whom citizens have 
no direct mechanism of control would be better at acting on their behalf than the politicians 
over whom they at least wield electoral power. Accordingly, this conception also misses 
the impetus that drives proponents of participatory governance – a desire for citizens to 
have some direct control over administrative decisions. 
There are a number of other forms of public participation in administration that are 
aligned with the logics of bureaucracies and markets and that could only loosely be 
described as deliberative; notably individualised, market behaviours aimed at driving 
competition between service providers (R. Dean 2016; Papadopoulos 2012; Warren 2012). 
Deliberative democracy is founded in a rejection of the liberal democratic concern with 
aggregation of pre-political, individual preferences (Dryzek 2000), and it appears 
deliberative governance is also sceptical of NPM and the consumer-orientation to 
governance (Parkinson 2006; Boswell 2016). It is possible that these non-deliberative acts 
could be integrated into the deliberative system in the same fashion that Mansbridge et al. 
(2012) integrate protest – that is, they may violate deliberative norms yet still contribute to 
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the system-level functions. Still, it feels counterintuitive to assess something according to 
functions that it was never intended to realise ahead of the functions that it was instituted to 
serve. In the case of consumer choice, for instance, the intended functions would be 
individual autonomy for the consumer and an accountability sanction on providers, neither 
of which feature as important functions of the deliberative system. 
The way that the deliberative system interprets non-deliberative acts, only valuing 
them to the extent they contribute to deliberative functions, suggests it is wedded to a 
specifically deliberative ideal of legitimacy that takes no account of the procedural value 
pluralism described above.  As Mansbridge et al. note, “the legitimacy of a democracy 
depends in part on the quality of deliberation that informs citizens and their 
representatives” (2012, p. 1, emphasis added). However, in analysing all political activity 
according to deliberative ideals, the deliberative systems approach makes the deliberative 
conception of legitimacy the whole rather than part of the story. The deliberative system 
encounters problems because it attempts to theorise a system from within a single model of 
democracy and, as Warren (2012) has argued, models-based approaches always result in 
functional over-expansion. The consequence is three forms of synecdoche: public 
administration is reduced to governance networks; participation is reduced to talk; and 
political legitimacy is reduced to deliberative legitimacy. The insight that functions can be 
distributed across different deliberative arenas remains a useful one for thinking about 
participation in a policy system. Nonetheless, to develop a systemic approach to 
participation in public administration it is necessary to broaden the conception of 
participation, the conception of public administration, and the functions that participation 
can serve. The rest of this chapter outlines such an approach. 
 
 
6.2 Three Functions of Participation in Public Administration 
Participation is a foundational concept of democratic government. The very term 
‘democracy’ denotes that there must be an avenue for mass rule. As such, in adapting the 
deliberative systems approach, it is tempting to build a grand theory of participatory 
governance that explicates what a system of public administration should look like to count 
as participatory, thus democratic, in nature. This project is, nevertheless, complicated by 
the very different interpretations concerning the extent and type of participation that is 
186 
 
necessary for a regime to count as democratic. At one end of the spectrum, it is sufficient 
that citizens participate in periodic elections and then leave governing to representatives 
and experts (Schumpeter 1976). At the other end of the spectrum, citizens should be 
involved in decision-making in most if not all domains of their everyday lives (Pateman 
1970). Though participation may be foundational, it varies in importance. A theory of a 
‘participatory governance system’ that assessed all public administration activity in terms 
of participatory functions would therefore commit the same error as the deliberative 
systems approach, which assesses all political activity in terms of deliberative functions. 
This section instead turns the systemic question upon its head. It eschews the temptation to 
develop a theory of a participatory governance system from a single model of democracy 
and public administration in favour of a problem-based approach (Warren 2012) that is 
more ecumenical with regards to the functions a policy system has to serve (G. Smith 
2009; Owen and Smith 2015). It asks not whether a policy system is participatory in 
nature, but instead considers the diverse roles that participation can fulfil within a complex 
policy system. The systemic questions then become what functions does a policy system 
have to realise; followed by, which forms of participation can best serve these functions? 
The typology of participation presented in Chapter 3 provides a useful starting 
point for identifying these functions. The presentation of the four modes of participation 
was intended to clarify the often hidden normative assumptions that characterise struggles 
over the meaning of participation in order that these struggles could continue on a clearer 
terrain free from some common misconceptions. It stressed, however, that these modes of 
participation should not be viewed as models of participatory governance. They are not 
different, fully self-sufficient answers to the problem of democratic policy-making. Each 
mode of participation is better viewed as a set of practices oriented towards responding to a 
particular problem of governance. Participation as knowledge transfer is primarily oriented 
to solving the problem of how in highly differentiated societies all the relevant expertise 
can be brought to bear on developing optimally effective policy solutions. Participation as 
collective decision-making is about empowering those who are affected by a decision to 
wield some control over it. Choice and voice is primarily oriented towards ensuring the 
responsiveness of decisions and services to the wants and needs of users. Finally, 
arbitration and oversight is about demonstrating that where power is wielded it is done so 
accountably. The four modes of participation therefore each provide a particular function 
for participation in governance: effectiveness (from knowledge transfer); autonomy 
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(collective decision-making); responsiveness (choice and voice); and accountability 
(arbitration and oversight). 
Three of these functions – effectiveness, autonomy and accountability – will be 
described in detail below (the fourth function of responsiveness is merged into 
effectiveness, as will become apparent in the discussion). Since these functions are derived 
from the different modes of participation, they are associated with a broad range of 
competing conceptions of democracy and public administration. They do not reify a single, 
normatively contentious theory, thus a system that realises all three functions may have 
what Sen (2010) has called a ‘plural grounding’. It could be supported for a number of 
different reasons without agreeing on the relative merits of those reasons. As such, the 
system could embody the kind of ‘clumsy solution’ that is attractive when people hold a 
range of competing procedural preferences. 
The modes of participation do not only converse with multiple variants of 
normative political theory; they were also developed in consideration of the ways that 
participation has been justified in practice. As such, the functions engage with the 
important expectations that underpin people’s assessments of participatory decision-
making. There was extensive evidence from the empirical work with key informants that 
these functions are important aims for participatory policy-making. Chapter 4 described 
how, for participants in this research project, the value of public participation was 
universally linked to improving the effectiveness of policies, through harnessing citizens’ 
valuable expertise to produce better outcomes. It was noted how for some participants 
recognising citizens’ expertise was itself a way to recognise their autonomy, and a large 
number of participants also valued participation to realise communal autonomy as 
collective self-government. Accountability has been less discussed in this thesis until now, 
but it was frequently referenced by participants. Mostly participation was framed as a 
process of communicative accountability through the opportunities for challenge that are 
created as a result of transparent decision-making. This grounded approach, which asks 
what are the problems participation is intended to solve and what are the values this 
problem-definition embodies, is one alternative for bridging the gap between normative 
political theory and empirical social science that Smith (2009) argues has stymied the 
development of this field of research.  
The three functions have only been adumbrated above, so a more detailed 
explication of each will now follow. Concepts such as effectiveness and autonomy can be 
construed in multiple ways, so it is important to clarify how they are being used here. 
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Moreover, though each function is primarily associated with one mode of participation, 
there is not a direct one-to-one relationship between modes and functions. In clarifying the 
content of the three functions, it will be possible to outline the extent to which different 
modes of participation are attuned to serving these functions, and thus how they perform 
different labours within the policy system. These explications will be illuminated 
throughout with examples of participation in the English National Health Service (NHS). 
The NHS is a complex system of multi-level governance with a wide range of 
opportunities for participation both individualistically as a consumer of health services and 
collectively as a citizen. It presents an ideal case of a complex but bounded policy system 
in which participation is employed to serve an array of functions. As such it is worthy of 
study as a system in its own right, so it is important to stress that the purposes here are only 
to illustrate the systemic approach, not provide a comprehensive systemic analysis of 
participation in the NHS. 
 
6.21 Effectiveness 
Effectiveness in producing good outcomes is a core function of any policy 
decision-making process. For JS Mill the merit of any set of political institutions is to be 
judged “by the goodness or badness of the work it performs for [the people], and by means 
of them” (1861, 43). Epistemic theories of democracy have similarly attempted to root the 
superiority of democracy in actual democracies’ propensity to produce better decisions 
(Anderson 2008; Estlund 2008a; 2008b). The epistemic function of the deliberative system 
is related to these ideas. For Mansbridge et al. (2012) it is partly about whether decisions 
are informed by facts, logic and the relevant reasons, but stops at the domain of opinion 
and will-formation, so is output- rather than outcome-focused. Participation in governance 
has tended to be favoured more for its ability to potentially improve policy outcomes 
(Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan 2007; Cabinet Office 2002; Fung 2003; 2006; Involve and 
National Consumer Council 2008; Papadopoulos and Warin 2007; Parkinson 2004). The 
role of citizens in improving policy outcomes through improving the quality of decisions, 
implementation and delivery has been primarily focused on the distinctive but 
complementary knowledge that non-professionals can contribute to the policy process. 
This can be because they bring specialist technical information and/or novel perspectives 
routed in their experience of a phenomenon, or new perspectives simply because they may 
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be free of the blinkers of received professional wisdom (Fung 2006). The importance of 
outcomes is rejected by pure proceduralists, who question the extent to which it is possible 
for there to exist procedure-independent standards of goodness (Peter 2008). Nonetheless, 
people find it difficult to separate process quality from outcomes, so much so that their 
assessments of the quality of the same decision process alters substantially when associated 
with different quality of outcomes (Arvai and Froschauer 2010).  
The theoretical literatures’ concern with effectiveness is mirrored in practice. The 
facility for participation to improve health policy outcomes is at the heart of the NHS’s 
participation strategy, "Patient and public participation is important because it helps us to 
improve all aspects of healthcare quality" (NHS England 2015). There are a range of 
opportunities for the public and patients to involve themselves in NHS decision structures 
in order to contribute their perspectives and expertise. At the national level, NHS 
England’s public voice team conducts a number of initiatives, most prominently the NHS 
Citizen process which combines an online platform for raising and collaboratively solving 
issues with a biannual, national citizens’ assembly. At regional and local level:  
 NHS Trusts have patient and public voice teams that often mostly deal with 
complaints but also run ad hoc participation initiatives such as ‘Experts by 
Experience’ groups;  
 local clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) have a duty to involve and consult on 
plans and decisions, and a number of them have set up patient participation groups 
(PPGs) and/or other involvement mechanisms such as citizens assemblies;  
 general practitioners are now statutorily mandated to set up PPGs for their 
practices;  
 and independent local Healthwatch networks also organise extensive patient and 
public participation (see Table 6.21 below for a summary of NHS participation 
mechanisms).  
Though local practices vary it is common for these initiatives to be framed as means for 
working collaboratively with professionals to improve services, namely as knowledge 
transfer activities. PPGs in general practice, for instance are described as “patients and 
practices working together… to bring about positive change to the benefit of all patients 
and practice staff” (Royal College of General Practitioners 2014, 3).  
It is noteworthy that only patients and carers, particularly those dealing with long-
term conditions, are painted as ‘experts by experience’ throughout NHS participation 
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literature27. There is little consideration of the expertise the public more generally may 
bring, who are instead involved to ensure their views, needs and preferences are reflected 
in services provided (Department of Health 2008; NHS England 2015; NHS England 
2013). Patients and carers are also involved as service users to provide feedback that can 
improve outputs through a range of consumer insight mechanisms. One of the most 
prominent is the Friends and Family Test, which is administered to patients after they have 
received care and asks if they would recommend the care they have received, but there are 
also a number of additional surveys conducted by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
and avenues for patients to complain about poor care. There is frequently little distinction 
between the ways that public participation and consumer insight are described as 
improving outputs in the NHS; both are seen primarily as ways to ensure services are 
responsive to the needs of those they serve (see, for instance, NHS England, 2013). As 
such we find knowledge transfer type activities, where the public is asked to provide its 
input on public priorities for the NHS, and choice and voice type activities, where service 
users and public are asked to provide input on what they expect for their own care, both 
employed in service of the idea of effectiveness as responsiveness, to public values and 
patient needs. In practice then, effectiveness contains two distinct ideas that are often 
pursued in tandem: outcome quality and output responsiveness. 
 
6.22 Autonomy 
The idea of autonomy is key to democratic legitimacy. Democracy’s respect for 
autonomy is a common justification for its superiority to other forms of government, and it 
has been argued that some conception of autonomy is at the heart of all democratic thought 
from ancient Athens to our contemporary representative democracies (Lakoff 1996; Held 
2006). Lakoff (1996) stipulates three different conceptions of autonomy that have 
underpinned democracy. Communal autonomy is the ability of a collectivity to determine 
the rules and structures by which it operates, which Lakoff associates with Athenian 
democracy but also informs participatory democracy and the civic republican tradition. 
                                                 
27 This is perhaps not surprising as patient and public involvement has risen alongside an agenda to involve 
patients more fully in decisions about their own care, on which they are viewed as expert (Department of 
Health 2012; NHS England 2013). This agenda often appears to be a latent influence on patient and public 
involvement in somewhat inappropriate ways, given that patients are intended to be acting publicly not 
privately. It is, for instance, stressed that PPGs in general practice are not venues for personal issues or 
patients to receive additional care, but also that they “enable patients to look after their own health, with the 
support of their GP and practice staff” (Royal College of General Practitioners 2014, 3).  
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Plural autonomy is the ability of social sub-groups to regulate their own affairs and share 
in power, which Lakoff links to the Roman Republic and is also realised in modern forms 
of corporatism. Finally there is individual autonomy, which concerns individual citizens’ 
ability to pursue their own will, and is primarily associated with liberal democracy.  
Autonomy in its various guises has been a key idea in other accounts of the 
functions of participation and deliberation (Mansbridge et al. 2012; G. Smith 2009; Warren 
2012), which is unsurprising given the centrality of the concept of autonomy in the 
democratic thought from which they are drawn. Warren describes his “collective decision-
making” function as “about collective empowerment, which occurs when collectives have 
the capacity to make and impose binding decisions upon themselves” (2012, 9–10). This 
closely mirrors the idea of communal autonomy, as does Smith’s (2009) “popular control” 
function. The idea of plural autonomy is captured in Smith’s (2009) “inclusiveness” 
function and the “democratic” function of Mansbridge et al. (2012). However, it takes a 
more individualistic bent in that it is focused on “participation by citizens from across 
different social groups” (G. Smith 2009, 21), rather than the participation of different 
social groups as social groups. Warren’s (2012) “empowered inclusion” function is about 
distributing powers to individuals so that they can demand and enforce their inclusion, 
justified with regards to respect for the individual autonomy of those who will be affected 
by a decision. Individual autonomy also underpins the “ethical” function of promoting 
mutual respect of Mansbridge et al. (2012), which is based upon respect for citizens as 
autonomous agents.  
It may be uncontroversial that democracy should function to promote autonomy, 
but the question of whether participation in public administration should do the same is 
more contested. For classical public administration, autonomy is realised through politics 
and the legislature, thus is unnecessary in administration. It has already been noted 
(Chapter 4) that a number of participants in this study made similar arguments. Moreover, 
whilst individual and collective empowerment was a key objective of participation for 
some participants, others questioned whether the public actually wanted to be involved in 
decision-making or would prefer technocrats to perform this role.  
The extent to which electoral mechanisms realise effective popular control over 
public services has become questionable, nevertheless, as government has shifted towards 
governance, weakening the connection between elected politicians and the provision of 
public services. Sorenson and Torfing (2005), for instance, have pointed to concerns 
regarding the lack of democratic control over governance networks and the need for such 
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networks to be democratically anchored. The NHS is no exception. Successive reforms 
have weakened the control of national and local politicians over health provision. One of 
the main charges against the much criticised 2012 Health and Social Care Act was that it 
transferred the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Health to commission local NHS 
services to local CCGs. Accordingly, the Secretary of State no longer has responsibility to 
answer for, nor power to intervene in, local commissioning decisions. The NHS is now 
made up of a number of relatively autonomous bodies – for example, commissioners like 
NHS England and CCGs, and service providers like Foundation Trusts and General 
Practices – that make decisions about provision of health services without the traditional 
forms of democratic control.  
This fragmentation of democratic authority in the NHS has been accompanied by a 
trend towards distributing empowerments directly to citizens. These empowerments have 
primarily been construed as forms of plural autonomy. Citizens have been seen as one of a 
number of stakeholders that need to be represented in governance structures, and there are 
number of NHS organisations that include lay representatives on boards. CCGs must have 
two lay members, who “ensure the public voice of the local population is heard and that 
opportunities are available for PPE [Patient and Public Engagement]” (Gilbert 2012, 6).  
Foundation Trusts are membership organisations that combine forms plural and 
communal autonomy. Plural autonomy is again through representation on the board. The 
board of governors consists of four groups: public governors, patient governors, staff 
governors and appointed stakeholders. Communal autonomy is through the membership 
process. Trusts are tasked with creating their own public by recruiting a membership, 
taking steps to ensure it is broadly representative of the community they serve. 
Membership is open to anyone who works at the trust, has been treated by the trust or lives 
in the area served by the trust. Members are consulted on development plans, can stand for 
election as a governor and vote to elect the public, patient and staff governors28.  
Attempts to realise communal autonomy through processes of collective decision-
making are rarer, yet there are some nascent initiatives to institutionalise forms of 
                                                 
28 As of 2011 there were close to 2 million members of foundation trusts. However, this is quite a low (and 
declining) number per Trust – on average 13,962 members per trust. Election turnout had also declined from 
48% in 2004 to 25% in in 2011, which is low but in line with other membership organisations. There were on 
average 2.76 candidates per seat and significant numbers of uncontested elections, though this was a bigger 
problem for staff rather than public and patient seats (all statistics from: Monitor et al., 2011). As such, 
though the governance structure of foundation trusts embody the value of autonomy it is questionable 
whether it is successfully realised. The same argument could be made about the other examples cited in this 
section. However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess whether all of these institutions are 
successful in their intentions. 
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participatory co-governance. One example is the NHS Citizens’ Assembly described in 
Chapter 3, a two-day public meeting with the NHS England Board to decide on key 
priorities; another is the regional citizens’ senates, which have been founded to 
complement the regional clinical senates of healthcare professionals. These citizen senates 
consist of up to 35 members of the public who, in consultation with other public and 
patient forums and organisations, independently determine their own priorities for strategic 
healthcare developments. They then work alongside the clinical senates in strategic clinical 
networks to try to implement their agenda for regional health improvements.  
Respect for individual autonomy has also been a key driver of changes in the 
governance structure of the NHS, though mainly focused at the level of individual care. 
This has been concerned with transforming the relationship between patient and 
professional, so that patients are not passive recipients of the decisions of professionals but 
active participants in decision-making about their own care (Department of Health 2012; 
Le Grand 2003; NHS England 2013). The most prominent approach to fulfilling the 
principle of individual autonomy has been the institutionalisation of patient choice. 
Advocates of choice have explicitly viewed it as a means for distributing individual 
empowerments in order that patients can demand inclusion in decisions about their health 
when faced with paternalistic professionals (Le Grand 2008; Le Grand 2003).  
 
6.23 Accountability 
The final legitimacy function to be considered here is accountability. 
Accountability has been described as “the buzzword of modern governance” (Bovens, 
Schillemans, and Goodin 2014, 1). Following Pitkin’s (1967) influential account, the 
representative relationship has commonly been conceived as one of authorisation and 
accountability through elections (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999b; Mansbridge 
2003). This has primarily been constructed in terms of a principal-agent relationship, as 
Warren and Castiglione neatly summarise:  
Democratic representation involves a representative X being held 
accountable to constituency Y with regard to interest Z. Accountability 
means that X provides, or could provide, an account of his/her decisions 
or actions to Y with respect to Z, and that Y has a sanction over X with 
regard to Z. (2004, 20) 
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In this description accountability has two elements. There is a communicative element, 
namely providing an explanation or justification (which could be about decisions or actions 
but can also be extended to include inputs, outcomes, or performance), as well as a process 
of interrogation of the principal rendering this account. Then there is an element of 
judgement whereby the agent assesses the account and rewards or sanctions the principal 
accordingly. Theories of democratic representation and accountability have moved beyond 
this simple principal-agent model of electoral accountability becoming more complex and 
diverse (Mansbridge 2003; Warren 2014); yet despite the diversity, Bovens, Schillemans 
and Goodin (2014) argue that there is an underlying conceptual consensus in public 
administration and political science on these two constituent elements of public 
accountability. 
The notion that bureaucracy could be made directly accountable to citizens is a 
relatively new one. Whether at the coal-face or walking the corridors of power, bureaucrats 
have traditionally been held accountable vertically through hierarchy and horizontally 
through professional self-regulation (Peters 2014). They were only indirectly accountable 
to the public, through the elected politician at the head of the hierarchy (Manin, 
Przeworski, and Stokes 1999b). Nonetheless, a number of issues already documented 
above such as the recognition of network governance and the discretion that bureaucrats 
have in interpreting legislation, as well as a perceived lack of bureaucratic responsiveness 
to both politicians and public, have driven attempts to institutionalise new accountability 
mechanisms. In the UK this has included publicly reported performance target regimes, 
increased performance audit and inspection, increased competition between public service 
providers, and increased participatory accountability. Damgaard and Lewis (2014) have 
described five levels of citizen participation in public accountability, which mirror the 
rungs from Arnstein’s ladder. Each level progressively broadens the extent of 
communication with citizens, with their highest mode of "joint ownership" also including 
the power of citizens to sanction public servants, for example, holding power over which 
staff to hire and fire.  
The largest experiment to provide individuals with powers of sanction over public 
servants in the NHS has been the introduction of choice and competition through a quasi-
market in providers of health services. As Le Grand (2008) notes choice only becomes a 
sanction when there is competition between providers, otherwise the choice to exit does 
not have any consequences for the provider. Despite noting its growth across multiple 
policy areas and countries, Damgaard and Lewis strangely exclude this from their 
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framework of participatory accountability in an effort to retain the form of Arnstein’s 
ladder (2014, 268). Nonetheless, competition is commonly conceived of as an instrument 
of accountability (Peters 2014), and, with the questionable proviso that the quasi-market 
functions effectively, this is quite a substantial transfer of public accountability to 
consumers of health services.  
Participatory accountability also echoes through the terms of reference of a number 
of other NHS institutions. These efforts, however, have mainly revolved around citizen 
oversight, focused on increasing instances of direct communicative accounting of health 
professionals to citizens, with the opportunity for citizens to pass judgement though 
without the power to directly sanction. The Care Quality Commission (CQC) now 
advertises for ‘experts by experience’ to assist its inspections of health and social care 
services by providing a patient’s perspective on service performance through talking to 
current service-users and staff and observing service delivery. Healthwatch draws its name 
from the oversight metaphor of the consumer watchdog. One of its three core functions is 
enabling people to hold local services to account by monitoring and reviewing provision 
(Local Government Association and Healthwatch 2013). It uses a number of tools to carry 
out these functions and understand quality of performance from local people’s perspective, 
including ‘enter and view’ inspections, ‘patient-led assessments of the care environment’, 
and ‘15-step challenge visits’ (Gilburt, Dunn, and Foot 2015). Similarly, one of the “two 
simple questions” that the NHS Citizen process is intended to solve is “How can the board 
of NHS England be held to account by the public which it serves?”29 The NHS Citizen 
website has an entire section on accountability, and the Citizens’ Assembly that is the 
culmination of each process cycle has a dedicated “accountability and reporting phase”30. 
Once again, this is a strengthening of direct communicative accountability between NHS 
England and the public in which the Board gives account of its actions with opportunities 
for those present to pose questions, but citizens have no formal powers over the Board to 
compel action. 
 
 
  
                                                 
29 https://www.nhscitizen.org.uk/design/what-is-nhs-citizen/introduction/what-problem-will-nhs-citizen-
solve/ Accessed 25 May 2016. 
30 https://www.nhscitizen.org.uk/design/what-is-nhs-citizen/governance-and-democracy/accountability-
within-the-system/ Accessed 25 May 2016. 
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Table 6.21: NHS participation mechanisms and their primary functions 
NHS mechanism Description Function(s) 
NHS Citizen (NHS 
England) 
 
 
a) Online Issue 
Raising 
 
 
 
b) NHS Citizens’ 
Assembly 
NHS England is the national level 
commissioning body responsible for 
distributing the NHS budget. 
 
Online platform for raising and 
collaboratively solving issues about the 
English health service. 
 
 
Biannual two day public assembly to discuss 
priorities for NHS England. 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
(responsiveness 
& quality) 
  
 
Autonomy 
(communal) 
Accountability 
(communicative) 
 
Foundation Trust  
 
 
a) Expert by 
Experience Patient 
Groups 
 
b) Foundation 
Trust Governors 
 
 
 
c) Foundation 
Trust Members 
Foundation Trusts are the main providers of 
secondary and tertiary healthcare services. 
 
Groups of volunteer patients and carers who 
give a patients perspective to influence 
strategy and provision. 
 
Elected public governors and patient 
governors sit on the board of the Trust and 
represent the perspective of these respective 
groups in decision-making. 
 
Foundation Trust members vote in elections 
for governors, can stand for election and are 
consulted on development plans. 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
(responsiveness 
and quality) 
 
Autonomy 
(plural) 
 
 
 
Autonomy 
(communal) 
 
Clinical 
Commissioning 
Group  
 
a) Patient 
Participation 
Groups 
 
 
b) CCG Lay 
Members 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG) are 
responsible for distributing the NHS budget 
to local services. 
 
Patient participation groups provide a 
patients perspective on local services to 
influence commissioning decisions. 
 
Two representatives on the CCG board who 
represent the patient and public perspective 
in decision-making and engage in patient 
and public engagement activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
(responsiveness 
and quality) 
 
Autonomy 
(plural) 
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General Practice  
 
 
Patient 
Participation 
Groups 
General Practices are the main primary care 
providers. 
 
Patient participation groups provide a 
patients perspective on services to influence 
provision. 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
(responsiveness 
and quality) 
 
Friends and 
Family Test 
A satisfaction survey administered to 
patients after they have received care. 
Effectiveness 
(responsiveness) 
 
Regional Citizen 
Senates 
A group of up to 35 members of the public 
that work alongside clinical senates to 
decide upon priorities for regional healthcare 
strategy. 
 
Autonomy 
(communal) 
Patient Choice The ability of the patient to choose between 
competing providers of healthcare services. 
Autonomy 
(individual) 
Accountability 
(sanction) 
 
Care Quality 
Commission 
(CQC)  
 
Experts by 
Experience 
Inspectors 
CQC is one of the main regulators of 
healthcare services. 
 
 
‘Experts by experience’ are service users 
that conduct inspections alongside 
professional inspectors to provide the patient 
perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
Accountability 
(communicative) 
Healthwatch  
 
 
a) Information 
gathering 
 
 
 
b) Inspection 
Network of statutory bodies performing role 
of local consumer champion.   
 
A range of independent engagement 
activities to assess local views and 
experiences of healthcare that are fed to 
providers to influence provision. 
 
Monitors and reviews local healthcare 
services from the perspective of local 
people, with a number of tools to enable 
public inspection of services. 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
(responsiveness 
and quality) 
 
 
Accountability 
(communicative) 
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Figure 6.21: Diagram of the primary functions of the four modes of participation 
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6.3 Structuring Participation Systemically 
The previous section of this chapter has argued that participation can play an 
important role in promoting effectiveness, autonomy and accountability within a policy 
system. Furthermore, different types of participation are differently suited to serving these 
functions (Figure 6.21), so, in order to realise them through participatory governance, it is 
necessary for the system to be comprised of a range of different avenues for participation. 
The presence within the English NHS of a vast number of participation opportunities 
employing a variety of modes of participation to contribute to different functions 
demonstrates that this is not simply an abstract theory but also has some purchase for 
describing how complex policy systems are actually functioning. Since it would be 
misleading to claim that participation in the NHS (or anywhere else) has been explicitly 
designed as a system, a systemic analysis can improve our understanding of how well 
participation is functioning in these complex policy systems, and how it might be 
improved.  
A systemic analysis would pose some questions concerning the individual 
participation initiative, as well as how the system is functioning as a whole. At the level of 
the individual initiative, the identification of the relationships between modes of 
participation and functions provides the tools to question whether a particular approach is 
well-suited to realising its intended function. Is there a good match between the type of 
initiative and the type of function being pursued, or is there a mismatch? Is there a 
functional over-expansion whereby one type of participation attempts to achieve a 
combination of functions that go beyond its particular strengths, resulting in failures or 
tensions? At the level of the system, there should be a consideration of comprehensiveness 
and parsimony: does the system realise all of the requisite functions, and do different 
participatory initiatives simply replicate the same function creating unjustifiable 
redundancy? A further analysis of some of the NHS participation initiatives described 
above can again help to illuminate the utility of the questions prompted by the systemic 
approach. 
A full analysis of the functional comprehensiveness and parsimony of the NHS at 
the system-level is beyond the scope of this chapter, since its intention has not been to give 
a comprehensive account of all participation in the NHS, only to use examples from the 
NHS for illustrative purposes. The many participation initiatives reviewed herein are 
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suggestive of comprehensiveness. On the surface, the two forms of effectiveness, three 
forms of autonomy and two forms of accountability were all targeted by at least one 
example of participatory governance (see Table 6.21), though the question of whether the 
NHS is in practice successful at realising these functions remains open. There is a 
preponderance of opportunities to participate in the service of effectiveness, and only one 
means of sanction. Still, there does not appear to be superfluous replication of functions. 
The many opportunities to participate in knowledge transfer and voice activities to improve 
effectiveness is linked to the fact that the NHS is a multi-level system with national, 
regional and local administrative units as well as different levels of service provision, for 
instance; general practice and foundation trusts. The replication thus takes place due to the 
need to involve the public at different levels. These multiple levels, however, pose a 
further question of whether the system is comprehensive at each level, which would again 
necessitate additional analysis in order to determine. 
Issues pertaining to the relation between functions and modes of participation at the 
level of the individual initiative are easier to diagnose. The creation of unproductive 
tensions through an attempt to serve multiple functions has been a consistent problem 
across different NHS participation mechanisms. This is particularly apparent concerning 
NHS Citizen and Healthwatch’s efforts to combine collaborative partnership for increasing 
effectiveness along with the production of accountability, which is often interpreted by 
participants as adversarial. Local Healthwatch organisations have struggled to balance 
these alternative functions, instead opting to act as critic or friend (but not both) to other 
local health institutions (Gilburt, Dunn, and Foot 2015, 36). This has led to quite distinct 
practices between different localities. ‘Friendly’ Healthwatch organisations, with the 
perception that other local institutions are doing their best, have focused on acting as a 
strategic partner providing support to improve services. ‘Critical’ Healthwatch 
organisations have focused on being an independent public voice that holds to account by 
rattling the cages of other local institutions. Both types have rejected the practices of the 
other as ineffective (Gilburt, Dunn, and Foot 2015). NHS Citizen has suffered from similar 
problems. The process has also been presented as both a way to work collaboratively with 
the NHS England Board to set priorities for the NHS and a means to hold the Board to 
account. The difficulties of forcing participants into a solidaristic mode of participation, 
particularly when it has been presented as a means of challenge, are apparent from even a 
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passing glance at the NHS England Gather Space31 (a kind of online forum) where there 
are frequent rebellions from more adversarial contributors against the organisers of the 
process.  
Part of the appeal of the ‘clumsy solution’ for participation in policy systems, 
which encompasses a combination of seemingly contradictory modes of participation, is 
that it can productively exploit such tensions. This is achieved through the dialectical 
relationships between different ways of organising that both support and constrain one 
another. Solidaristic ways of organising based upon trust are effective for producing 
collaboration at low cost. However, the more solidaristic and trust-based they become, the 
more opportunity there is for corruption and free-riding. Accordingly, some agonistic 
mechanisms based on distrust are necessary to prevent solidaristic modes of organisation 
destroying themselves in complex and diverse societies. The same arguments can be 
applied to modes of participation. Participation as knowledge transfer is a relatively low-
cost means for improving the effectiveness of policy outcomes by bringing to light new 
knowledge, hence its attractiveness in the NHS. However, the value of democracy is not 
simply in bringing to light all relevant information. Its broad distribution of powers is 
intended to give individuals and groups the power to ensure their perspective is actually 
taken account of – either through accountability relationships that discipline decision-
makers when they go awry, or through the autonomy to participate in the decision itself. 
Even though it may undercut the trust in the decision-maker characteristic of collaborative 
knowledge transfer, participation for autonomy or accountability’s sake can reinforce 
effectiveness by ensuring that information is not just brought to light but also heeded. 
Nonetheless, this does not entail that all opportunities for knowledge transfer must include 
powers to ensure autonomy or accountability. These different labours can potentially be 
performed at different sites, or in sequence.  
The problem with the Healthwatch and NHS Citizen examples then is not so much 
that there is a tension between the collaborative pursuit of effectiveness and the adversarial 
pursuit of accountability, but that there is insufficient functional differentiation between 
these two pursuits within these two initiatives. Interestingly, both initiatives could 
themselves be viewed as subsystems of participation given they each contain multiple 
avenues to participate, so in theory it would be possible to distribute the different functions 
                                                 
31 See: https://gather.nhscitizen.org.uk/. Accessed 25 May 2016. 
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to different parts of their own processes. Instead, it appears that specific Healthwatches 
have been characterised by functional myopia whereby the pursuit of either effectiveness 
or accountability has come to dominate; whereas for NHS Citizen a lack of specificity 
about objectives for particular components has set-up contradictory imperatives for 
behaviour for participants throughout the process, since they are attempting to be both 
collaborative and adversarial. The failure of both Healthwatch and NHS Citizen to 
adequately distribute functions across sites poses a question of whether small 
organisations, relying on voluntary participation, can realistically foster such different 
institutional practices. The need for a coherent organisational identity may prevent 
Healthwatch, for instance, simultaneously engaging in both collaborative and adversarial 
interactions with other local healthcare institutions, in which case different functions would 
need to be distributed to different organisations.   
An additional means for distributing functions is to sequence them. Warren (2012) 
has claimed that all single model-based approaches to organisation lead to the functional 
over-expansion of a single mechanism, such as deliberation or voting. This over-expansion 
was particularly apparent in choice theorists’ argument, introduced in Chapter 3, that there 
should be a non-negotiable, market-based rule to determine the closure of hospitals. If an 
insufficient number of patients choose to use a hospital so that it becomes financially 
unviable, then it should close and there should be no interference from the democratic 
process. This argument uses a single mechanism (choice) that is appropriate for realising 
individual autonomy and over-extends it to a domain that is properly the concern of 
communal autonomy. Whether a hospital should close clearly has implications for the 
community in which it is situated and there should be avenues for the community to 
influence this decision, as opposed to it being decided indirectly through the aggregated 
choices of individuals concerning a different matter, their own care. A more appropriate 
balance of participatory activities would be for market-failure to trigger a community 
decision process in order to decide whether the hospital should close and, if not, to 
generate viable solutions for keeping it open. This sequencing enables choice and 
competition to do its work in serving individual autonomy and sanctioning poorly 
performing hospitals, whilst using a more appropriate process to realise communal 
autonomy on a matter of community concern. Given that NHS Citizen operates on a 
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regular cycle, where online issue raising feeds into a biannual citizens’ assembly, a greater 
attention to how functions are sequenced could help to solve its difficulties. 
Context is also an important consideration in determining the right balance of 
functions within a system. Accountability, for instance, does not have to be agonistic in 
orientation. Mansbridge (2014) has lamented our increasing propensity to equate 
accountability with sanction and neglect the more trust-based, communicative forms of 
accountability. She has called for a contingency theory of accountability with more 
communicative forms of accountability prevailing in circumstances of justified trust, and 
with sanction-based accountability dominating when there is justified distrust. NHS 
Citizen provides a useful lesson in this regard. It was heavily advertised as a means to hold 
the NHS England Board to account. Participants were then offered a trust-based, 
communicative means of accountability that is rather vaguely stated32 and which many of 
them have been sceptical of. To put this in context, NHS England was created as a result of 
the much derided 2012 Health and Social Care Act. It is a relatively remote, national-level 
policy body. The Board consists of political appointees by a Government that has a 
historical issue with public distrust over its commitment to the NHS. This is not a good 
starting point for assuming the high levels of public trust required for communicative 
accountability to be unproblematic. A systemic approach should enquire whether the 
missing sanction-based accountability is justified by its presence elsewhere and the NHS 
England Board is legally accountable to the Secretary of State for Health, meaning there is 
another appropriate authority with power to sanction. However, this will be of little 
comfort to those who, as aforementioned, do not trust the Government on the NHS. It was 
also noted how sanction through patient choice pervades the NHS as a system, yet this only 
acts as a sanction on providers, not on commissioners like NHS England. The distrustful 
thus have few options but to hijack what is intended to be a solidaristic process in order to 
express their distrust, which casts some doubt on the comprehensiveness of the system at 
the level of commissioning. 
The importance of understanding context goes beyond the consideration of the right 
forms of accountability to encompass the appropriate systemic balance between different 
modes of participation and the pursuit of effectiveness, autonomy and accountability. In 
                                                 
32 See: https://www.nhscitizen.org.uk/design/what-is-nhs-citizen/governance-and-democracy/accountability-
within-the-system/. It is notable that much of this description focuses on accountability of participants rather 
than accountability of the Board. Accessed 25 May 2016. 
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circumstances where there is a group of decision-makers who are motivated to act in the 
public interest, trusted and competent but information is scarce, then participation may 
predominantly comprise knowledge transfer activities in the pursuit of effectiveness. 
Mechanisms for ensuring autonomy and accountability would still be necessary but may be 
relatively light-touch. Circumstances where relevant information is widely available and 
interpretable by all are more amenable to collective decision-making in the service of 
autonomy, and knowledge transfer type activities become less important. When decision-
makers are untrustworthy or incompetent then the pursuit of accountability grows in 
relative importance, thus choice or oversight may come to predominate. An assessment of 
context is therefore an essential component in gauging the comprehensiveness of a system. 
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed a new approach for thinking systemically about 
participation in public administration. It has retained the insight of the deliberative systems 
approach that important system-level functions can be distributed across different 
initiatives, but argued that it is necessary to go beyond the deliberative system given its 
partial conception of public administration, participation, and the functions it can serve. In 
doing so it has proposed a new set functions that engage with multiple variants of 
democratic and public administration theory, as well as the expectations that underpin 
people’s assessments of participatory decision-making. This openness to multiple, 
potentially competing, functions reflects the inescapable plurality in citizens’ notions of 
political legitimacy, which is represented in the heterogeneity of preferences for political 
decision-making. It holds out the possibility that a system which realised all of the 
functions could generate widespread support amongst people with heterogeneous 
preferences on the basis of what Sen (2010) has called ‘plural grounding’. The system 
could be supported for a number of different reasons without agreement on the relative 
merits of those reasons. Heterogeneity of preferences does not render institutional 
engineering impossible; rather, policy-making institutions should be analysed as systems 
incorporating diverse practices that serve diverse functions. The range of examples from 
the English NHS suggests that a system of different types of participation that appeal to 
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diverse procedural preferences is feasible. To achieve broad-based participation from 
across society in processes of public administration it is also necessary. 
The chapter has also made a case for the value of this systemic approach in order to 
better understand the current practice of participatory governance, as well as to improve 
our future participatory designs. It demonstrated how the questions posed by the approach 
could illuminate problems of particular participatory initiatives in the NHS and suggest 
potential remedies. There is however scope to build on this initial presentation. The three 
functions are an appropriate place to begin a systemic analysis of participation in public 
administration given their prominence in the theoretical literature and empirical work with 
key informants. This of course does not mean that they are necessarily comprehensive and 
that these three functions are the most important in all circumstances. One of the 
advantages of this approach is that it would be quite simple to add or substitute new 
functions as appropriate, though it is unlikely that in contemporary democratic societies a 
political system could retain legitimacy long-term whilst missing any of effectiveness, 
autonomy or accountability. In addition, more remains to be done to develop an 
understanding of the different ways that modes and functions can be effectively structured 
within the variety of contexts that obtain in complex policy systems. The above example of 
market-based choices triggering a collective decision-making arena to decide on the future 
of a hospital illustrates that there are theoretically sensible ways to sequence very different 
forms of participation. Still, it will be necessary to understand the likely tensions at the 
points different modes of participation interact in order to make them work in practice.  
The next, and final, chapter of this thesis draws out the implications of the 
preceding chapters and situates them in the literature. In considers the lessons of the 
research for the ways that we think about participation, the ways that we do participation, 
and sets out some directions for future research. 
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Chapter 7 
Re-thinking Theory, Improving Practice 
 
 
This thesis has proposed a new typology aimed at improving our understanding of 
the different ways of approaching public participation in policy decision-making. It then 
reflected on empirical work that used a novel mixed model design to analyse how closely 
people’s participation preferences match the four modes of participation, as well as to 
explore the nature of these procedural preferences. The previous chapter outlined a 
systemic approach to participation in governance that attempted to take account of this 
heterogeneity in preferences for participation. This final chapter draws out the implications 
of this research. It is divided into three sections. The first section primarily considers the 
implications for the academic literature, with particular attention to existing typologies of 
participation and common ways of thinking about participatory governance. The second 
section concentrates on how the lessons of the research may be employed in improving 
participatory practice, emphasising the need for a flexible understanding of citizens and 
officials’ roles and relationships in participation initiatives. The concluding section then 
suggests some potentially fruitful directions for further research, detailing some ideas for 
extending the research empirically and analytically. 
 
 
7.1 Re-Thinking Participatory Theory 
The early part of this thesis critiqued a common approach to classifying 
participatory policy-making techniques, which ranked types of participation based on 
contentious normative assumptions that were more or less explicit (Arnstein 1969; Pretty 
1995; White 1996) or concealed (Involve 2005; IAP2 2014; NHS England 2013), and 
which are still influential in shaping debates about, as well as the practice of, participation 
today.  The empirical findings from this research bear out this critique. The discovery of 
normative heterogeneity between individuals’ with different perspectives on participation, 
alongside heterogeneity within an individuals’ perspective,  poses serious problems for 
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typologies of participation that are rooted in one normative basis. For Arnstein “citizen 
participation is citizen power” (1969, 216), and anything less is ‘tokenism’ or ‘non-
participation’. However; this is not so for around half of the participants in this study, who 
saw participation more as a means to broaden the inputs into policy decisions, rather than 
redistribute power to citizens. Though such forms of participation may seem illegitimate to 
participatory democrats, participation as knowledge transfer fits neatly within a common 
alternative understanding of democracy and public administration, the Westminster model, 
which provides us with an alternative framework for thinking through the legitimacy of 
participatory processes. It is true that consultation, labelled a form of tokenism by 
Arnstein, is not the best means for realising citizen power. Nonetheless, if one’s aim is to 
improve policy outcomes by accessing the widest information, it can be a useful and 
legitimate tool. The identification of a range of understandings of participation by this 
study thus supports Fung’s (2006) contention that there is no canonical form of 
participation in contemporary governance; that it may be used to advance multiple 
purposes and values. 
The four modes of participation developed throughout this thesis provide a means 
for understanding the alternative normative orientations to participation, but the typology is 
not intended to replace all other classificatory schema. Participation’s association with 
multiple purposes and values does not preclude us from asking how it ought to be done. 
This is the question that preoccupies a number of the continuum typologies, such as 
Arnstein’s ladder. Arnstein is arguing participation ought to be instituted as citizen control. 
The ladder thus provides useful information both intellectually, in showing which forms of 
participation are most attractive for one particular normative orientation, and 
pragmatically, to guide action for those who share this normative orientation. It has to be 
recognised, however, that this approach is only a partial account, since it only embodies a 
single purpose and value. Arnstein’s ladder could arguably be encompassed within the 
collective decision-making quadrant of the typology of four modes of participation. It is 
only a quarter of the picture so it becomes an obfuscation when taken to be comprehensive. 
Three alternative ladders, one for each of the three alternative modes of participation could 
help to further elucidate the forms of participation that are most attractive to these 
alternative normative orientations. 
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The typology of four modes operates at a higher level of abstraction than the 
classifications of participation mechanisms by features of their institutional design, such as 
the way participants are selected or the mode of communication (Fung 2006; 2015; G. 
Rowe and Frewer 2005; G. Smith 2005). The two approaches could be usefully employed 
in conjunction with one another. It would be unwise to strictly map, for example, the 57 
types of democratic innovation identified by Smith (2005) onto the four modes of 
participation, given the variety of purposes for which the same mechanism could be used. 
Still, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, the modes of participation can assist analysis of what 
purposes and values might be realised by different participation mechanisms, analysis of 
the functions that participation is used to serve, and how mechanisms may complement or 
detract from each other. The same can be said for the three-dimensional conceptual space 
encapsulated by Fung’s (2006; 2015) democracy cube. The four modes can help envisage 
which parts of the cube are compatible with which normative orientations. The 
classifications of different mechanisms can be viewed as a menu of participatory options, 
while the typology of modes of participation is more akin to a good waiter, who helps you 
understand which option is most likely to sate your particular participatory hunger 
according to your preferred tastes.  
The approach developed through this thesis raises some questions for the ways that 
participation has been understood in the academic literature that go beyond contesting 
existing participation typologies. It challenges the usefulness of New Public Management 
(NPM) as a lens for thinking about participation. Participatory initiatives that do not live 
up to participatory or deliberative democratic standards are frequently described as NPM 
(Papadopoulos and Warin 2007; Parkinson 2004; R. Rowe and Shepherd 2002). Rowe and 
Shepherd (2002) even claim that NPM conceptions of participation were hegemonic 
amongst the members of NHS Primary Care Group Boards they surveyed. NPM was 
deliberately eschewed as a label for one of the four modes of participation because it is 
debatable whether it furnishes us with a coherent conceptual apparatus for analysing 
participation initiatives. The NPM approach is often equated with ‘consumer involvement’ 
(Papadopoulos and Warin 2007; Parkinson 2004), yet it has been persuasively argued that 
NPM combines contradictory elements of hierarchism, egalitarianism and individualism 
(Hood 1995), making it unclear what any NPM approach to participation would look like. 
For Rowe and Shepherd (2002), for instance, it is characterised by an instrumental focus 
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on improving outcomes.  However, the perspectives of those participants in this study who 
primarily saw participation as a means to improve outcomes were more aligned with 
classical conceptions of public administration than NPM. Moreover, the idea that 
participation should improve policy outcomes and make services more efficient and 
effective was widely shared across the participants in this study – the disagreement 
concerned the extent to which this should be the primary focus of participation. In their 
study of tenant participation in social housing management, Cairncross, Clapham and 
Goodlad (1997) report a similar consensus on this point. Long-standing traditions of 
organisational practice are not simply displaced by new theories of governance. Actors will 
bring the logics of these traditions into new governance practices. This is not to say that 
NPM as a management trend has not had an impact on the way that participation has been 
conceived, nor that there is no consumerist element to views of participation. Policy 
documents and the research interviews conducted for this study clearly indicate the notion 
of participation as consumer voice is prevalent. Nonetheless, to call this an NPM approach 
to participation creates an ambiguous signifier given the multitude of ideas encompassed 
by NPM, and this can result in the elision of quite different modes of participation. The 
evidence of this study suggests we should think more carefully before classifying any 
participatory policy initiative that does not meet the standards of participatory or 
deliberative democrats as an instance of NPM. More conceptually precise analytical 
categories, such as the four modes suggested above, would effect a more precise analysis. 
The move away from models-based thinking, following Warren (2012) and 
outlined in the previous chapter, could also hold lessons for some of the debates addressed 
by this thesis. The procedural preference literature has often implicitly framed preferences 
like models, as self-sufficient alternatives. Citizens have a preference for expert-led, 
representative-led or citizen-led decisions (Bengtsson 2012; Font, Wojcieszak, and 
Navarro 2015). Populations have a general tendency towards stealth democracy or 
sunshine democracy (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Neblo 2015). Prescriptions for 
public administration reforms have been similarly framed as alternatives. Bureaucrats can 
be disciplined through command and control or choice and competition (Hood 1998; Le 
Grand 2008). An institution operates on the principles of classical public administration or 
NPM. The same approach has been used to classify institutional attempts at participation, 
for instance; whether a democratic, technocratic or consumerist model is being employed 
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in participatory housing or healthcare exercises (Cairncross, Clapham, and Goodlad 1997; 
Hickman 2006; R. Rowe and Shepherd 2002). The modes of participation herein were not 
presented as fully-fledged, alternative models of participatory governance, but as sets of 
practices responding to particular problems of contemporary governance. They are not in 
direct competition with one another as they perform different functions. Using one does 
not preclude using another. They are in tension but can also compensate for each other’s 
weaknesses and reinforce strengths. Institutions and preferences will thus comprise more 
than one logic. Applying this insight to procedural preferences helps to make sense of what 
have been presented as seemingly incongruous findings, that support for citizen 
engagement is compatible with a preference for decision-making by experts (Bengtsson 
2012; Font, Wojcieszak, and Navarro 2015). Understanding different forms of 
participation not as alternative models of governance but as responses to specific problems 
of governance, with particular strengths and appropriate uses, may also help to remedy the 
neglect of agonistic approaches to participation. If a less favoured form of participation is 
not viewed as necessarily displacing one’s preferred form, then people may be more open 
to a diversity of practices.  
The neglect of agonistic participation in the academic literature was pointed to 
early in this thesis. It was also reflected in the findings from the empirical research. The Q-
sorts were overwhelmingly solidaristic in nature, spurning agonistic statements. Further 
analysis of the interviews suggested that particularly those with a preference for the 
collective decision-making mode of participation often minimised the extent of agonistic 
social practices in order to justify their preferences, as opposed to having a clear idea of 
how this mode of participation can function in circumstances characterised by conflict and 
competition. Similarly, just as in the academic literature where neither its advocates nor 
critics have unpacked choice as a theory of participation, a number of study participants 
rejected the notion that choice is participation. Part of the value of this thesis is to broaden 
what counts as participation, so that there are viable options for doing participatory policy-
making even when agonistic social practices predominate. Presently, in the rare instances 
that the literature considers ‘non-democratic’ approaches and judges that they have some 
value they are still described with a tone that suggests they are reprehensible. Goodin and 
Dryzek, for instance note that mini-publics are useful as a means of ‘shaping policy by 
market testing’ (2006, 229). Still, their description paints this solely as a process for policy 
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actors to refine their sales pitch to the public, whereas civil servants in this study presented 
their ‘market testing’ more as a process of learning whether their policy products work for 
their intended recipients and where they could be improved. This underlines the 
importance of attempting to thoroughly understand modes of participation from within 
their own perspective in order to guard against a partial understanding or 
misunderstanding.  
This thesis has attempted to understand modes of participation from a variety of 
perspectives. It has made few normative prescriptions for what participation should look 
like, except that in complex policy systems avenues for participation should be diverse. 
There is no a radical proposal to transform social relations through participation so that 
they non-hierarchical, free of coercion, characterised by popular power and mutual respect 
and understanding. A critic might argue that such an approach blunts the transformative 
potential of participation. It does exactly what Pearce warned of, appropriates the 
discourses and concepts of participatory democracy and turns their emancipatory hopes 
into new tyrannies (2010, 15). However, the intention is to go beyond the radicalism and 
resignation of a field in which idealists outline their radical intentions for participation and 
sceptics bemoan how these intentions do not translate to the messy reality of practice.  
This does not mean the approach has no radical implications. If the intention is to 
get more of the public participating in governance, rather than to get more of the public 
participating in governance in a particularly prescribed way, then broadening our horizons 
as to what participation can achieve and where is vital. Knowledge of how participation 
can serve the myriad functions demanded by complex policy systems can assist with 
making the case for embedding participatory practices at the heart of government 
institutions and policy networks. Rather than viewing participation as a means to 
supplement the deficiencies of the status quo (Fung 2006), participatory techniques can 
begin to be viewed as a viable alternative to these arrangements. This itself is a radical 
agenda when so much participation remains on the margins of the actual processes of 
governing. In addition, a systemic analysis of participation could help us to appreciate 
systemic deficiencies that demand more radical systemic solutions. While participation is 
localised in specific, marginal projects it remains easy to blame these projects for their 
failures at addressing what are often structural problems. A project can be blamed for poor 
recruitment practices if it fails to attract disadvantaged groups, rather than considering the 
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structural barriers to participating that these groups may face. A systemic analysis that 
demonstrated a group was failing to participate across the board, would help in making a 
democratic case to press for structural reforms to address the underlying problem, whether 
that is poverty, apathy or some other issue. 
Rejecting a strong normative orientation to thinking about participation poses a 
further question concerning the standards by which we should judge participatory policy-
making. Even scholars sympathetic to the idea that legitimacy is complex and multifaceted, 
“that to pursue perfect legitimacy is to pursue a chimera... because legitimacy's elements 
cannot all be present at once” (Parkinson 2006, 43), tend to retain their attachment to 
normative prescription. Parkinson, for example, continues describing his project for a 
deliberative systems theory as follows, 
It may simply be a fact of life that all our categories, all our standards, 
have such tensions within them, that all utopias are contradictory (Hood 
1998: 47). Nonetheless, simply because existing institutions cannot be 
perfect does not mean they cannot be improved, and utopias provide useful 
critical standards for measuring the improvements. In that spirit I use the 
critical standard established here to explore the real worlds of deliberative 
democracy, suggesting reforms in the concluding chapter to move current 
deliberative institutions in a more legitimate, democratic direction. (2006, 
43) 
The notion that we can accept the contradictory nature of legitimacy yet still engage in 
utopian theorising that provides a critical standard with a single direction of travel is 
mistaken. If legitimacy is in tension then it entails there is more than one way of achieving 
it. As Nozick recognised, once the inescapable plurality of competing legitimate principles 
is accepted, then “Utopia will consist of utopias, of many different and divergent 
communities in which people lead different kinds of lives under different kinds of 
institutions” (1974, 312). The feasibility of Nozick’s vision that there will be entire 
communities with distinctly different sets of institutions is questionable, particularly given 
it says little about the relationships and interdependencies that must exist between them. 
Nevertheless, the previous chapter demonstrated how it is possible to incorporate distinct 
sets of practices within a system of institutions.  
Abandoning utopia in order to recognise plurality does not have to result in a 
descent into relativism in which all solutions are equally legitimate. It means that when we 
design institutions we will need to make trade-offs between competing goods, rather than 
move closer to a pre-determined utopian ideal. As Sen (2010) has argued, a transcendental 
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critical standard is neither necessary nor sufficient for making these kinds of comparative 
judgements. If there are many ways to diverge from perfection, then a utopian standard of 
participation does not give us any guidance concerning how to rank two non-perfect 
alternatives for participation that diverge in different ways. Neither is it necessary to have 
an idea of the perfect participation process in order to judge between two non-perfect 
participatory arrangements, which can simply be assessed on their own merits. In the 
previous chapter these merits were whether the particular arrangement promotes 
effectiveness, autonomy and/or accountability in decision-making. Rather than providing a 
single participatory standard to aspire to, this thesis is intended to provide some tools for 
carrying out the kinds of comparative assessments that characterise real world institution 
building. The goodness of participation is thus not measured against a particular normative 
ideal of participation. It is assessed in terms of: whether there is a good match between the 
mode of participation and the intended function; whether the participation actually realises 
its intended function – for example; are the relevant policy outcomes more effective, or 
decision-making processes more accountable; and whether it is perceived to be legitimate – 
do people think outcomes are better and decision-making is fair and takes account of their 
concerns? The next section considers how some of the insights from previous chapters 
could help to improve participation in these ways. 
 
 
7.2 Improving Participatory Practice 
Although this thesis does not prescribe what participatory policy-making should 
look like, and instead claims that this is a debate that must be conducted within context, 
through actual politics, the insights generated by the research can be employed to improve 
participatory practice and avoid governance failure. Its chief contribution is in giving 
officials, practitioners and citizens a number of different frames for thinking through the 
variety of legitimate objectives and associated practices that can be realised through 
different participatory initiatives. When we create opportunities to participate, or when we 
decide to participate, we often do so with complex, even contradictory, assumptions about 
what participation means underpinning our decisions. The civil servant who has convinced 
her sceptical colleagues to incorporate extensive public participation in their policy design 
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process has to make some tough choices. Who is going to participate, for instance? If the 
process is kept open to all, then it may be criticised within the department for just 
involving the usual suspects. If participation is restricted, say, to a randomly selected 
group, then influential policy NGOs may be vocal about their exclusion. Similarly, the 
citizen deciding to get involved in participatory governance needs to be able to appraise 
what she is letting herself in for. She may have been told that she has an opportunity to 
hold policy-makers to account, only to find the process is more about sharing her 
experiential expertise. She has to decide whether to play by the rules of the space, try to 
shape them in a different direction, or simply stop participating altogether. This research 
helps to illuminate the strategic choices and compromises we have to make when 
designing and engaging in participatory activities33. The civil servant puzzling over who 
should participate in her process would come to a different answer based on whether she is 
trying to collect experiential expertise, in which case including important NGOs would 
most likely prove useful, or break through an interest group deadlock, in which case they 
should most likely be excluded. The citizen deciding whether to participate or not could 
make a much clearer assessment of the type of participation she is engaging in, whether it 
is a legitimate example of that type, and in what other directions it could potentially be 
taken. 
The explicit foregrounding of what are usually implicit assumptions about 
participation should result in more clear-sighted participatory designs, as well as a better fit 
between the rhetoric and practice of participation. This could help to reduce the feelings of 
frustration and powerlessness amongst both citizens and officials that Newman et al. 
(2004) claim have often resulted from moves towards more collaborative governance in the 
UK.  The admission that citizen power is only one objective of participation and there are 
other legitimate objectives provides practitioners with multiple ways for thinking through 
the legitimacy of their processes. This could produce participation that is better tailored to 
meeting its real objectives. In addition, if citizen power is not considered the only 
legitimacy criterion for participation, it may also help to increase the honesty around a 
process’ real objectives and lead to a better match between the rhetoric and practice of 
participation. There is no monolithic public just waiting to be consulted or represented; 
                                                 
33 The typology of four modes of participation has been disseminated to public officials, participation 
practitioners and civil society groups through presentations and blogs, and a number of people have reported 
that they found it useful for these purposes. 
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publics are continuously brought into being, forming around specific issues or 
opportunities (Mahony, Newman, and Barnett 2010). Therefore, presenting novel 
consultation techniques as collective decision-making opportunities will have 
consequences for the kind of public and expectations that form around that opportunity. 
Mis-presentation is likely to lead to frustration on both sides of an initiative.  
There are lessons concerning potentially effective rhetorical strategies for those 
who want to demand more participation or push the boundaries of citizen power, as well as 
for those want to promote their participatory opportunities. The analysis of how 
participants in the study discursively justified their participation preferences (Chapter 5) 
demonstrated that civil servants opposed to the transfer of decision power are sensitive to 
the idea that they are overly hierarchical and possessed nuanced techniques to defend 
themselves against this charge. Some skilled activists appeared at least implicitly aware of 
this. They challenged policy-makers on their own terrain, basing their arguments for a 
more equal distribution of decision power in pragmatic arguments about the exclusion of 
expertise from the decision, and eschewing more idealistic concerns with consensus 
decisions. 
Taking seriously the alternative understandings of participation should force us to 
recast the roles of public officials and citizens and the relationships between them. There is 
a long tradition and extensive academic literature theorising the relationship between 
politicians and bureaucrats, which has documented the departure from the Weberian ideal 
with bureaucratic work becoming more politicised and more public (Aberbach, Putnam, 
and Rockman 1981; Hood and Lodge 2006; Grube 2014). The relationship between 
citizens and bureaucrats is less explored and remains what Hajer (2003) has called an 
‘institutional void’ without clear rules and norms by which policy-making is conducted. 
There have been moves, as noted earlier in this thesis, to better understand ‘public 
encounters’ between citizens and bureaucrats (K. Bartels 2013). Still, these have been 
focused on encounters between citizens and street-level bureaucrats, for instance; welfare 
officers role in the regulation of the poor (Dubois 2010), local government officers’ 
increasing civic entrepreneurship (Durose 2011), and police officers co-production of 
public safety with local communities (Fung 2004). The public participation work of 
bureaucrats in central government departments and agencies that comprise the majority of 
the public officials who participated in this research has received little attention.  
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More than 35 years ago Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman remarked on “the demise 
of what we may call the Weberian epoch of government” (1981, 19). Nonetheless, it was 
apparent in Chapter 5 that though public officials’ professional self-identity is complex it 
retains a strong Weberian overtone. This self-identity as a neutral technocrat posed 
problems for these bureaucrats and their understanding of their relationship to participatory 
policy-making. Given the fragmentation of public service bureaucracies into agencies and 
networks that have to perform both administrative and political functions, the spaces in 
which civil servants can play the role of impartial decision-maker have shrunk. Their 
doubts about their own role are thus likely to persist. Accordingly, it would improve the 
capacity of the civil service and the prospects for participatory governance if the 
connection between civil servants’ sense of positive professional identity and their role as 
neutral, expert decision-makers was weakened in favour of a more flexible identity. In 
order to make use of all four of the different modes of participation, the public official 
would need to possess this kind of flexible professional self-identity that enables her to feel 
comfortable performing multiple roles with different relationships to the public. The 
neutral technocrat persona is appropriate for knowledge transfer activities, but does not sit 
well with the other participation modes. In the collective decision-making mode, the 
bureaucrat needs to become a deliberator on equal footing with the citizens involved in the 
process. In the choice and voice mode, the bureaucrat must play policy entrepreneur. In the 
arbitration and oversight mode, the most appropriate role for officials is as a neutral 
guardian of the legitimacy of the process.  
A number of the officials that took part in this research did implicitly have a 
multifaceted understanding of the role of the bureaucrat but this often resulted in cognitive 
dissonance. Only one participant, perhaps facilitated by previous experience as a 
community organiser, appeared to move effortlessly between identities as a neutral 
decision-maker weighing up interests, a convenor of collective conversations and a 
participant in such conversations. This may suggest that civil servants only need to be 
exposed to new ways of thinking in order to develop the required flexibility, however; this 
would be to oversimplify the task. Another two participants had previous experience 
working in civil society organisations that promote participation, yet rather than drawing 
on this experience to enable them to take on multiple roles they rejected their former-selves 
as naïve. This perhaps suggest that there is an institutional culture within the civil service 
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that mitigates against a plural self-understanding; a suggestion reinforced by the fact that 
the one flexible official frequently defined herself against the dominant institutional 
culture. It should also be remembered that the motivations of officials are complex and, 
like everybody else, are egoistic as well as public-spirited (Dunleavy 1991). The role of 
expert technocrat carries significantly more power and prestige than that of deliberative 
equal with the great, unwashed masses; thus officials may be expected to resist the latter in 
favour of the former.  
There are also genuine risks in changing these well-established institutional 
practices. Public statements by bureaucrats can lead to perceptions that they are 
compromised and partisan (Grube 2014). Once politicised, however, to attempt to regain 
credibility by retreating into impartiality is futile. It was described in Chapter 5 how the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) was perceived by some participants as 
implicated as a cause of poverty and stigma of poor people. DWP consultation processes 
were viewed as a sham that were not worth participants’ time, and their alleged refusal to 
take part in a participatory poverty initiative because it would be too political was seen as 
further confirmation of their politicised agenda. This highlights the need to think more 
creatively and flexibly regarding the relationship between public officials and citizens in 
order to improve the practice of participatory policy-making. The typology of four modes 
of participation can provide a starting point for this project. The DWP, for instance, would 
be well advised to adapt its participatory opportunities to recognise the distrust of its 
officials rather than persisting with a pure knowledge transfer approach that assumes trust. 
One way would be to add an oversight dimension in order to ensure accountability. 
The way that the participating public is conceptualised has received considerably 
more attention than the role of officials. It is common to make a distinction between 
whether the public participates as citizens or consumers (Cairncross, Clapham, and 
Goodlad 1997; Callaghan and Wistow 2006; Jung 2010). There are those who have argued 
in favour a conceptualization of the public as co-creators or co-producers (Cornwall and 
Gaventa 2001; Boyte 2005), and others who have documented the multiplicity of 
conceptions implied by different governance practices (Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan 
2007; Frederickson 1991).  This thesis does contribute an additional theoretical insight to 
the literature on this front. It is rare to see the public conceptualised as a neutral arbiter 
between interest groups, as is the case for the arbitration and oversight mode of 
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participation. Moreover, the alternative conceptions of the participant that accompany 
different modes of participation can also help us to recast some common issues in the 
practice of participation.  
Authorities often interpret the lack of enthusiasm for participation among many 
citizens, or certain groups of citizens, as meaning they are apathetic or hard-to-reach 
(Lowndes, Pratchett, and Stoker 2001) – the citizens themselves are problematized. Whilst 
this may seem appropriate logic for participatory spaces conceived as democratic 
opportunities, it appears less appropriate when they are conceived as knowledge transfer 
opportunities, whereby decision-makers invite the public to contribute their expertise. Few 
people would characterise a technical expert who spurned a vague invitation to share their 
expertise without recompense as apathetic or hard-to-reach. If we want ‘citizen experts’ to 
join knowledge transfer opportunities, perhaps they should be treated like any other kind of 
expert – flattered with personal invitations, even paid for their time. Direct invitations and 
other incentives have been advocated as a means for encouraging the participation of those 
who wouldn’t usually engage (Lowndes, Pratchett, and Stoker 2001), but the study 
participants who discussed this in interview saw them more as a demonstration of the value 
of their participation rather than as an incentive to participate. For certain types of 
participation there does appear to be a normative as well as an instrumental case for 
practices such as paying participants. 
The thesis, unlike much of the literature, does not make the argument that the 
public participating as citizens is preferable to participating as consumers, or that 
participating as co-producers is the best form of participation. Instead it proposes that 
heterogeneous participation opportunities would respect the heterogeneity of citizens. 
Some citizens on some issues may want deep and ongoing engagement in collective 
decision-making, as for instance in the Chicago community policing forums documented 
by Fung (2004). Other citizens (or even the same citizens on other issues) may simply want 
a convenient means for voicing some concerns to a trusted public organisation. Often 
different groups and different circumstances call for different types of participation 
(Lowndes, Pratchett, and Stoker 2001; Neblo 2015). Choice and voice type activities that 
are usually maligned by participation advocates are, for instance, a way to widely 
distribute power and influence to people without imposing heavy participation costs on 
participants. As such they may be particularly attractive to those with little time, or those 
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without confidence to engage in lengthy deliberations. Engaging those who distrust 
institutions in oversight activities may prove a more productive way to harness that distrust 
than forcing them to participate in more solidaristic processes. Designing a range of 
different interacting avenues of participation into a policy system, which take account of 
the different preferences that people have for participation, as well as their different 
personal circumstances, such as the time and confidence they possess, could therefore 
prove to be a means for addressing the perennial problem of how to make participation in 
governance more inclusive. 
Though it is important to be aware of agonistic modes of participation for use in 
agonistic contexts, the appetite for these forms of participation should not be 
overestimated. As aforementioned, the participants in this study mostly shunned agonism 
in favour of solidarism. Given the particular nature of the sample it is not possible to 
generalise this finding to the broader population, however; other research with 
representative population samples has found similar results. Much of the debate between 
stealth democracy and sunshine democracy has revolved around whether citizens have a 
preference for leaving decisions to elites but are mobilised to participate out of distrust for, 
or dissatisfaction with, contemporary institutions, or whether they have a preference for 
participation but are demobilised by their negative feelings about the status quo (Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse 2002; Neblo 2015). Neblo (2015) has shown that there is more evidence 
for the latter and that people’s willingness to participate in deliberate politics increases 
along with an increase in positive perceptions of institutions. If this preference for more 
solidaristic participation holds in general then this would constitute grounds for adopting 
what Parkinson has called ‘stepped pluralism’ (2012, 158). Solidaristic practices should be 
the default setting for attempts to institute participatory policy-making opportunities, only 
moving to agonistic practices if the specific context demands it.      
 
 
7.3 Directions for Future Research 
This research employed a novel mixed methods approach that provided a fresh 
perspective on the topic of procedural preferences by collecting quantitative and qualitative 
data from the same participants. The rich data this provided enabled a more in-depth 
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examination of the nature of procedural preferences that throws new light on some 
important questions in this field. It challenged the conceptualisation of procedural 
preferences as a generalised orientation towards either representative-led, citizen-led, or 
expert-led decision-making, demonstrating, for example, that such preferences were bound 
by context. Existing survey research on procedural preferences has often found evidence of 
ambivalence in preferences amongst a large number of people through the particular 
patterning of their survey responses, but has then only been able to speculate that this 
complexity is not simply measurement error (Bengtsson 2012; Font, Wojcieszak, and 
Navarro 2015; Neblo 2015). This research confirms that these findings are more likely a 
reflection of the dilemmatic nature of procedural preferences rather than random noise. 
They are indicative of understandable ambivalence on difficult questions, and reasonable 
preference complexity related to context. The research also began to describe the sources 
of this ambivalence, linking it to three of Merton’s (1976) six types of sociological 
ambivalence, as well as specific features of the context that influence preferences, such as 
the geographical level of decision-making or the particular type of policy issue. However, 
the aim of this study was to investigate the broad nature of preferences, not to provide a 
detailed map of all the sources of ambivalence and the ways that context binds preferences. 
Therefore, further research to comprehensively identify them would help develop 
understanding of the complexity of people’s preferences for their political and social 
institutions. 
The empirical findings from this PhD also suggest an avenue for explaining the 
complex relationship that has been discovered between people’s procedural preferences 
and their political actions (Bengtsson and Christensen 2016; P. Webb 2013). The 
interviews with some participants showed that the relationship between their preference for 
how institutions should work and their actual behaviour was mediated through their 
appraisal of how those institutions are working. Some of the participants who subscribed to 
the knowledge transfer approach to participation bemoaned that policy-makers had 
abdicated their responsibility to stand back, look at the bigger picture and make a fair 
decision, and it was this that had pushed them into more antagonistic activist campaigning. 
This notion that political behaviour is determined by ideal preference plus appraisal of 
reality has analytical purchase, and it is at the heart of the debate between stealth and 
sunshine democracy described above. In this case it has been conceived solely in terms of 
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mobilisation and demobilisation – negative appraisals of the status quo either drive people 
to or from participating (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Neblo 2015). However, the 
findings from this PhD were not so much a process of mobilisation or demobilisation but a 
process displacement of political activity from one sphere to another. People’s perceptions 
of existing institutions may play a more complex role in mediating between preferences 
and actions than influencing their willingness to participation. These perceptions may also 
affect the types of participation they engage in and further research could establish the 
prevalence of displacement of participation and whether there are other important effects 
of appraisals. This insight, as well as the findings on ambivalence, demonstrate the value 
of collecting both qualitative and quantitative data on the same person’s preference in 
order to fully understand this complex and multifaceted phenomenon. This combination is 
rarely pursued and future research should be mindful of the additional understanding it can 
bring. 
The empirical research conducted for this thesis attempted an in-depth exploration 
of ways that participatory policy-making can be understood, thus sampled a small but 
diverse group of key informants who were most adept to answer this question. This makes 
the research subject to the limitations of any research that is conducted with a small 
population of key informants. As it was undertaken with key informants involved with 
participatory policy-making in health, housing, poverty and social security policy in the 
UK, care must be taken when generalising the findings beyond this population. There are a 
number analytical reasons, however, for thinking that the findings may apply more broadly 
(see Section 2.34 for a full discussion of the strength of inferences from this research). 
Each of the four modes of participation are rooted in widespread ideas from democratic 
and public administration theory that are pervasive in many countries and policy domains. 
Still, further empirical research in different contexts would help to test whether the 
confidence in these analytical generalisations is warranted. The author has conducted a 
similar study in collaboration with Catherine Durose and Liz Richardson of key informants 
in a different UK policy context, local and neighbourhood governance, which has found 
comparable results. Work is also ongoing to replicate the study in the US in order to have a 
basis for cross-national comparison. A significant portion of the data collection has been 
completed without problems, suggesting that the ideas that underpin the Q-sort statements 
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translate to this context despite the quite different political tradition. Further research that 
replicated this approach in other contexts would be valuable. 
A further reason for sampling key informants was that the intensive nature of the 
Q-method approach meant it performed best with participants who had some knowledge of 
the subject. The key informants in this study do have important differences from other 
relevant populations. They comprise already active citizens who may have different views 
from those that are not participating, as well as civil servants with some interest in 
participation who may differ from their colleagues. The research could therefore be 
extended by recruiting broader samples of these populations. The piloting phase uncovered 
difficulties, however, when using this intensive process with a wider population. To extend 
the research, especially to a representative sample of the general public, would thus likely 
require some redesign to streamline the methods. The results from this study could help 
inform a less intensive survey since they demonstrate which kinds of propositions are most 
likely to identify differences in viewpoints. It is unlikely that a broader survey along these 
lines would result in the identification of new modes of participation, but it could address 
other important questions, such as the distribution of support for the different modes 
amongst officials and the general public, as well as comparing this to support for other 
non-participatory modes of decision-making. 
The purposive sampling approach to the recruitment for this research resulted in a 
diverse group of participants involved with participation in different policy areas in 
different ways. The small number of participants meant it would be premature to draw any 
robust conclusions from analysis of subgroups within the sample that this approach 
naturally created. There were, however, a number of differences between subgroups that 
merit further study. One noteworthy discovery from the research interviews is that distrust 
of institutions appeared more closely related to one’s position in social relations than to 
one’s normative view of participation. The participants in the study who were experiencing 
poverty or in receipt of social security benefits had little trust in policy-makers whether 
they favoured the collective decision-making or knowledge transfer modes of participation. 
In contrast, well-networked and more affluent participants favouring the collective 
decision-making approach, thus who may be expected to have some distrust of institutions 
that rarely function in this fashion, instead tended to have relatively high trust that public 
officials were trying their best to act in the public interest. It is not clear whether this is a 
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result of the current UK policy environment in which people with disabilities and/or 
experiencing poverty feel stigmatised and attacked by government, or is representative of  
a more permanent socio-economic gradient in institutional trust, which would challenge 
existing research that suggests political trust in Britain is not correlated with social group 
(Newton 1999). Establishing this finding more generally would have important 
consequences for the way participation exercises should be conducted. It would suggest 
that any institution that wants to engage in collaborative policy-making with disadvantaged 
people may find it prudent to rethink the role of the policy-maker in such exercises. It has 
already been noted how in the particular context of this study DWP attempts to present 
themselves as neutral functionaries fed into this distrust.  
Alongside the potential empirical extensions to the research agenda pursued 
throughout this thesis, there are also potential analytical extensions. The research has taken 
something of a deliberately naïve approach in focusing on ideal types of legitimate 
participation and how they can serve important, uncontroversial functions. There are those 
that have questioned the extent to which institutionalised participation is intended to realise 
such lofty ideals, or is instead more attractive as a process of governmentality aimed at 
regulating public conduct (Blakeley 2010; McKee and Cooper 2008). Participation in 
healthcare, housing and benefits policy has been viewed as an organisational practice that 
co-opts the agency of responsibilised citizens and civil society organisations, directing 
their conduct towards dominant stakeholders’ ends (Flint 2004; Gilliatt, Fenwick, and 
Alford 2000; Martin 2011). A concern with participation as a means for the public to 
understand the difficulties and agenda of professionals, to appropriately use health 
services, and to share responsibility for those services was apparent from NHS 
participation policy documents drawn on in the previous chapter (NHS England 2013; 
Royal College of General Practitioners 2014). Whether such practices constitute an abuse 
of participation is open to debate, but this thesis has remained silent on these issues. As 
emphasised throughout, the typology of four modes of participation provides a tool for 
assessing what genuinely is an abuse, as opposed to simply a form of participation that 
does not match one’s own normative standards but may be viewed as legitimate from 
within a different perspective. In addition, the typology might be used to illuminate 
particular dysfunctions that are associated with different modes of participation. The 
knowledge transfer mode for instance only functions when decision-makers have a genuine 
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regard for the information and expertise that is provided by the participants. It is 
particularly susceptible to abuse by disingenuous policy elites.  An ongoing collective 
decision-making procedure is not so vulnerable to this dysfunction, but is perhaps more 
prone to domination by a closed group of ‘super-participants’. The research is thus a 
potential point of departure for a deeper consideration of abuses of participation. 
The previous chapter outlined an approach for thinking systemically about 
participation in complex policy systems. It described the potential strengths of the 
approach and how different modes could serve different functions. Nonetheless, this work 
is still in the embryonic stages and could benefit from further elaboration of the different 
ways that alternative modes of participation can be combined to strengthen each other. It 
could also benefit from a consideration of its downsides; the potential risks and challenges 
that accompany a systemic approach. It is possible that the contradictory assumptions that 
underpin the different modes would work to undermine rather than strengthen each other. 
It has already been noted how it requires both citizens and officials to flexibly negotiate 
between different roles and relationships with one another. It is also possible that, whilst a 
systemic approach may be attractive in that the system can address multiple functions, the 
complexity of the system may render it opaque to the users of the particular participatory 
spaces that comprise the system, thus undercutting the perceived legitimacy of the 
individual spaces with their users.  
The author has observed this tension in the design of the NHS Citizen process, 
which has attempted to combine multiple, sequenced avenues for participation. It follows a 
cycle which begins with an open process of online and offline issue raising. These issues 
are then filtered through a citizens’ jury, which selects the five most important issues that 
will form the agenda for the NHS Citizens’ Assembly that marks the culmination of the 
cycle. The citizens’ jury was commissioned for the sound democratic reason that a closed, 
randomly selected group would enable minority concerns to be given equal weighting 
when compared to, say, an online voting process which would favour the issues with the 
largest constituency. Despite this, it was extremely poorly received by those who were 
already participating in the online discussion forum, as it was perceived to be a way for the 
process designers to exclude them and exert their control over the process.  A potential 
paradox of the systems approach, then, is that the pursuit of broad-based legitimacy at the 
macro-level may undermine perceived legitimacy at the micro-level. Further research is 
225 
 
 
thus likely to bear fruit in developing our academic understanding of how participation can 
function in complex policy systems, as well as yielding useful guidance for institutional 
designers on the promise and pitfalls of the systems approach. 
This thesis has remained silent on the distinction between face-to-face and digital 
participation. The invention of digital technologies has mostly been viewed as a boon for 
participatory organisation as a result of its potential to solve the significant problem of 
scale. Online participation means that huge numbers of people can participate in activities 
at low-cost to both the organisers and participants. It can enable people to easily access 
information, vote from their homes, or deliberate across geographical and temporal 
divides. Accordingly, many participation initiatives now take place online, or incorporate 
online elements (the NHS Citizen process just discussed is an example of the latter), often 
with great success. The Citizens Foundation, which developed the online participatory 
budgeting process for the city of Reykjavik in Iceland, for instance, reports that more than 
70,000 of the 120,000 inhabitants of the city have taken part in the process34. These 
technological changes have spawned specific typologies of models of digital democracy 
(Dahlberg 2011; Paivarinta and Sabo 2006). In addition, it has been argued that public 
administration is shifting towards ‘digital-era governance’ with its own particular logic of 
organisation (Dunleavy et al. 2006; Margetts and Dunleavy 2013). This poses the question 
of how far the four modes of participation in public administration appropriately reflect 
this new digital reality. 
Although online and offline participation can have important differences, it is 
unnecessary to have completely separate analytical schema to understand and analyse the 
two sides of this phenomenon. Models of digital democracy, for instance, have taken their 
cue from existing theories of liberal, deliberative and direct democracy (Dahlberg 2011; 
Paivarinta and Sabo 2006). Digital technologies provide institutions with new tools for 
addressing the problems of government, but it is questionable whether they transform the 
problems that government has to solve. The problem-based, systems approach becomes 
more relevant in the instance of complex participation processes that combine online and 
offline elements in order to unravel the functions of each component. Moreover, the four 
modes of participation can help make sense of digital-era trends. One of the attractions of 
                                                 
34 See: https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/12RZZG2M3sCYP7-
uBhpyI7MytzwLsumXgWcgfpxPewrY/edit#slide=id.g2a9cb345f_00. Accessed 5 May 2016. 
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the ‘open data’ movement has been that making government data easily accessible online 
would create opportunities for citizen audit, namely increase bottom-up participatory 
oversight of government. Some of the public officials that took part in this project 
emphasised this in their interviews, and Margetts and Dunleavy (2013) have attributed the 
closure of the UK Audit Commission to this claim. It has been argued throughout this 
thesis that the participation literature has paid little attention to more agonistic forms of 
participation such as oversight, yet open data may make this increasingly frequent and 
important. 
Other trends in digital government, particularly the growth of ‘big data’ analytics, 
may have important consequences for the way certain modes of participation are 
understood. It has been described how participation as voice is about revealing consumer 
preferences and that certain forms of knowledge transfer are necessary to reveal citizens’ 
needs and values. Big data holds out the possibility that asking people for this information 
could become redundant; their preferences may instead be inferred directly from their 
recorded behaviours. Institutions could engage in “pre-emptive needs analysis” (Margetts 
and Dunleavy 2013, 9) through real-time aggregation of healthcare or social security 
records. Sentiment analysis of social media conversations could realise the ambition of 
Mansbridge (1999) and Habermas (1996) that everyday political talk in a free-wheeling 
public sphere informs political decision-making. In addition, government by algorithm 
could reduce the spaces for collective decision-making. Consider, for instance, Fung’s 
(2001; 2004) descriptions of community policing in Chicago, where police and citizens 
engaged in deep and ongoing collaborations to collectively agree neighbourhood policing 
priorities that harnessed citizens’ knowledge of crime in their neighbourhoods. Are these 
kind of neighbourhood forums necessary in an age of ‘predictive policing’, where 
computers crunch crime statistics and distribute police officers accordingly, and when 
police forces have real-time systems that can listen for gun shots (Morozov 2013)? It is not 
impossible that the two could co-exist, but it is also easy to see technology replacing 
certain forms of participation, especially given the allure of new toys and the fact that 
interactions with citizens can be challenging and time-consuming. Another possibility is 
that participation is not completely replaced but is accommodated in specific ways. For 
instance, knowledge transfer processes may be employed in order to harness citizens’ 
expertise to solve problems of data interpretation, or to provide information on phenomena 
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that are not well captured by data collection. In order to reassert communal autonomy over 
government by big data, there could be a growth of collective decision-making spaces 
devoted to critiquing algorithms, identifying any implicit biases and ways they might be 
remedied. The modes of participation thus remain pertinent in the digital-era. Still, it would 
be a fruitful endeavour for future research to conduct an in-depth analysis of their relation 
to digital government and how they may be adapted to this new context, as well as the 
ways to combine online and offline participation to realise systemic functions. 
 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
This concluding chapter is being written shortly after arguably the most poorly 
conducted and traumatic attempt at participatory politics in recent UK history: the 
referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union. It would be tempting to see 
this event as confirmation that the public is best kept out of politics and policy-making. 
Decisions are best left to elites. There were prominent newspaper commentaries arguing 
just this even before the surprise result (Dawkins 2016; Mitchell 2016). If this were 
desirable, it is questionable whether it would be a realistic option given the rising tide of 
populism, as well as the plummeting trust in political institutions. On a more positive note, 
the EU referendum demonstrated the appetite of citizens to become involved in politics 
when they are given a chance to influence something that they think matters. The problem 
was that they were invited to participate in a process that was ill-conceived, poorly 
designed and conducted in bad faith. As such, the referendum is a demonstration of what 
happens when participation is conducted improperly, with little attention to likely wider 
systemic effects, rather than what must happen when the public participates. It reinforces 
the argument for careful thought in order to develop appropriate institutional designs for 
participatory policy-making. 
The four modes and three functions of participation provide such a framework for 
carefully reasoning through the difficult choices that have to be made when designing or 
taking part in participatory governance activities. The systemic approach goes beyond the 
radicalism and resignation of much of the existing literature, affording a means for 
assessing participation without committing to one contentious normative orientation to 
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political organising. The thesis provides some suggestions for how this new approach can 
help to improve the practice of participatory policy-making, particularly with regard to 
reconceptualising the roles of officials and citizens and the relationships between them. 
The research has employed a novel mixed methods approach to investigating procedural 
preferences that demonstrates the value of collecting qualitative and quantitative data on 
the same person’s preference in order to fully understand this multifaceted phenomenon. 
The findings add to existing empirical research on procedural preferences by 
demonstrating that ambivalent preferences are real and explainable, not just measurement 
error, and suggest fruitful avenues for future research on this subject, from the sources of 
ambivalence to a more nuanced comprehension of the relationship between procedural 
preferences and participatory behaviour. These theoretical and empirical insights therefore 
further the understanding of public participation in social policy in a number of ways that 
should be of interest to scholars of participatory governance as well as those involved with 
participatory policy-making activities.  
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Appendix 2: Coding Framework, Inductive Analysis of Documents 
1. OBJECTIVES OF PARTICIPATION  
1.1 Means for producing greater accountability  
1.1.1 Accountability through a market mechanism  
  1.1.2 Accountability through transparency  
  1.1.3 Accountability through public pressure  
  1.1.4 Accountability through face-to-face dialogue  
  1.1.5 Accountability through citizen monitoring of performance  
  1.1.6 Accountability of interest groups through transparent decision-making  
  1.1.7 Accountability of lower levels to higher levels of government  
1.2 Building trust in public institutions/public figures & improving relationships with the 
public   
 1.3 Maximise information available to decision-makers   
  1.3.1 Participation to capture lay expertise  
1.3.1.1 experiential knowledge from being on the receiving end of policy 
interventions 
   1.3.1.2 experiential knowledge of particular ways of life 
   1.3.1.3 different insights 
  1.3.2 Participation to capture public needs  
  1.3.3 Participation as market research/to capture public wants and demands  
  1.3.4 Participation to capture public values and opinion  
 1.4 Produce improved public inputs    
 1.5 Democratic renewal   
  1.5.1 More responsive representatives and  institutions  
  1.5.2 share decision power outside the elite  
  1.5.3 building trust in public institutions and representatives  
  1.5.4 Improved citizens  
  1.5.5 Reduced exclusion   
 1.6 Achieve responsiveness (to needs, wants, values)  
 1.6 Give the public/community a voice (voice can be in terms of needs, wants, values, or 
expertise)  
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 1.7 Transfer formal decision power to the public/communities   
 1.8 Radically transform society    
  1.8.1 Participation to achieve democratic self-government  
  1.8.2 Participation to remedy political/social exclusion  
 1.9 Challenge the powerful   
 1.10 Create a new relationship between public organisations and the public   
1.10.1 a relationship between an active, demanding citizenry and a listening, 
responsive state  
1.10.2 a partnership relationship, in which the state and citizens work together to 
solve intractable problems  
1.10.3 the 'Big Society' relationship in which the state does less but facilitates 
citizens to take on more active roles to provide services in their communities  
 1.11 Means to an end or an end in itself   
 1.12 Engage in collective deliberation   
 1.13 Improve decision outcomes   
  1.13.1 Improvement in substantive outcomes  
  1.13.2 Increase in outcome legitimacy  
 1.14 Improve process legitimacy   
  1.14.1 Individual process legitimacy  
  1.14.2 Wider system legitimacy  
 1.15 Legitimation tool   
 1.16 Participation as a right (Human right; citizenship right; consumer right)  
 1.17 Achieve empowerment   
  (See: Participation to transfer formal decision power to the public/communities)  
  (See: Accountability 1-5)  
  1.17.1 subjective feeling of empowerment within individuals  
  1.17.2 collective empowerment  
  1.17.3 community development  
 1.18 Educate and inform the public   
 1.19 Fulfilment of personhood   
 1.20 Participation to 'make a difference'   
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  1.20.1 the input of participants must affect the output of the decision process  
1.20.2 participation must add value when compared with non-participatory 
policy-making processes   
 1.21 Improve services   
 1.22 Resolve complex or controversial issues    
 1.23 Resolve conflicts between competing interests  
  1.23.1 Through public reason  
  1.23.2 Through arbritration  
    
2. CONCEPTIONS OF PARTICIPANT  
2.1 A Representative   
  2.1.1 selected representative  
  2.1.2 representative of an interest  
  2.1.3 representative of the population or some population characteristics  
  2.1.4 representative of ordinariness  
 2.2 Activists'/Unrepresentative   
  2.2.1 vested interests  
  2.2.2 awkward busybodies  
  2.2.3 Too well informed thus atypical of normal people  
 2.3 Adjudicators   
 2.4 Anti-hierarchy   
 2.5 Change-makers   
 2.6 Collective   
 2.7 Community   
 2.8 Consumers   
 2.9 Decision-makers   
 2.10 Demanding participation   
 2.11 Differentiated   
  2.11.1 Role differentiation  
  2.11.2 Social characteristics  
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 2.12 Experts   
  2.12.1 in our own needs/wants  
  2.12.2 with experiential knowledge of certain specialised areas  
  2.12.3 in areas where no-one can claim expertise  
 2.13 Impartial   
 2.14 In need of empowerment   
  2.14.1 to fully participate  
  2.14.2 to address their marginalisation  
 2.15 Individual and collective   
 2.16 Information units   
 2.17 Interest groups   
 2.18 Incentivised   
 2.19 Policy tool   
 2.20 Problem-solvers    
 2.21 Public reasoners   
 2.22 Realising full capabilities   
 2.23 Rights-holder   
 2.24 Self-determining   
 2.25 Self-governors   
 2.26 Self-reliant individuals/communities   
 2.27 Social   
 2.28 Stakeholders   
 2.29 Transform views vs aggregate preferences  
2.19.1 Malleable to changes in views  
  2.19.2 Fixed preferences  
    
3. CONCEPTIONS OF OFFICIAL PARTICIPANTS  
3.1 Authorities as leaders   
  3.1.1 Retain decision power  
  3.1.2 Example setters / community leaders  
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  3.1.3 Enablers / facilitators  
 3.2 Authorities as self-interested   
 3.3 Authorities as paternalistic   
 3.4 Authorities as ill-equipped   
    
4. CONCEPTIONS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUTHORITIES AND PARTICIPANTS  
4.1 Battle   
 4.2 Participants in charge   
 4.3 Partners   
 4.4 Personal   
    
5. CONCEPTIONS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS   
5.1 Conflictual   
 5.2 Equals   
 5.3 Mutually respectful   
    
6. PARTICIPATORY PRACTICES (MACRO-FEATURES) 
6.1 Individual vs collective   
  6.1.1 Individualised  
  6.1.2 collective empowerment  
 6.2 Public interest / Private interest / Transform views vs aggregate interests   
 6.3 Top-down vs bottom-up / Negotiation vs prescription   
  6.3.1 Initiation  
6.3.1.1 invited spaces 
   6.3.1.2 informal spaces 
   6.3.1.3 counter-publics 
  6.3.2 Definition of the participatory space.  
  6.3.4 Power and accountability  
  6.3.4 Subsidiarity / Geographical  
 6.4 Adjudication   
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 6.5 Bargaining by interest groups   
 6.6 Choice and Competition   
 6.6 Dialogue   
 6.7 Information process   
  6.7.1 Customer oriented  
  6.7.2 Expertise-led  
6.8 Independent   
 6.9 Partnership   
 6.10 Tailor forms   
    
7. MICRO-FEATURES OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES  
7.1 Accountability   
 7.2 Additional Support   
 7.3 Agenda-setting   
  7.3.1 Prescribed or negotiated  
  7.3.2 Individualised or collective 
  7.3.3 Narrow or broad  
  7.3.4 Fixed or changeable  
 7.4 Aggregation and Decision-making (Ouput)   
  7.4.1 Individualised or collective 
  7.4.2 By whom  
  7.4.3 Type (e.g. recommendations)  
 7.5 Communication medium   
  7.5.1 Individualised or collective 
  7.5.2 Type (e.g. face-to-face)  
  7.5.3 Direct or representative  
 7.6 Continuity of participation   
 7.7 Dissemination   
 7.8 Ground rules   
  7.8.1 Prescribed or negotiated  
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  7.8.2 Fixed or changeable  
  7.8.3 Permissible behaviour  
 7.9 Information provision   
 7.10 Participant selection   
  7.10.1 Open or restricted  
  7.10.2 Inclusive  
  7.10.3 Representative  
  7.10.4 Targeted  
  7.10.5 Prescribed or negotiated  
 7.11 Response type   
 7.12 Role differentiation   
  7.12.1 Prescribed or negotiated  
  7.12.2 Multiple publics  
  7.12.3 Professionalised vs laity  
 7.13 Transparent   
    
8. EVALUATION CRITERIA  
8.1 Accountability & Transparency   
  8.1.1 Representatives to represented  
  8.1.2 Process to wider public  
  8.1.3 Participants to sponsors  
  8.1.4 Sponsors to participants  
8.1.4.1 Clearly defined purpose 
   8.1.4.2 Honesty about limits 
   8.1.4.3 Transparency about influence on decisions 
 8.2 Agenda-based/Objectives-focused   
  8.2.1 Achieves intended purpose(s)  
  8.2.2 Achieves purpose(s) efficiently  
  8.2.3 Most effective means of achieving purpose(s)  
  8.2.4 Appropriate participant selection  
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 8.3 Beyond evaluation   
 8.4 Clearly defined purpose   
 8.5 Conflict resolution   
 8.6 Cost-effectiveness   
 8.7 Counterfactual effectiveness   
 8.8 Decision Legitimacy   
  8.8.1 Outcome oriented  
  8.8.2 Process oriented  
 8.9 Decision quality   
 8.10 Dialogue Quality   
8.10.1 the extent to which the different participants (and participants and 
sponsors) genuinely engage with one another  
8.10.2 the extent to which participants (and participants and sponsors) are 
mutually respectful to another  
8.10.3 the extent to which everyone has a full chance speak and be heard and no 
points of view are excluded  
8.10.4 the extent to which participants (and participants and sponsors) are open 
and honest with each other  
8.10.5 the extent to which all options are interrogated and participants do not 
satisfice  
8.10.6 the objectivity, completeness and accessibility of any information provided 
to inform the dialogue  
 8.11 Dissemination   
 8.12 Early Involvement   
 8.13 Fairness   
  8.13.1 who participates  
  8.13.2 the agenda-setting  
  8.13.3 information provided  
  8.13.4 the ways that participants interact  
  8.13.5 the decision-making procedure  
 8.14 Honesty about impact   
 8.15 Impact (on outcomes)   
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 8.16 Improved citizens   
  8.16.1 increased skills for democratic participation  
8.16.2 Greater trust in the political system and public organisations and decision-
makers   
8.16.3 Greater trust in other citizens, closer bonds with other citizens and the 
ability to recognise the perspectives of others  
 8.17 Inclusive   
 8.18 Increased understanding   
  8.18.1 Of participants  
  8.18.2 Of the general public  
  8.18.3 Of sponsors  
 8.14 Independence/Autonomy   
 8.15 Influence on policy decisions   
 8.16 Institutional coordination   
 8.17 Mutual understanding   
 8.18 Negotiated by participants  
 8.19 Open to all   
 8.20 Other-oriented   
 8.21 Output quality   
 8.22 Output use   
 8.23 Participant control  
 8.24 Participant satisfaction   
 8.25 Sponsor satisfaction   
 8.26 Participant-oriented   
 8.27 Participation rate   
 8.28 Policy quality   
 8.29 Process legitimacy   
  8.29.1 Fairness  
  8.29.2 Appropriateness  
 8.30 Representativeness   
  8.31 Of participants  
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  8.32 Of dialogue/arguments  
 8.31 Subjective empowerment   
 8.32 Sufficient resources   
 8.33 System legitimacy   
    
9. EVALUATION DEBATES  
9.1 Outcome vs process  
 9.2 Trade-offs   
 9.3 Universal or specific  
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire 
 
I would like to collect some information about you and your involvement in participation 
initiatives to assist with comparisons with other participants in this research project. 
Please answer the following questions/statements. 
 
I am usually involved in public participation initiatives as: 
 
I have not participated in any way 
A member of the public 
A user of public services 
An academic 
A civil servant 
A politician 
An employee of a public service organisation 
An employee of a third sector organisation 
A member of an interest group (e.g. patient group) 
A participant in a social movement 
Other (please state): 
 
My role in participation initiatives is: 
 
Voluntary 
Professional 
Not applicable 
 
My role in participation initiatives is primarily as: 
 
A participant 
An expert 
An organiser/facilitator/manager 
A commissioner 
A user of the outputs 
Other (please state): 
Not applicable 
 
In what policy sector have you been involved in participatory policy-making?   
 
Health 
Housing 
Local government 
Social security 
Social exclusion 
Other (please state): 
Not applicable 
 
Please mark on the line how often you are involved in participation initiatives: 
 
 
 
Never involved         Continuously involved 
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Sex:    Male  
   Female 
 
 
Age:    
 
 
What is your ethnic group? 
 
 
 
 
What is your highest level of educational qualification? 
 
 No qualifications 
 Secondary education (e.g. GCSEs/O-levels) 
 Further education (e.g. A-levels/vocational equivalent) 
 Higher education (e.g. Degree or higher) 
 
 
Please indicate your approximate pre-tax, personal income over the previous year: 
 
 less than £14,999 
 £15,000 - £24,999 
 £25,000 - £34,999 
 £35,000 - £49,999 
 More than £50,000 
 Don't know 
 Don't want to answer 
 
 
If there was a general election tomorrow who would you vote for? 
 
 Conservatives 
 Green Party 
 Labour 
 Liberal Democrats 
 Plaid Cymru 
 Scottish National Party 
 UKIP 
 Other (please state): 
 I would not vote 
 I don't want to answer 
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Appendix 4: Consent Form 
 
Before you agree to participate in this research it is important that you understand what 
your participation will involve. If you have any questions about the research, or if anything 
is unclear, please do not hesitate to ask. 
 
What do I have to do to take part? 
This project attempts to better understand people's opinions about public participation in 
policy-making. If you choose to participate, it will involve two things. First, you will be 
asked to sort some cards that contain common statements about public participation in 
the policy process based on whether you agree or disagree with them, and the final order 
you choose will be recorded. You will then be interviewed about your thoughts on public 
participation and the sorting process you have just completed. If you agree, the process 
will be audio recorded in order to increase the accuracy of analysis. The duration of your 
involvement depends on how much time you wish to spend sorting the statements. 
 
What happens to the information I provide? 
Any information you provide will be kept confidential and will only be used for the 
purposes of the research study. Information that could be used to identify you will be 
removed from the data. The results of this research will be written-up as a Ph.D. thesis 
and as academic papers, however; you will not be identified in these publications and your 
anonymity will be protected. 
 
Another person/organisation recommended I participate in this research. How will 
my participation affect my relationship with that person/organisation? 
If you have been put in contact with the researcher by another person/organisation, your 
participation will not affect your relationship with this person/organisation. It will not be 
held against you if you choose not to participate. Any data you provide will not be 
discussed with this person/organisation. 
 
Can I withdraw from the research? 
You are free to withdraw from the research at any time without giving a reason. If you 
have any reservations or questions you would like to discuss with the researcher, you can 
use the following contact details: r.j.dean@lse.ac.uk or +44 (0)7947 835 604. 
 
Please sign below to confirm that you agree to participate. 
 
 
 
Signature: 
 
 
 
Print name:        Date: 
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